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Abstract 
Collaborative governance- or collaboration- has become increasingly important for the 
design and implementation of public policy in the United States.  This dissertation explores 
concrete and unique policy-related benefits emerging from collaboration, and the processes by 
which they emerge. 
Collaboration is defined broadly as “any interaction between two or more organizations 
undertaken with the intention to cooperate.” This definition is applied in the context of water 
quality management, where the physical nature of watersheds and the lack of regulatory 
authority available to policy-makers leads to a variety of collaborative arrangements.  
A survey of literatures addressing collaboration from different theoretical angles revealed 
five concrete, policy-related benefits of collaboration: 1) resource access/exchange, 2) innovation 
generation, 3) coordinated action, 4) working relationships built through social capital, and 5) 
reduction/resolution of conflict. A rich empirical dataset was developed to explore these benefits, 
utilizing one large case (the Chesapeake Bay watershed restoration) and one smaller case 
embedded in the first (water quality management in the Northern Virginia, or NOVA, region). 
Key data sources included 1081 Bay Journal newspaper articles and 86 hours of audio 
interviews. Coding revealed 456 instances in which collaboration led to one of the five benefits, 
including 243 instances of resource exchange/access, 99 instances of coordinated action, 62 
instances of working relationships developed through social capital, 28 instances of innovation 
generation, and 24 instances of conflict resolution.  
The analysis in this dissertation focuses on the 99 empirical instances of coordinated 
action. A process common to all instances, called “Harmonizing”, is identified and described. 
Harmonizing occurs when organizations address a shared problem at a scale that approaches the 
actual scale or scope of the problem. Chapter 5 features an original typology of harmonizing 
based on the type of “problem landscape” over which organizational actions are harmonized: 
geographical, organizational, or ecological. Chapter 6 describes how harmonizing solves three 
types of “boundary” problems common to many policy areas (not just water quality 
management) and results in more holistic and efficient policy-making by avoiding the pitfalls of 
duplication, divergence, omission, and counter-production (Huxham and MacDonald 1992).  
The context of collaboration is explored by applying three contextual codes to the data: 1) 
the types of groups collaborating, 2) the collaborative forum, and 3) the policy area in which 
collaboration occurs. A key contextual finding is that certain collaborative forums – particularly 
coordinating organizations– facilitate harmonizing under difficult conditions. A thematic 
analysis of the role of coordinating organizations, utilizing a broader spectrum of data, revealed 
in more detail the roles that coordinating organizations play in overcoming obstacles to 
collaboration such as competition, parochial perspectives, and accountability concerns.  
The greatest contributions of this dissertation relate to the benefit of coordinated action. 
However, a thematic analysis (presented in Chapter 8) uses empirical data to describe the other 
four benefits and processes by which they emerge. It is found that resource exchange generates 
benefits at the community level – not just at the organizational level as implied by resource 
exchange theory— by expanding the overall resource base and improving organizations’ 
collective ability to act. Another key finding is that including perceived “naysayers” in the 
decision process helps to prevent innovations from being squashed, by forcing a serious 
conversation about perceived versus real obstacles.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction and justification for research 
 
Collaborative governance- or collaboration- has become increasingly important for the design 
and implementation of public policy in the United States.  For many government agencies, 
collaboration is a primary strategy for coping with the realities of the policy process: overlapping 
jurisdictions, dispersed expertise, complex and shifting problems, and scarce resources.  
Although collaboration in government is not a new phenomenon, scholarship on 
collaboration has expanded considerably over the past fifteen years in the public policy and 
public management fields. Some scholars believe that collaborative governance represents a new 
management “paradigm” that has replaced the bureaucratic paradigm (e.g. Goldsmith and Eggers 
2004, Kettl 2002). Many extol the virtues of collaboration, describing advantages for 
collaborating organizations and for the policy process in general. Advantages to individual 
government agencies may include access to financial or technical resources, greater political 
legitimacy, and greater access to client groups. For the policy process in general, collaboration 
may increase flexibility and adaptability, promote higher levels of information exchange and 
better communication among organizations, and encourage organizations to pool resources 
towards achieving common goals. Beyond process, some scholars believe that collaboration will 
lead to improved substantive policy outcomes- such as more effective government programs (e.g. 
Selden, Sowa, and Sandfort 2006, Jennings and Ewalt 1998). Other scholars focus on the 
secondary benefits of collaboration, such as increased social capital and trust, personal 
transformations, reduction of conflict among collaborating parties, and mutual learning (e.g. 
Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000, Connick and Innes 2003).   
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Many promises have been made about collaboration. Meanwhile, insufficient effort has 
gone into describing the outcomes of collaboration and evaluating whether it improves policy or 
produces value beyond what is possible when organizations work alone. This research identifies 
and describes concrete benefits of the collaborative process.  In addition, I examine processes or 
mechanisms by which collaboration produces benefits and the conditions under which benefits 
are produced. Specific questions that guide this research are: 
1) What key concrete, policy-related benefits can be attributed to collaboration? 1 
2) What are the process/mechanisms unique to collaboration that bring about these 
benefits?  
3) How do key contextual variables (in particular: policy area, actors involved in 
collaboration, and collaborative forum) affect the type of benefit(s) that emerge from 
each collaborative process/mechanism?  
 
I identify and describe five benefits of collaboration in this dissertation: coordinated action, 
resource access/exchange, innovation, reduced conflict, and working relationships created 
through social capital. My most significant contribution, however, relates to the coordinated 
action benefit. I introduce an original concept – a process called Harmonizing – by which 
independent organizations address a shared problem at a scale that more appropriately fits with 
the actual scope of the problem. By harmonizing at the appropriate scale, decisions and actions 
                                                             
1 This research focuses on the benefits, and not the costs, of collaboration. Leaving costs out of my analysis was a 
conscious, strategic decision based on my review of the literature. Literature on benefits of collaboration is 
voluminous but fragmented. The sheer volume of scholarly work done on collaborative benefits, which utilizes 
various theoretical bases, meant it was possible to collect enough scholarly work to develop research propositions. 
The fragmented state of the literature on collaborative benefits indicates that it is an appropriate time to organize, 
streamline, and integrate existing scholarship into a defined list of benefits, and explore them empirically. Scholarly 
work on costs of collaboration, on the other hand, is limited. Scholars talk about how collaboration is time-
consuming and expensive, and about the loss of autonomy or the fear of releasing proprietary information. But most 
of the public management literature addresses obstacles to achieving collaboration rather than costs.  There is not yet 
a sufficient volume of literature on which to base a conceptual development project. 
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of independent organizations make sense from a broad, comprehensive, or holistic perspective. 
There are also gains in efficiency (through reduction in redundancy, goal divergence, and 
counter-production) and benefits related to standardization of policies. My analysis of the 
harmonizing concept and the benefits produced by harmonizing is the focus of three of my four 
empirical chapters.  
In this introductory chapter, I provide a definition of collaboration, justify my research 
goals, and describe gaps in the literature that I am filling. In Chapter 2, I introduce key 
information on water quality management, the policy context selected for my research. Chapter 3 
is devoted to a survey of various literatures from which I identify eight benefits of collaboration, 
five of which are pursued in my empirical analysis. In Chapter 4, I describe my methods and 
cases. Chapters 5 through 7 are devoted to the benefit of coordinated action, and in particular the 
harmonizing concept. In Chapter 5, I introduce the harmonizing concept and my original 
typology. In Chapter 6, I explain how different harmonizing types solve problems common to 
many policy areas, not just water quality, and describe the efficiency and standardization 
benefits. In Chapter 7, I analyze the context in which harmonizing occurs and conduct a broader 
analysis of the role of coordinating organizations in achieving successful collaboration under 
difficult conditions. In Chapter 8, I conduct an analysis for the other four benefits of 
collaboration, pulling out key themes and findings. Chapter 9 is a conclusion, in which I discuss 
my contributions, the limitations of my research, and future research plans.  
I explore my research questions in the context of water quality management, focusing on 
two cases:  1) the Chesapeake Bay restoration, a collaborative partnership among six states, the 
District of Columbia, U.S. EPA and the Chesapeake Bay Commission and 2) watershed 
management and related activities in Northern Virginia, a region physically embedded with the 
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Chesapeake Bay watershed.  These cases guide data collection, which includes 86 hours of in-
depth interviews and 1,081 news articles. Coding this data results in 456 “instances” of 
collaboration where one of the five key benefits of collaboration occurred. Qualitative analysis 
methods applied to this database of “instances” of collaboration– such as sorting, categorizing, 
and thematic analysis – result in in-depth conceptual development on the coordinated action 
benefit and a series of key themes for the other four benefits. In addition, I conduct an analysis of 
co-occurring codes to examine the context in which the benefit of coordinated action occurs.  
Note that although this research uses a rich, carefully constructed empirical dataset, my 
contributions are towards theory-building rather than hypothesis-testing. I develop robust 
concepts— particularly the concept of harmonizing— through structured analysis of my 
empirical data. Harmonizing and other ideas may serve as unifying concepts for collaboration 
and may be applied to studies of collaboration’s outcomes by future researchers; I provide 
specific research questions and hypotheses in the conclusion.  Harmonizing may also be applied 
by practitioners of collaboration to improve policy outcomes.   
 
Defining collaboration  
Collaboration is conceptualized in a wide variety of ways by scholars drawing upon different 
literatures and different theoretical bases. This “conceptual stretching” (O’Leary and Vij 2012, 
pp. 11) means it is important to clarify my own definition: 
  
“Collaboration is any interaction between two or more organizations undertaken with 
the intention to cooperate.” 
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My definition was inspired by Bardach’s straightforward definition of collaboration as “any joint 
activity by two or more agencies that is intended to increase public value by their working 
together rather than separately (Bardach 1998, 8)”. Changes made to Bardach’s definition are 
aimed at broadening the concept. For instance, I replace “agencies” with “organizations” to 
clarify that collaboration may occur between non-government actors. I also replace “joint 
activity by” with “interaction between”, which assumes nothing about the content of a 
collaborative relationship. Under my definition, “interaction” requires that representatives of the 
parties engage in direct communication, whether in person or via phone or email.  Other joint 
activities are likely, but not necessary.  
An important change was removing the “intention to increase public value” clause of 
Bardach’s definition. I prefer to maintain a neutral, inclusive definition of collaboration and look 
for public value creation during empirical analysis. Including expectations of public value 
creation may unintentionally bias findings. In any case, intending to create public value is not 
necessarily a prelude to creating public value. Organizations coordinating by chance or for 
selfish reasons could end up producing public benefits, while organizations intending to produce 
public benefits could fail.  
I replaced the “public value” clause with one that requires parties to interact with the 
intent to cooperate. My definition does not include interactions that are fully adversarial by 
design and in practice, like one organization suing another.  Actual cooperation is not a 
requirement. However, collaboration most often involves a mixture of adversarial and 
cooperative interactions. 
 
Key aspects of my definition 
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I define collaboration as occurring between organizations rather than individuals. Of course, 
actual interactions occur between individuals; but studying inter-organizational coordination 
requires the assumption that individuals represent their respective organizations during the 
collaborative process.    
Second, collaboration occurs among all different types of organizations, including private 
sector, government, non-profits, and citizens groups. Because of my policy focus, government 
often plays a central role in collaboration, but this is not a defining characteristic. With this 
inclusive definition, I capture a broad diversity of collaborative arrangements. It is presumed that 
collaborative processes occur in a variety of contexts, including among non-governmental 
organizations. Limiting my definition at the outset is not conducive to theory building. 
Third, my definition is “structural”; the basic defining aspect is organizations forming 
linkages with each other.  A structural definition imposes no requirements regarding what the 
organizations do or talk about (content), how the interaction came about (origin), or the outcome 
of the interaction. A structural definition is uncomplicated, making collaboration distinguishable 
with a minimum of information and allowing me to code hundreds of “micro” instances of 
collaboration in my data. A structural definition also meets my theory-building objectives by 
capturing a wide variety of inter-organizational relationships. 
Fourth, collaboration is emotionally “neutral”. I make no assumptions that collaboration 
occurs in a positive atmosphere or generates positive emotional connections. Even civility is not 
a requirement, since many inter-organizational interactions involve conflict. An emotionally 
neutral definition avoids a-priori assumptions about the “goodness” of collaboration, leaving the 
task of evaluating benefits of collaboration to empirical analysis.  
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Justification of definitional breadth  
My “structural and neutral” definition of collaboration is broad and inclusive.2  This means 
instances of collaboration in my data range enormously in terms of importance, scale, actors, and 
context. Maintaining such a broad scope was a conscious decision. The purpose of my study is to 
build theory about collaborative benefits, which requires identifying a wide variety of examples 
for each benefit.  
 A coding example will illustrate this point. Rather than group collaborative arrangements 
by contextual variables like policy area, actors, or case, I group primarily by the benefit 
provided. Thus, my primary codes are benefits like: “Coordinated Action”, “Resource 
Exchange”, and “Innovation”. Collaborative arrangements under each primary code are diverse. 
For example, here are two instances coded with “Overcoming Resource Constraints”, a sub-code 
of Resource Exchange: 
1) Under the guidance of a regional non-profit organization, citizen groups collected 
hardwood seeds which will later be used by State environmental agencies for the 
purpose of growing trees to be planted in streamside buffers. This overcame a key 
resource constraint for the State environmental agencies because they do not have the 
staff-time for this activity.   
                                                             
2 Although my definition is very inclusive, note that there are three varieties of inter-organizational interaction I 
specifically exclude. First, although both conflict and power imbalances are natural and normal parts of 
collaboration, I exclude relationships that are purely adversarial by design and practice, such as one organization 
suing another. Similarly, I exclude relationships purely based on exertion of power or situations where actions are 
forced by law, such as enforcement actions on private or nonprofit parties by regulatory agencies (note that this is 
also specifically excluded by Hardy, Phillips, and Lawrence 2003). These interactions offer no space or opportunity 
for two-way collaboration.  Second, I exclude inter-organizational relationships based on formal contracts where 
money is exchanged for goods or services. The addition of a legal, contractual relationship for pay significantly 
changes relationships and distorts my description of collaborative benefits. Other scholars have made a similar 
exclusion (e.g. Hardy, Phillips, and Lawrence 2003, Gazley and Brudney 2007). Finally, I exclude mergers of 
organizations that used to be formally independent (Gazley and Brudney 2007), such as joint ventures. In these 
cases, the organizations are no longer autonomous within the joint venture, so inter-organizational coordination does 
not apply.    
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2) NASA officially joined the Chesapeake Bay Program as a partner. This overcomes a 
key resource constraint by making satellite data available for assessing Bay 
conditions. 
 
These two instances meet the criteria of “Overcoming Resource Constraints” although the scale 
of the collaborative arrangement, the type of resource provided, and the types of organizations 
involved are very different.  The common denominator is the concept itself.  In this research, my 
focus is on these concepts (the “collaborative benefits”). 
 My process is to collect disparate “snapshots” of each collaborative benefit. Using 
descriptive and typological analysis, I sort, describe, and display these snapshots to build theory. 
Drawing upon a wide variety of collaborative arrangements, from the most interpersonal and 
intense to the most superficial and cursory, increases the generalizability of the concepts and the 
applicability of the study.  
 
Defining concrete, policy-related benefits 
My research questions specify that I am interested in “concrete, policy-related benefits” of 
collaboration. By “concrete”, I mean benefits with a clear output that can be measured. This 
excludes vague outcomes like “developing a shared understanding” or “trust-building” or 
“change in attitudes”. Although these outcomes may be important, their ultimate result is 
uncertain. Innes and Booher (1999) argue that “intangible” outcomes eventually generate 
tangible second- and third-order effects such as spin-off partnerships. However, one can never be 
sure whether tangible effects resulted from the original collaborations, since the pathways are 
impossible to disentangle (Innes and Booher 1999, Connick and Innes 2003). 
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“Policy-related benefits” are benefits that make policy more effective, efficient, or 
equitable in some concrete way. Further, these benefits must accrue at the community or societal 
level. Provan and Milward (2001) define community-level benefits based on the effectiveness 
and efficiency with which the local community and its clients are served. This fits well for my 
research, since the collaborative arrangements I study aim to improve policies at scales ranging 
from local communities to the regional level.  However, I add “societal level” to indicate benefits 
may accrue, intentionally or not, to the larger society. A focus on community/societal level 
benefits means that I do not address benefits accruing at the personal, organizational, or 
“network” level.  Personal-level and organizational-level benefits have only a tangential or 
indirect connection to better policy.  “Network” level benefits, as defined by Provan and 
Milward (2001) and others, improve the quality or functioning of an organizational network but 
have little direct connection to better policy. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I justify my research by describing gaps in the literature 
that I aim to address.  
 
Justification of research  
My ultimate research goal –my long term research agenda- is to evaluate collaboration as a 
management strategy. It is critical to know whether collaboration creates and distributes quality 
public benefits at a reasonable cost to society, since scarce public funding should be allocated as 
efficiently as possible (Provan and Milward 1995 and 2001). In addition, collaboration is often 
mandated or strongly encouraged by government because of the multiple benefits it is presumed 
to create, even without hard evidence of these benefits (Chen 2008, Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 
2006). Public officials who manage collaborative arrangements, service providers who 
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participate, clients who receive services, and taxpayers who fund the operation need to know 
whether collaboration is effective, and how effectiveness can be maximized (Kenis and Provan 
2009).  
Further, it is a common perception that collaboration is costly. Major costs of 
collaboration identified in the literature include transaction costs, especially time (e.g. Barringer 
and Harrison 2000, Alter and Hage 1993), the loss of organizational autonomy (e.g. Chen 2008, 
Huxham and McDonald 1992) and of proprietary information (e.g. Barringer and Harrison 
2000), the inability for organizations to take credit (e.g. Huxham and McDonald 1992, Lasker, 
Weiss, and Miller 2001), and “lowest common denominator” agreements that do not address 
underlying conflicts (e.g. Layzer 2008). When collaboration is focused on decision-making via 
consensus among stakeholders, some scholars worry that traditional channels of representative 
democracy are undermined (e.g. Manring 2005, Walker and Hurley 2004) or that collaboration 
produces “symbolic policy” that reduces demand for political change without eliminating the 
undesirable social or environmental conditions that prompted it (Lubell 2004a; Rodríguez, et al 
2007). If collaboration is costly, it should not be used blindly or thoughtlessly. In a memorable 
passage, Huxham (2003) argues that because of the significant costs, it is best to avoid 
collaboration unless the potential for “collaborative advantage” is clear and strong:  
 
“making collaboration work effectively is highly resource consuming and often painful. 
My strongest piece of advice to practitioners, therefore, is ‘don’t do it unless you have 
to’. Put rather more formally, the argument is that unless the potential for real 
collaborative advantage is clear, it is generally best, if there is any choice, to avoid 
collaboration (pp. 420-421).” 
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Although my ultimate research goal is evaluation of collaboration, my literature survey indicates 
we are not yet ready. Evaluative frameworks already developed lack conceptual depth in their 
depiction and operationalization of the benefits and costs of collaboration (e.g. Innes and Booher 
1999, Provan and Milward 2001, Agranoff 2008). In fact, the literature on collaboration as a 
whole lacks conceptual development on the outcomes of collaboration, particularly the benefits 
of collaboration.3  Without truly understanding which benefits can be expected from 
collaboration, how collaboration is uniquely poised to produce these benefits, and how these 
benefits are manifested empirically, it is difficult to design an evaluative framework.  
I find from my review of the literature that outcomes of collaboration remain 
conceptually under-developed because scholars are narrowly focused on other aspects of 
collaboration, such as the dynamics of collaboration, antecedents to collaboration, determinants 
of collaborative success, or demonstrating causal relationships between collaboration and 
outcomes. I describe these issues below, and explain how they lead to a gap in the literature 
filled through this research project.   
 
Literature issue #1: Focus on dynamics of collaboration, rather than outcomes 
A fascination with collaboration as a form of organizing, especially the “collaborative network”, 
has led some scholars to focus on dynamics of collaboration and lose sight of effectiveness 
(Rogers and Weber 2010; Turrini, et al 2009). Network structure is one popular area of study. 
Although in its simplest form a network is just organizational “nodes” connected by “links” or 
“ties”, descriptions of network sub-structures and structural characteristics have become 
                                                             
3 Key costs of collaboration, like time, money, and loss of proprietary information, are more self-explanatory than 
benefits and less in need of conceptual development.  
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complex. Scholars describe the position of organizations in the network, using concepts like 
“centrality” and “multiplexity”, and use this as a proxy for power or legitimacy. Other scholars 
focus on network-level structures, such as “cliques” or “structural holes”, or network-level 
characteristics like “density” of ties, “fragmentation”, and “centralization” (See Provan, Fish, 
and Sydow 2007, pp. 484-486 for summaries of these network position and network structural 
characteristics). Network analysis software, which allows for mapping and measurement of 
network characteristics, has facilitated and encouraged the exploration of network structure. 
Although this line of research is fruitful in terms of describing network relationships, it detracts 
scholarly attention away from questions of effectiveness and outcomes.  
Other scholars have focused on governance of collaborative networks. For instance, a 
typology developed by Provan and Kenis (2008) describes three types of network governance: 
shared participant governance, lead organization governance, and governance by a “network 
administrative organization”, or NAO. Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti (1997) describe 
conceptually how structural embedded relationships among organizations provide the foundation 
for social mechanisms -- macroculture, restricted access, collective sanctions, and reputations—
to arise, which in turn allows network governance to emerge and thrive. Ostrom (1990) has done 
more general work on the role of rules, norms, and collective sanctions in structuring 
relationships towards the management of shared natural resources.  To the extent that these 
studies relate network governance to policy effectiveness, they contribute to our understanding 
of outcomes. Yet, scholars tend to focus on description of governance structures/processes 
themselves or their effect on network-level outcomes such as cohesion and ability to retain 
members, rather than external effects on the community or society (Provan and Milward 2001).   
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Other scholars study the management of collaborative networks. Agranoff (2006), for 
instance, provides ten lessons for public managers working within inter-organizational networks.  
A literature review and conceptual paper by McGuire (2006) frames most issues in terms of 
network management and includes a section specifically for managers.  Two edited volumes are 
aimed explicitly at helping public managers navigate the waters of collaboration and 
collaborative networks: O’Leary and Bingham (2009) and Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan (1997). 
Like governance, these studies are useful to the extent that they link management to policy 
outcomes. Yet policy outcomes often take a backseat to description of management challenges 
and development of management tools applicable to the collaborative environment.   
 
Literature issue #2: Focus on antecedents rather than outcomes 
Another limitation of the literature is a focus on antecedents of collaboration rather than 
outcomes (Chen 2008).  Antecedents may be framed as motivations for organizations to 
participate in collaboration, expected benefits of collaboration, or factors that predict the 
emergence of collaboration (e.g. Gazley and Brudney 2007, Shaw 2003, Oliver 1990, Fleishman 
2009). The study of antecedents is useful and valid, but problems arise when antecedents are 
confused with effects:  when motivations to collaborate are conflated with benefits, and, 
conversely, obstacles to collaboration conflated with costs. Generally, this occurs due to sloppy 
terminology rather than conceptual errors. For instance, Gazley and Brudney (2007) start out 
talking about “advantages and disadvantages” of collaboration (i.e. benefits and costs) but their 
survey questions and discussion of results indicate their real focus is on motivations and 
disincentives to collaborate.  Similarly, Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti (1997) aim to explain the 
“comparative advantage of network governance”, yet their propositions focus on conditions that 
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allow network governance to “emerge and thrive”.  In both cases, the end product is 
collaboration itself rather than its benefits.  
Conflation of motivations with benefits (and obstacles with costs) is understandable 
because they are endogenous. Organizations are motivated to collaborate by expected benefits, 
and deterred by expected costs. If benefits are actually produced, and costs avoided, the desire to 
collaborate strengthens. Brass, et al 2004 (p. 809) recognize this reciprocal relationship in their 
literature review, yet make an effort to distinguish between “antecedents” and “consequences” of 
collaboration and maintain this distinction even with significant empirical overlap. It is important 
to follow their lead. After all, organizations may collaborate based on expected benefits that do 
not materialize, or may realize benefits that were not expected.  
 
Literature issue #3: Focus on causal relationships rather than specification of outcomes 
Conceptual development of outcomes of collaboration has been hindered by the scholarly focus 
on causal relationships. Scholars have moved quickly to the task of identifying and testing 
determinants of successful collaboration, even as the definition of success is under-theorized.  
Kenis and Provan (2009) describe this problem, but it is not a new concern.  In fact, they draw 
upon decades-old research by Yuchtman and Seashore (1967) to illustrate their point: 
“Another deficiency is that in many studies the concept of network performance is poorly 
specified. In 1967, Yuchtman and Seashore commented that ‘Most of the study [of 
effectiveness] has been devoted to the conditions under which organizations are more or 
less effective’ (1967, p. 891; emphasis in original) and that ‘. . . little attention, however, 
has been given to the concept of effectiveness itself. The later remains conceptually a 
vague construct . . .’ (1967, p. 891).” (Kenis and Provan 2009, pp. 441-442) 
 
Kenis and Provan (2009, pp. 442) urge scholars to “properly define or operationalize” their 
effectiveness criteria when evaluating collaboration. My concern is more foundational, which is 
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that the dependent variable (outcomes of collaboration) is underdeveloped. The focus on 
“success factors” glosses over important theoretical and conceptual questions about the unique 
benefits and costs expected from collaboration.  
“Causal relationship studies” are a mix of empirical and conceptual work. They look at 
factors or conditions as determinants of collaboration success, such as network structure and 
governance characteristics (e.g. Provan and Milward 1995, Provan and Kenis 2008, Huang and 
Provan 2007, Turrini, et al 2010, Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2006), characteristics of the 
collaborative process such as impartial mediation, trust, joint problem solving, and leadership 
(e.g. Chen 2008, Ansell and Gash 2008, Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2006), or 
environmental/contextual conditions such as resource munificence, system stability, and 
complexity of the problem space (e.g. Provan and Milward 1995, Lasker, Weiss, and Miller 
2001, Born and Genskow 2000, Turrini, et al 2010).  
The impact of determinants on collaboration is a valuable area of study, but leads to 
foundational problems. In some cases, developing a tight, plausible causal relationship requires 
narrowing outcome measures to a single measure which does not capture the complexity of 
outcomes (e.g. Provan and Milward 1995). In other cases where multiple outcome measures are 
used, they are not conceptually developed enough to understand their inter-linkages or their 
unique origins in the collaborative process (e.g.  Chen 2008, Turrinni, et al 2010). This leads to 
vague, conceptually overlapping, or under-specified outcomes.    
Similar issues arise from causal studies of the overall impact of collaboration. Rather than 
focusing on the impact of specific factors (“determinants”), these studies relate some measure of 
the existence or strength of collaboration directly to an outcome measure. Measures include 
things like level of exposure to policy networks (e.g. Lubell and Fulton 2008, Campbell, Koontz, 
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and Bonnell 2011), the existence of a formally identified and funded network (e.g. Lubell 2004a 
and 2004b, Schneider, et al 2003, Born and Genskow 2000, Roussos and Fawcett 2000), usage of 
coordinating tools and strategies (Jennings and Ewalt 1998), and networking behavior of public 
managers (Meier and O’Toole 2003, Nicholson-Crotty and O’Toole 2004). These studies are 
useful and valuable in assessing impacts of collaboration. Yet, like the “determinants” studies, 
outcome variables are not well-developed conceptually. Further, they do little to explain how 
collaboration is uniquely poised to bring about these outcomes; in many cases, outcome 
measures are the same as what could be expected under other management approaches.   
 
Literature gap: Conceptual development of outcomes  
Issues with the literature discussed above indicate a gap in our conceptual understanding of 
collaborative outcomes. While most of the scholarship described above skips conceptualization 
altogether and jumps quickly to measurement, other scholars under-conceptualize their outcome 
measures.  For instance, Lasker, Weiss, and Miller (2001) describe the pathway by which 
collaboration leads to outcomes using a proximate outcome measure called “synergy”, defined as 
“the power to combine the perspectives, resources, and skills of a group of people and 
organizations” (Lasker, Weiss, and Miller 2001, pp. 183). I commended them for developing a 
conceptual measure and enumerating a conceptual pathway from collaboration to improved 
community health, their end outcome of interest. Yet when examined closely, the concept of 
synergy is a composite of various other benefits of collaboration, most with distinct theoretical 
origins. In their operationalization of the synergy concept, they reference theories and ideas 
about resource exchange, diffusion of innovation, comprehensive thinking that emerged from 
diverse network membership, and the legitimacy benefits of stakeholder participation. Rather 
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than developing these diverse outcomes measures individually, however, they are mashed 
together into the vague umbrella concept of “synergy”.  
Other authors provide vague outcome measures without recognizing the need for further 
conceptual development. For instance, Bryson, Crosby, and Stone (2006) write that inter-sectoral 
collaboration produced “public value” that cannot be produced by single sectors working alone 
and that collaboration creates a “regime of mutual gain” (pp. 51), yet do little to unpack the 
meaning of either concept or show their theoretical derivations. Turrini, et al 2010 provide a list 
of “effectiveness types” derived from the literature (Table 2, pp. 534); some identify only the 
level at which effectiveness is measured (e.g. client level, community level, and network level) 
based on the framework by Provan and Milward (2001), while others (“innovation and change” 
and “sustainability and viability”) are vague.  Without greater specificity, it is unlikely that any 
two scholars using these criteria would apply them in the same way. At first glance, Barringer 
and Harrison (2000) seem to provide a more concrete, highly specified list of “advantages” and 
“disadvantages” of collaboration (see Tables 3 and 4, pp. 385-386). However, there is theoretical 
overlap among advantages / disadvantages listed because the authors neglect to categorize them 
based on theoretical foundations.   
In addition to vague outcome measures, the literature lacks specification of mechanisms 
or processes by which outcomes emerge (Lasker, Weiss, and Miller 2001, Jones, Hesterly, and 
Borgatti 1997, Provan and Kenis 2008). Lasker, Weiss, and Miller (2001) provide a clear 
description of this gap in the literature:  
“Lacking in [existing scholarship], however, is an explication of the pathway through 
which partnership functioning influences partnership effectiveness. The frameworks 
developed thus far do not identify the mechanism that enables partnerships to accomplish 
more than individuals and organizations on their own can. The work does not explain 
what happens in a successful collaborative process that gives partnerships an 
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advantage over single agents in planning and carrying out interventions that improve 
service delivery and health.” (Lasker, Weiss, and Miller 2001, pp. 182, emphasis added). 
 
Although my main research task is to identify benefits unique to collaboration, conceptual 
development requires an understanding of processes that bring them about. For instance, 
“resources accessed through the partnership” cannot be understood without describing how 
resource exchange operates in an inter-organizational environment. To distinguish collaboration 
benefits one must understand how and why collaborative processes uniquely produce these 
benefits. Otherwise, the identified benefits could just as easily emerge from non-collaborative 
approaches.  Process specification is also important because the same “benefit” or “product” of 
collaboration may come about through different pathways. For instance, although “resources 
accessed through the partnership” seems fully explainable through resource exchange, other 
processes may be at work. Perhaps diffusion of innovation provided access to key information or 
products, or perhaps the comprehensive thought processes that emerges in the collaborative 
environment made unexpected resources appear.   
This research addresses the under-conceptualization of collaboration’s outcomes and the 
mechanisms that bring them about. I start in Chapter 3 by identifying eight key benefits of 
collaboration. For five of these benefits, I weave together a theoretical and conceptual 
description, combining insights from a diverse set of collaboration literatures. Based on this 
analysis, research propositions are developed for each of the five benefits and applied to a rich 
empirical data set that includes hundreds of mini cases, or “instances”, of collaboration. It is 
through analysis of this empirical data in Chapters 5 through 8 that I develop concepts about the 
benefits of collaboration. The benefit of coordinated action receives the most attention. In 
chapters 5 through 7, I identify and describe a process called harmonizing by which 
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organizations address policy issues at the appropriate scale. Empirical analysis on the other four 
benefits is less structured, and focuses on developing key themes to guide practitioners and 
researchers.  
  I have one more task before my literature survey in Chapter 3. The following chapter is 
devoted to introducing key aspects of water quality management, the policy context in which I 
have chosen to study collaboration.  
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Chapter 2: Policy Context of Water Quality Management 
 
In this chapter, I discuss water quality management in general terms and explain why it is a good 
context in which to explore collaboration. My focus is on policies that seek to improve surface 
water quality; several of the most commonly used policies are discussed at the end of the 
chapter. Surface waters include rivers, streams, lakes, and Bays (in contrast to groundwater, 
which exists below ground level).  
 
Point and non-point sources of water pollution 
The most obvious sources of water quality impairment are industrial and sewage treatment plants 
that discharge waste directly into surface waters. Because there is an identifiable point at which 
pollutants are discharged, these are called “point sources” or “end of pipe” sources. Point sources 
are discrete, making them easy to identify and control. The Clean Water Act specifically defines 
a point source, in section 502(14), as: 
 
any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, 
ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, 
concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which 
pollutants are or may be discharged (US-EPA 2012a). 
 
Point sources targeted by the Clean Water Act include industrial plants, municipal sewage 
treatment plants, and large agricultural operations. The two key programs used to control point 
sources are: 1) the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), a regulatory 
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permitting program that requires point source dischargers to abide by numerical pollution limits, 
and 2) the Municipal Sewage Treatment Plant Construction Grants Program, which provides 
grants and loans for construction of Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTWs).  
Another category of pollutants are “nonpoint sources”, which are dispersed and more 
difficult to identify.  To understand nonpoint source (NPS) pollution one has to first understand 
the concept of a “watershed” or “drainage basin”, defined as the area of land that drains into a 
particular surface water body. Every drop of water that falls within the watershed of a particular 
surface water body does one of two things: it infiltrates into ground (and eventually the 
groundwater) or it runs over the land until it ends up in the surface water body. This second 
mechanism, where the water is called “runoff” or “stormwater”, is the main cause of NPS 
pollution. As the drop of stormwater runs over the land, it picks up a wide range of pollutants, 
such as lawn fertilizer, pet waste, road salts, loose dirt from eroded areas or constructions sites, 
and oil spilled on roadways. These pollutants are carried over the land until they reach the river, 
lake, or other surface water body at the low point of the watershed. Thus, most “nonpoint 
sources” of pollution are actually pollutants on the land washed into the water during storms. The 
main exceptions are liquids dumped illicitly, either directly into surface water or into stormwater 
drains or pipes that lead to surface water. The EPA describes nonpoint source pollution as 
follows (US-EPA 2012a):  
nonpoint source (NPS) pollution comes from many diffuse sources. NPS pollution is 
caused by rainfall or snowmelt moving over and through the ground. As the runoff 
moves, it picks up and carries away natural and human-made pollutants, finally 
depositing them into lakes, rivers, wetlands, coastal waters and ground waters. Nonpoint 
source pollution can include: 
• Excess fertilizers, herbicides and insecticides from agricultural lands and 
residential areas 
• Oil, grease and toxic chemicals from urban runoff and energy production 
• Sediment from improperly managed construction sites, crop and forest lands, and 
eroding streambanks 
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• Salt from irrigation practices and acid drainage from abandoned mines 
• Bacteria and nutrients from livestock, pet wastes and faulty septic systems 
• Atmospheric deposition and hydromodification4 
 
Like most scholars interested in watershed management, my primary interest is nonpoint source 
pollution.5 “Point sources” of pollution have mainly been brought under control through the 
NPDES regulatory program, leaving NPS pollution as the key problem for most surface waters 
of the United States.  In addition, nonpoint source pollution presents interesting policy 
challenges that cannot be resolved without collaboration, for reasons discussed in the next 
section.  
 
Why nonpoint source pollution management requires collaboration 
The physical nature of nonpoint source pollution— the fact that it is carried in stormwater over 
the entirely of the watershed landscape— means the appropriate management area is the 
watershed boundary. This creates challenges since watershed boundaries generally cross 
municipal and county boundaries, and sometimes even states and nations. One tactic for reducing 
the number of jurisdictions involved is to focus on smaller sub-watersheds (often called sub-
sheds).6 But even sub-watersheds generally contain several local jurisdictions and a variety of 
public and private property owners. Stormwater flows over all of this land, regardless of 
                                                             
4 Atmospheric deposition refers to pollutants from the air deposited directly into surface water bodies. 
Hydromodification refers to man-made changes to streams, rivers, lakes, and other surface water bodies that 
facilitate the scouring of banks and therefore the introduction of sediment and other pollutants into the water. EPA 
considers both of these “nonpoint sources” although the pollutants do not reach surface waters via the 
stormwater/runoff mechanism.  
5 Although my focus is on nonpoint sources, it is important to remember that the policy problem I address is water 
quality impairment. When water quality impairments are addressed on the ground, little attention is paid to 
distinguishing between types of sources. The same government agencies and nonprofit groups generally work to 
control both sources. 
6 Watersheds are nested (i.e. multiple “sub-watersheds” can be nested within a larger watershed). Generally, sub-
watersheds are watersheds for tributary streams. For instance, the tributaries to the Potomac River all have their own 
watersheds, and these “sub-watersheds” are nested within the Potomac River Watershed. The Potomac River 
Watershed, in turn, is nested within the Chesapeake Bay Watershed. 
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ownership. Thus, watershed management requires collaboration between a multitude of public 
and private entities that own or manage land within the watershed and/or hold authority for land 
use regulation. These include: federal or state agencies, local governments, businesses, non-
profit land trusts, and private landowners (Leach, Pelkey, and Sabatier 2002). 
The physical nature of nonpoint source pollution is only half of the story, however. Many 
scholars gloss over the other half, which is that collaborative tools are used to address nonpoint 
source pollution because of a lack of regulatory options. Regulatory programs for nonpoint 
source pollution have serious limitations, stemming partly from characteristics of the programs 
themselves and partly from a lack of political will. The National Pollution Discharge Elimination 
Program (NPDES), the permitting program authorized by the Clean Water Act, is the only 
surface water quality program at the Federal level with significant regulatory teeth.7  However, 
NPDES applies almost exclusively to point sources of pollution, with just three exceptions: 
stormwater in municipal separate storm sewer systems (MS4s),8 industrial stormwater, and 
stormwater on construction sites one acre or larger.9    
The Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) program, also authorized by the Clean Water 
Act, directly targets NPS pollution and is considered a regulatory program. The TMDL program 
requires States to write plans for allocating pollution loads to impaired water bodies such that 
pollutant levels will not exceed State water quality standards. However, US-EPA has no 
authority to require implementation of these allocation plans. Further, although the NPDES 
program provides a regulatory process for enforcing pollutant caps for point sources, there is no 
                                                             
7 The Section 401 permitting process for dredging or filling wetlands also has regulatory teeth, but this is less 
directly related to NPS pollution control.   
8 MS4 permits are issued from US-EPA or its State affiliate agencies under the National Pollution Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) stormwater program and require urbanized municipalities and Counties to regulate 
stormwater runoff within their political boundaries. 
9 These three regulated sources were added to the NPDES program via the 1987 Amendments to the Clean Water 
Act (for more information, see US-EPA 2012b).  
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regulatory process for nonpoint sources and no authority to create one.  Thus, US-EPA can make 
States responsible for setting targets but has no way to enforce their implementation.  
States may regulate nonpoint sources, if they muster the political will to give themselves 
that authority.  Yet laws passed at the State level generally stop short of regulating nonpoint 
sources through a NPDES-like permitting process. For instance, similar laws in Virginia (the 
Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act) and in Maryland (the Critical Areas Act) require local 
jurisdictions in tidal areas of the Chesapeake Bay to limit development around tidal streams, 
rivers, and wetlands. These laws address NPS pollution by increasing infiltration and filtering of 
stormwater, and by decreasing land disturbances near the water. However, neither regulates 
pollutant loads in stormwater or the application of pollutants to the landscape. And enforcement 
is uneven across local jurisdictions.  
Another category of State laws are “Erosion and Sediment Control” (ESC) laws.  
Regulations authorized under these laws minimize sedimentation during the grading and 
construction process, when soils are loose and easily erodible. Most ESC regulations apply only 
to construction on one acre or more of land, however. In fact, States pass these laws in large part 
just to fulfill their requirements under the NPDES Stormwater Program, the program mentioned 
above that expanded NPDES protections to municipal, industrial, and construction stormwater.  
Local governments have the most direct opportunities to regulate land use and review site 
plans for new development. Some local jurisdictions pass ordinances requiring low impact 
development (LID) or environmental site design (ESD) practices, which keep stormwater in 
place and allow for greater infiltration, filtering, and evaporation. Generally, these apply only to 
new development. Other jurisdictions pass ordinances to reduce impervious surface. Examples 
include: maximum parking allowances or requirements for structured parking, reduced road 
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width, and caps that limit impervious surfaces to a percent of total lot size.  Further, most local 
planning departments do site plan reviews before issuing permits for new development. If the 
site plan is out of compliance with any local stormwater ordinance, changes are required before a 
permit is issued. If the developer requests a variance or a special exemption, the “proffer” 
process allows local governments to request adjustments that go beyond current regulatory 
requirements in exchange for the permit.   
Considering this array of regulatory opportunities, why does most NPS pollution remain 
unregulated? The first reason, described above, is the essential nature of nonpoint source 
pollution. It is difficult to regulate pollution that is dispersed over a large land area, crosses 
political boundaries, and occurs on people’s private property.  A second reason is the difficulty 
of measuring pollutant loads. With point sources, pollution concentration can be measured at the 
end of a pipe or outfall, but nonpoint sources require educated guesswork. Stormwater does not 
take a single direct path to local water bodies after picking up pollutants from the land: some gets 
absorbed, some ends up in little pools and evaporates, and some is filtered. Thus, nonpoint 
source pollution is regulated (to the extent it is) by requiring landowners to adopt best 
management practices (BMPs). At best, the pollution reduction expected from particular BMPs 
is estimated with computer models. For instance, the US-EPA Chesapeake Bay Program runs a 
complicated model for the Bay watershed that predicts nutrient and sediment reduction from a 
wide range of agricultural BMPs, such as cover crops and stream buffers.  However, even with 
improvements in modeling technology, the estimates of pollution reduction from BMPs are 
uncertain, making it impossible to issue permits for nonpoint source pollution with defined 
pollution limits.  
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A third reason is historical. For a long time after the passage of the Clean Water Act in 
1972, it was thought that controlling industrial and municipal point sources would solve the 
nations’ water quality problems. In addition to having a strong regulatory framework, the 
NPDES program had the advantage of being politically popular, since it imposed limits on 
“dirty” industry and cities. Since at least 1990, when EPA passed the first real rules on the 
TMDL program, there have been serious efforts at the national level to address nonpoint sources. 
Yet, the inability of nonpoint programs to gain traction may derive in part from their late start. 
Even the concept of nonpoint source pollution remains foreign to most citizens. Whereas 
regulating direct emissions into water is common sense, regulating fertilizer application on 
private land seems intrusive and disconnected from the problem of water quality.  
The three obstacles already mentioned – the essential nature of NPS pollution, scientific 
uncertainty about the effectiveness of BMPs, and a historical focus on point-sources— are small 
issues compared to a fourth: the lack of political will.  There is resistance to regulating nonpoint 
sources from groups that support economic development (developers, realtors, property 
managers, civic groups) and groups that support agriculture (famers, farmers’ organizations, and 
agricultural suppliers).  These groups are powerful at all three levels of government and have 
successfully limited most attempts to adopt more stringent regulations.  At the Federal level, a 
key example is the TMDL rule passed in 2000 after significant research and review. After it 
ignited enormous controversy among development and agricultural interests, it was withdrawn 
less than three years later (Malone 2003).  EPA has been unable to tighten the TMDL rules ever 
since, so most aspects of the TMDL process are based on 1997 regulations. In addition to 
political resistance, the US-EPA’s ability to pass new regulations is hampered by the convoluted 
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laws they inherit from Congress and by an almost-constant resource shortage which prevents 
them from enforcing the regulations they pass.  
States, as mentioned, can pass laws to further regulate nonpoint sources, but most have 
not done much beyond what EPA requires of them. They generally decline to get involved in 
local land use, partly out of fear of a backlash from property rights and home rule advocates, and 
partly because the State lacks the time and resources to meddle in detailed affairs of its localities. 
Further, state legislators, governors, and appointed agency leaders are subject to powerful 
lobbying efforts from development and agricultural interests. Also, because of competition for 
business and wealthy residents, State leaders are attuned to the argument that stringent 
environmental protections will put them at a competitive disadvantage.  
Local governments face similar competitive development pressures. The likelihood of 
local governments adopting NPS pollution regulations varies greatly depending on contextual 
factors like its predominant land uses and centers of local power. Some localities in urban North 
Virginia (where I did my interviews) have powerful environmental groups integrated into local 
government through advisory commissions. Further, environmental advocates get elected to City 
Council. In other localities, the drive for economic development is the local government’s 
foremost priority and environmental groups gain little traction.  
 
Non-regulatory tools used for nonpoint source pollution 
Regulatory options for addressing nonpoint source pollution are limited, which leaves non-
regulatory options like grants, incentives, and voluntary projects. The most commonly used tools 
are summarized below.  
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1. Best management practices (BMPs) are installed or adopted on private land to minimize NPS 
pollution. They are generally categorized by the type of land use to which they apply (e.g. 
agricultural BMPs and urban BMPs).  Common agricultural BMPs include planting cover 
crops during the non-growing season, carrying out a nutrient management plan that 
minimizes fertilizer usage, planting buffers around streams and wetlands, and putting 
sensitive lands into reserve.10 Extensive programs at the Federal and State level provide 
financial assistance for the installation of agricultural BMPs, including sharing the costs of 
installation and paying rent for farmland put into reserve. Technical assistance is also 
available through the USDA National Resource Conservation Service (NRCS) and local Soil 
and Water Conservation Districts (SWCDs).  
Urban BMPs include things like installing low impact development (LID) stormwater 
practices (e.g. rain gardens, grassy swales, permeable pavement), planting stream buffers, 
and conserving urban tree canopy.  For government agencies managing road networks, BMPs 
include regular street sweeping and minimization of road salt. Incentive programs to 
subsidize private urban BMPs are less established and attract less funding than agricultural 
BMP programs. When they exist, they are generally implemented by local governments or 
regional Soil and Water Conservation Districts (SWCDs).   
 
2. Land conservation is a critical tool because vegetated land absorbs stormwater and filters out 
pollutants. More vegetated land (particularly forest) and less impervious surface in a 
watershed is better for water quality. Land conservation efforts often target the most sensitive 
areas, such as wetlands, streambanks, and highly erodible soils.  
                                                             
10 For a full list that applies to Virginia, see Section 2 of the Virginia Agricultural Cost Share Manual (Virginia 
Agricultural Cost Share Manual 2012). 
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Governments at all levels can purchase property, which they do for highly sensitive areas 
or areas with some special feature. Other options involve purchasing development rights. For 
instance, conservation easements are contracts between a landowner and some entity (usually 
a nonprofit land trust) where the landowner agrees to give up development rights in 
perpetuity. Purchase of development rights programs work the same way, except they always 
involve a payment to the owner for the lost development rights. Finally, transfer of 
development rights programs allow landowners to sell their development rights to be used on 
a different property. Governments can set these up so development rights are transferred 
from areas they want to keep rural to areas designated for growth.  
 
3. Restoration projects are a critical part of NPS pollution control. A common project is stream 
restoration, which can sometimes require heavy earth-moving equipment to stabilize 
streambanks and re-route the stream to create greater sinuosity. Other large projects are 
wetland restoration or creation, dam removal, and the installation of large LID infrastructure.  
Smaller-scale, simpler restoration projects include planting trees in the riparian buffer of 
streams or clearing invasive species from a wetland.  Smaller projects are often carried out in 
partnership with nonprofit organizations that mobilize volunteers to help with the work. 
 
4. Planning processes of various types are a major part of managing nonpoint source pollution. 
Where watersheds include multiple jurisdictions, planning is critical to ensure that that work 
done in one jurisdiction is not undone by its neighbors. Further, it is useful to have a process 
for coordinating the myriad programs and opportunities that exist for managing water 
quality. The most common process is “watershed planning”, in which actors with 
30 
 
 
responsibility for managing water quality, along with interested stakeholder groups, work 
together to coordinate their programs on a watershed basis.  
Other planning processes less directly related to water quality include green infrastructure 
planning and transportation planning. Green infrastructure is a relatively new idea for land 
conservation that focuses on creating “hubs” of protected space connected by “corridors” 
wide enough for wildlife to safely pass between the hubs. Because of the size of the 
conserved land and the need for connectivity, good green infrastructure requires coordination 
on a regional scale. Transportation planning, also approached on a regional scale, is critical 
for regions that want to practice “smart growth”. Smart growth is important for nonpoint 
source pollution control because it seeks to maximize open space and protect 
environmentally sensitive areas, while allowing for growth in less sensitive areas.   
 
5. Finally, there is public education. Without regulatory options, NPS pollution control depends 
on people changing their behavior. Much of the NPS-related education teaches people about 
the storm sewer system, including the key fact that anything dumped into storm sewers gets 
carried, untreated, into local water bodies. Education also focuses on how landowners can 
minimize their household impact by using less fertilizer, not fertilizing before a rainstorm, 
picking up their pet’s waste, fixing leaky fluids in the car, and pumping out their septic 
systems periodically.  
Aside from this general education, there are programs that encourage landowners to 
adopt BMPs. A common program encourages landowners to purchase and install a rain 
barrel, which collects run off from their roof for drinking, gardens, or other uses.  
Landowners are also taught about rain gardens, permeable pavers, and stream buffers. There 
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is limited money to help them install these practices, but technical assistance is generally 
available.   
 
Note that these non-regulatory and incentive-based measures occur alongside regulatory 
measures.  The organizations that address water quality rarely put a firewall between point and 
nonpoint sources, or between regulatory and voluntary programs. Rather, they combine 
whichever programs they have authority and resources to implement to get the job done. In this 
spirit, I do not focus solely on nonpoint sources and on non-regulatory measures, but consider all 
measures used to address water quality.  
 
The watershed management policy context and my definition of collaboration 
Under my broad definition of collaboration – “any interaction between two or more 
organizations undertaken with the intention to cooperate”— it is possible to imagine 
collaboration occurring within the context of a regulatory program. For instance, local planners 
might work with a private developer to improve site plans or help her come into compliance with 
stormwater requirements.  
In my research, then, collaboration is not the opposite of regulation. Collaboration may 
occur as part of regulatory policy, alongside regulatory policy, or as an alternative to it. 
However, when regulatory options are not available, a wider variety of collaborative 
arrangements tend to spring up to solve problems. This flourishing of collaborative arrangements 
is why watershed management presents an ideal policy context to study collaboration. Under a 
regulatory policy like NPDES, there tends to be a small number of “collaborating” parties who 
have set, ordered relationships based on legal requirements. Without this regulatory structure, a 
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multitude of partnerships, involving diverse and unexpected parties, develop.  This is, in fact, 
what has occurred in watershed planning.   
Because watershed management and planning is a fruitful area for studying collaborative 
arrangements, I chose to study collaboration in this context. However, when I examine my 
empirical data, I look for examples of collaboration that fit my broader definition. Thus my data 
include examples of collaboration in the context of regulatory programs or in the context of 
managing point sources of pollution.   
 
Overview of next chapters 
Chapter 3 presents a survey of collaboration literatures that identifies key benefits of 
collaboration. Insights from diverse collaboration literatures are integrated into a theoretical and 
conceptual description of eight distinct benefits, and research propositions are developed for five 
of these benefits. In Chapter 4, I present and justify my research methodology and describe the 
data collected to explore my research propositions. Chapters 5 through 8 present the results of 
my empirical analysis. The bulk of my analysis, presented in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, focuses on the 
benefit of coordinated action, while Chapter 8 presents a less structured analysis of the other four 
benefits. Chapter 9 is a conclusion in which I describe my contributions, the practical 
implications of my findings, the limitations of my research, and my future research agenda.   
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Chapter 3: Literature survey on the benefits of collaboration 
 
This chapter identifies benefits expected from collaboration through a survey of diverse 
collaboration literatures.  Existing conceptual and empirical research on each benefit is 
integrated and condensed into propositions applied to my empirical data.  
Collaboration scholarship is scattered among divergent areas of literature from business 
to non-profit management to economics, game theory, conflict resolution, and public 
management. Each area of scholarship posits a different rationale for collaboration in terms of 
the problems it solves or benefits it provides. Further, each literature starts from a different 
theoretical perspective, leading them to expect different outcomes (Rogers and Weber 2010, 
Wood and Gray 1991). Skelcher and Sullivan (2008), for instance, find that: “each theoretical 
perspective asks somewhat different questions about the relationships involved in collaboration, 
and consequently explains different attributes of collaborative performance (pp. 753)”.  This 
point is often overlooked to the detriment of collaborative outcomes research. It is difficult to 
have a productive scholarly dialogue on outcomes when scholars’ different conceptions of 
collaboration are leading them to vastly different conclusions about what to expect from it.  
 I address this problem by conducting a broad survey of collaboration literatures. This 
includes early work on inter-organizational coordination in the business/management literature 
(e.g. Rogers and Whetten 1982, Oliver 1990, Galaskiewicz 1985, Van de Ven 1976, Aldrich 
1976 and 1979) and newer work inspired by it (e.g. Dyer and Singh 1998, Powell, Koput,and 
Smith-Doerr 1996, Gulati 1998, Barringer and Harrison 2000). It also includes public 
management and public policy scholarship on collaboration in general, as well as the body of 
work on collaborative “networks” (e.g. O’Toole 1997, Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997, 
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Provan and Milward 1995 and 2001, Provan, Fish, and Sydow 2007, Agranoff 2007, Agranoff 
and McGuire 2001, O’Toole and Meier 2004) and inter-sectoral collaboration (e.g. Bryson, 
Crosby, and Stone 2006, Gazley and Brudney 2007, Berry and Brower 2005, Guo and Acar 
2005, Hodge and Greve 2007). From these literatures I developed a list of eight key benefits 
which will be described in this chapter: 
1. Access to resources / resource exchange. 
2. Improved organizational status or legitimacy. 
3. Efficiency / productivity gains. 
4. Greater flexibility / adaptability.   
5. Innovation / Knowledge generation / Learning. 
6. Achieving coordinated action. 
7. Building social capital and social infrastructure. 
8. Reducing conflict.  
 
This list of key benefits does not exist anywhere. Developing it required not only a review of 
various collaboration literatures, but also streamlining and honing in on key concepts. Most 
scholars focus on one or a small subset of benefits. Others provide a wide range of benefits 
which are not organized logically by shared theoretical or conceptual origins. A major challenge 
was weaving together the unique theoretical and conceptual basis of each benefit from 
fragmented bodies of literature. Thus, this chapter goes beyond a simple literature survey. The 
conceptual work on each benefit provides a framework on which theory can be built.  For each of 
the five benefits pursued empirically, I develop a research proposition. Through empirical 
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analysis (presented in Chapters 5 through 8), I build concepts that fill in gaps left by the 
fragmented state of the literature.  
Recall that I focus only on concrete, policy-related benefits. Benefits must be clear and 
measurable; must make policy more effective, efficient, or equitable; and must accrue at the 
community or societal level. Vague benefits and benefits accruing at the level of individuals, 
organizations, or networks are excluded.  Because of this and similar restrictions, benefits 
number two, three, and four in the list will not be pursued in my empirical analysis. However, all 
eight benefits are described below.   
 
Access to resources / resource exchange 
According to resource exchange theory, the purpose of inter-organizational coordination is to 
meet organizational resource needs and mitigate power imbalances (Aldrich 1979; Emerson 
1962; Galaskiewicz 1985; Van de Ven 1976; Aiken and Hage 1968).  Individual organizations 
do not have all the resources needed to achieve their goals and rely on inputs from the 
“collection of interacting organizations, groups, and persons” that comprise their environment 
(Van de Ven, et al 1975: 19). Since every organization is in the same position of dependency, 
exchange relationships develop. In addition to providing necessary resources, exchange 
relationships many be “a stabilizing force in the life space of organizations” (Alter and Hage 
1993: 45)” by reducing uncertainty about organizational survival (Aldrich 1979; Alter and Hage 
1993) and by forming and maintaining consistent interaction patterns among actors (Kickert, 
Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997).  
Resource exchange also mitigates power imbalances among organizations. To maintain 
autonomy, organizations attempt to maximize their power in exchange relationships by avoiding 
36 
 
 
(as much as possible) dependence on other organizations and by making others dependent on 
them. The power of an actor within an inter-organizational network is explicitly linked to his or 
her control over resources (Klijn 1997; Aldrich 1979). As Gulati and Garguilo 1999 put it: 
“Interorganizational cooperation is thus a means by which organizations manage their 
dependence on other organizations in their environment and attempt to mitigate the uncertainty 
generated by that dependence (pp. 1443)”. 
Resource exchange theory has been applied most heavily in the older “coordination” 
literature found in management and business journals, plus newer literature descended from this 
work. The focus of these literatures is on organizational-level outcomes, especially benefits 
accruing to private firms. The benefits of resource exchange at the higher levels I am interested 
in – such as a network of organizations, a community, or society as a whole— receive less 
attention.  
Public management literature picks up the resource exchange thread, but applies it to 
community or societal benefits. For instance, some scholars find that resource exchange expands 
the overall available resource base. Knowledge base expansion is particularly critical for 
development of new, innovative solutions (Agranoff 2006). One form of knowledge base 
expansion is joint fact finding, whereby stakeholders collectively identify data gaps and pursue a 
joint strategy to fill them (Leach 2006). Similarly, partnerships provide the opportunity for 
agencies to integrate and/or reconcile their databases and protocols, improving the information 
jointly available for problem solving (Rogers and Weber 2010, Imperial 2005). Further, the 
partnership structure itself often serves as repository, organizer, and clearinghouse of shared 
information (Born and Genskow 2000, Imperial 2005).  Benefits of knowledge-building and 
knowledge-management activities accrue first at the organizational and the partnership (or 
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network) levels, yet carry over to the societal level as they improve the decision-making capacity 
of public sector partnerships. Plus, the information is often made publically available.  
By expanding the resource base, resource exchange may improve collective problem-
solving. Imperial (2005) identifies resource exchange as a major activity of watershed 
management programs and finds that organizational resources such as funding, staff, and 
equipment were pooled “in ways that improved [partners’] collective ability to solve programs or 
enhance service delivery (pp. 297).” Connick and Innes (2003) found that intense discussion 
among watershed management partners regarding shared data and models improved the 
information available for decision-making. One collaborative group, for instance, discovered and 
fixed a large error in the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation projections of water supply.  
Most prominently, resource exchange improves collective problem solving by 
overcoming resource constraints and limitations of individual organizations. Through resource 
exchange partnerships, each organization compensates for its own deficiencies in skills, abilities, 
or knowledge. The result is that the partnership together is more than the sum of its parts, as 
described by Lasker, Weiss, and Miller (2001): 
 
Financial and in-kind resources are the basic building blocks of synergy. It is by 
combining these resources in various ways that partners create something new and 
valuable that transcends what they can accomplish alone (pp. 189). 
 
For government agencies, whose resources and abilities are generally inadequate to meet the 
broad, ambitious demands put on them, the need for partnerships is strong. To solve the policy 
problems they are tasked with, government agencies “must extend the boundaries of the agency 
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and thus the governmental jurisdiction (Agranoff 2005, pp. 18)”, incorporating private sector 
companies and/or nonprofits into partnerships for program development and service delivery. 
Goldsmith and Eggers (2004) argue that partnerships with private and non-profit organizations 
“increase the reach” of public programs by providing access to critical resources: innovative 
ideas, specialized skills and expertise, connections to key stakeholder groups, and the ability to 
spend money flexibly.  For instance, a network approach to welfare service delivery in 
Milwaukee County enabled the government administrative agency to “access the community ties 
and specialized skills of dozens of local [welfare service] providers (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004, 
pp. 26).” Further, these local providers offered a broader, more innovative, and more tailored set 
of services than the County was able to.  
Based on the literature survey above, resource exchange benefits applied at the 
community and societal level can be summarized by the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: (Resource Exchange) 
Collaboration leverages financial, technical, human, and informational resources11, 
expanding the resource base available to solve collective problems and overcoming resource 
constraints of individual organizations. 
 
Note that when it comes to public management partnerships in which government agencies play 
a central role, there is a fine line between organizational-level benefits and higher level benefits. 
The mandates, goals, and objectives of government agencies reflect societal goals. When these 
                                                             
11 I consider information a type of resource. “Information exchange” and “access to information”, therefore, are 
forms of resource exchange rather than separate benefits. Other scholars will commonly (and I believe arbitrarily) 
exclude information from resource exchange.  
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goals are achieved through resource exchange, the benefits accrue not just to the agency that met 
its targets, but also to the segments of society served by the agencies’ programs. 
 
Improved organizational status or legitimacy 
Another benefit of collaboration is increased status or legitimacy arising from links to large, 
powerful, or well-respected organizations (Hardy, Phillips, and Lawrence 2003; Galaskiewicz 
1985; Singh, Tucker, and House 1986; Stuart 2000; Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels 1999). Rather 
than resource exchange, the status/legitimacy benefit draws upon sociological theories of status-
transfer and economic theories of signaling. In fact, Stuart (2000) explicitly separates his 
hypotheses into alliance benefits based on “resource access” (access to technology, know-how, 
customers, and other resources) versus benefits based on “reputation”. The theoretical basis of 
reputation benefits is two-fold. First, under conditions of uncertainty about the quality or 
trustworthiness of an actor, the social status of the actor’s associates is used as a basis for 
evaluation.  Actors with powerful, reliable, and/or well-regarded partners are evaluated more 
favorably (Stuart 2000). Related is the sociological idea that “actors’ reputations are constructed 
in part from the identities of their associates (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels 1999, pp. 317-318)”. 
The benefit of alliance with powerful actors is tacit or explicit “endorsement” of a firms’ quality, 
which is especially important for small or new firms whose products and services are untested 
(Stuary 2000; Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels 1999).  Thus, organizational actors pursue partnerships 
with powerful allies to “signal” quality to customers, suppliers, and other potential partners 
(Stuart 2000).    
The status/legitimacy benefit applies mainly at the organizational level, although there 
have been incipient attempts to apply legitimacy concepts to organizational networks (see Provan 
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and Kenis 2008). The theory does not stretch to include benefits accruing at the community or 
societal level; thus I will not explore this benefit in my empirical analysis.  
 
Efficiency / productivity gains  
The drive for efficient government is a powerful and recurring theme in public policy 
scholarship. In the U.S. the privatization movement in the 1980’s popularized the notion that 
intensified relations with the private sector, via contracting out and public-private partnerships, 
would improve government efficiency. In the 1990’s, the national bestseller Reinventing 
Government (Osborne and Gaebler 1993) inspired not only national public sector reform but also 
the “new public management” (NPM) literature.  These movements share the core concept that 
government efficiency can be achieved by shifting functions out of the rigid government 
bureaucracy and into the hands of innovative, flexible, and skilled private sector and nonprofit 
partners through partnerships, contracting, grants, and networks. This creates efficiency in three 
ways. First, private and nonprofit sector organizations are more skilled at certain governing tasks 
and can do them more effectively for the same or less money. Second, the private and nonprofit 
sectors avoid many of the inflexible rules and rigidities faced by government bureaucracy. 
Finally, a cultural argument posits that partnerships expose inefficient, slow government 
agencies to the private sector culture of rapid, efficient service, continual improvement, 
maximizing value for money, and cutting through red tape.  
Evidence on actual efficiency gains for government agencies is mixed. For instance, 
Andrews and Entwistle (2010) predicted that, of all inter-sectoral combinations, efficiency gains 
would be greatest for public agencies partnering with the private sector because of the private 
sectors’ culture of “value for money”, greater flexibility, and specialized skills and resources (pp. 
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682). Yet they did not find a significant relationship. Gazley and Brudney (2007), in a large-scale 
survey of government and nonprofit managers, found that 46% of government managers valued 
inter-sectoral partnerships for cost-effectiveness, and 78% reported that public-private 
partnerships led to cost savings.   
It is useful to dig deeper into how collaboration brings about efficiency improvement. 
One idea is that collaboration reduces duplication which in turn reduces cost and waste (Zhang 
and Dawes 2006). Collaboration also increases efficiency by creating economies of scale.  
Perhaps the most obvious examples are inter-local agreements in which local governments agree 
to merge duplicative services (LeRoux, Brandenburger, and Pandey 2010, Feiock, Steinacker, 
and Park 2009). Higher levels of government can also create economies of scale by developing 
large-scale service delivery networks that smaller-size cities can join, thus lowering their per-
service costs (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004). Finally, collaboration might help organizations 
orchestrate a better division of labor. Partnering frees up a service provider to focus on core 
services they are most effective at producing. Assuming all service needs are met by someone in 
the partnership, this is a more efficient system overall.   
Note that these “root causes” of efficiency improvement (reducing duplication, achieving 
economies of scale, and division of labor) should actually be categorized together under 
“Coordinated Action”, a benefit described below. Other causes described by NPM and 
privatization scholars could be categorized under “greater flexibility of collaboration” and under 
“resource access”, the latter referring to unique skills, expertise, and cultural resources 
contributed by private and non-profit sector partners. In short, “efficiency improvement” is not a 
stand-alone benefit of collaboration but a fortuitous result of one or more other, more essential 
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benefits discussed separately in my analysis. Thus, I will not explore “efficiency gains” as its 
own benefit in my analysis. 
 
Greater flexibility / adaptability 12 
Collaboration scholars, particularly in public management, posit collaborative networks as an 
alternative management approach to inflexible and rigid government bureaucracy. Rigidity in 
government derives from internal bureaucratic control systems that slow down the pace of 
decision-making, limit adaptability, and stifle innovation.  The argument is that collaborative 
partnerships and network structures do better.  
For instance, while government bureaucracies are slowed down by complex and 
restrictive personnel and procurement systems, networks can procure goods quickly and upsize 
or downsize when needed (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004). Goldsmth and Eggers (2004) describe 
the Manhattan project and the U.S.-Soviet space race, where government-sponsored networks 
could hire, fire, and reassign contractors at will, in a way they could not have done with public 
employees. This flexibility, they argue, was critical in promoting innovation and speed. Other 
scholars discuss how government alleviates restrictions by partnering with the private sector 
(Andrews and Entwistle 2010). For instance, Agranoff (2005) notes that most municipal 
governments are limited in how much general obligation debt they can take on for private sector 
capital investment. Partnering with the private sector provides access to private funds that come 
with fewer restrictions.   
                                                             
12 Note that the benefits of flexibility have limits. Born and Genskow (2000) find that flexibility, although beneficial 
in terms of innovation, can be associated with unpredictability. Similarly, Provan and Kenis (2008) describe a 
tension in network governance between flexibility and stability: while flexibility allows for rapid responses to 
changing needs and demands, stability is important for developing consistent responses and promoting external 
network legitimacy. Further, research has shown that stability is an important predictor of positive network 
outcomes (Provan and Milward 1995). Since both flexibility and stability are important, network managers must 
learn to achieve some measure of both. 
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Working through a network makes it possible for public managers to adjust programs and 
services by bringing in new partners and/or cutting ties with existing partners. This allows them 
to keep up with changing demands and tasks (Provan and Kenis 2008; Goldsmith and Eggers 
2004) and is what makes networks “light on their feet” compared to bureaucracies (Powell 
1990). Because of this flexibility, collaborative networks are considered more suited than 
bureaucracies to uncertain and changing contexts that give rise to unanticipated events. For 
instance, collaborative networks are the organizational form of choice for emergency 
management, where problems must be assessed quickly and resources rapidly mobilized 
(McGuire and Silvia 2010; Waugh and Streib 2006; Moynihan 2005; Kiefer and Montjoy 2006). 
There is little time for cumbersome bureaucratic procedures or for decisions to run up and down 
hierarchical authority chains. The flexibility of collaborative partnerships, then, allows 
organizations to adapt to uncertain environments and respond with innovative approaches. It is 
not surprising that flexibility is often tied to innovation.  
The benefit of “flexibility/adaptability” makes sense when collaboration is defined as an 
alternative approach to inflexible and rigid government bureaucracy. This only works, however, 
if one defines collaboration in opposition to hierarchy. Under my definition, coordination among 
organizations in a hierarchical system is considered collaboration just as much as coordination in 
a fluid, networked system. The opposite of “collaboration” is not hierarchy, but rather 
organizations working alone. Without making this distinction between collaboration and 
hierarchy, the “flexibility / adaptability” benefit has limited theoretical justification and is 
therefore not part of my analysis.  
 
Innovation / Knowledge generation / Learning  
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Collaborative partnerships allow organizations to access innovative technologies or ideas just 
like they access money, labor, and information. However, the innovation benefit described here 
goes beyond “resource access” to describe how collaboration generates new innovations. 
Innovation generation is conceptually distinct from resource exchange. While resource exchange 
implies that innovations exist within or are controlled by partner organizations, innovation 
generation posits that innovation and knowledge is generated by the partnership itself (Gulati 
1999; Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr 1996; Hardy, Phillips, and Lawrence 2003; Brass, et al 
2004; Ahuja 2000; Aiken and Hage 1968). As Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr (1996, pp. 118) 
put it:  
Knowledge creation occurs in the context of a community, one that is fluid and evolving 
rather than tightly bound or static . . . Sources of innovation do not reside exclusively 
inside firms; instead, they are commonly found in the interstices between firms, 
universities, research laboratories, suppliers and customers. (Powell, Koput, and Smith-
Doerr 1996, p. 118) 
 
While resource exchange is a transactional process, innovation generation is a learning process. 
Collaborative interactions generate new ideas that lead to mutual learning. Or, as Sørensen and 
Torfing (2011, pp. 852) phrase it: “the generation of ideas is spurred when different experiences 
and ideas are circulated, challenged, transformed, and expanded through multiactor collaboration 
that facilitate mutual learning.” Agranoff (2006, pp. 60) similarly describes collaborative 
networks as “learning organizations” in which learning occurs through discussion, fact-finding, 
negotiation, and other strategies. Agranoff and McGuire (2001, pp. 303) discuss “shared 
learning” as a fundamental component of group development in networks, and characterize the 
collaborative process as a “joint learning system”. The collaborative process, if managed well, 
can “stimulate new alternatives that otherwise would not have been considered (Agranoff and 
McGuire 2001, pp. 321)”.   
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Innovation generation, then, is special and distinct from resource exchange because it 
creates something new. Organizations learning through collaboration are doing more than 
attaining a discrete set of skills or resources.  Powell, Koput, and Smith Doerr (1996) emphasize 
that: “(1) interorganizational collaborations are not simply a means to compensate for the lack of 
internal skills (2) nor should they be viewed as a series of discrete transactions.” (Powell, Koput, 
and Smith Doerr 1996, pp. 119). True learning means firms do more than passively receive 
resources they are lacking; they develop existing internal capabilities and enhance their ability to 
receive and transfer knowledge.  The formal exchange of resources is only the “tip of the 
iceberg” underneath which “lies a sea” of current and future benefits arising from dynamic and 
ongoing learning processes (Powell, Koput, and Smith Doerr 1996, pp. 120).  
In management literature on collaboration—which tends to focus on private firms—
learning is commonly associated with knowledge-based industries like bio-technology, 
pharmaceuticals, and electronics. Because practice changes rapidly in these industries, 
companies benefit from the creative energies and innovations that emerge from “ongoing social 
interaction” and discussion (Hardy, Phillips, and Lawrence 2003, pp. 326). For instance, research 
consortia are considered a “vibrant learning environment and a community in which new 
discoveries are made” (Barringer and Harrison 2000, pp.378).  
Policy areas requiring quick responses to evolving conditions, such as emergency 
management, are another place where innovation benefits emerge (e.g. McGuire and Silvia 2010, 
Waugh and Streib 2006, Moynihan 2005, Kiefer and Montjoy 2006). When problems and 
conditions change rapidly, standard responses may be incomplete or slow, especially if they are 
uncoordinated. This shows the tie between flexibility/adaptability and the innovation benefit: 
collaborative partnerships that maintain flexibility are more innovative under difficult, unusual, 
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or changing conditions. For instance, Connick and Inness (2003) describe how the CALFED 
partnership developed a rapid decision making process by which small committees of expert 
water managers, representing key stakeholder groups, were given authority to respond 
immediately to new information indicating threatening water quality conditions.  This “allowed a 
real-time response to events, as opposed to existing slow and inflexible bureaucratic decision 
making that provided little leeway for dealing with unforeseen conditions” (Connick and Innes 
2003, pp. 189). This type of process innovation is adaptive and context-dependent; it is unlikely 
to emerge unless the relevant organizations can negotiate and interact in real time to manage 
dynamic situations.  
 
Processes of innovation generation 
Scholars focused on consensus-building, conflict resolution, and negotiation are particularly 
attuned to processes of innovation generation (e.g. Gray 1989, Susskind and Cruikshank 1987, 
Connick and Innes 2003, Innes and Booher 1999, Ansel and Gash 2008).  According to these 
literatures, the spontaneous generation of innovations occurs through face-to-face processes of 
intense dialogue, discussion, and negotiation. These processes generate a level of trust, mutual 
understanding, respect, and reciprocity that loosens up critical information and makes 
participants comfortable with exploring out-of-the-box ideas (Gray 1989). Dialogue and 
consensus-building, in particular, facilitate the emergence of creative ideas and are especially 
important when stakeholders face an intractable problem or impasse, as described by Connick 
and Innes 2003, pp. 188: 
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Overcoming long-term impasses often requires new ways of thinking about the issues at 
hand…..Creative ideas emerged in these dialogues as participants struggled to address 
problems that had eluded solution either because of controversies, or simply because 
there did not seem to be any workable answer. 
 
Connick and Innes (2003) provide two examples of innovations emerging through intensive 
dialogue. First, an innovative water quality indicator (salinity) emerged from an intensive, 
facilitated weekend of consensus-building among various experts representing key stakeholders. 
Second, environmental water accounts (EWA) were developed by CALFED; these provided a 
way to be more proactive and efficient with fisheries protection by targeting fisheries’ water 
supply to the exact place and at the exact time it was needed. Although the EWA idea came from 
a single member of the group, it was developed and tested over hundreds of hours by a 
collaborative group of agency personal, agricultural stakeholders, urban water interests, and 
environmental groups.  
Dialogue and consensus building facilitate a freer flow of information, especially 
compared to adversarial processes. In adversarial legal processes, for instance, face-to-face 
contact between parties is restricted and important information regarding their interests— such as 
what is really important to them and how much they are willing to compromise— is withheld for 
strategic reasons (Gray 1989). A consensus-building process, on the other hand, is premised on 
information disclosure. The same thing could be said for regulatory negotiations (reg-neg) 
compared to traditional rule-making. As Weber and Khademian (1997, pp. 401) describe:  “The 
interactive bargaining format facilitates the flow of information among interested parties such 
that timely, innovative bargains can be struck that facilitate the interests of all players.” 
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The importance of number of ties and diversity of ties 
In the management literature, knowledge creation has been linked to both the number of 
collaborative ties and the diversity of organizations involved in an alliance (Hardy, Phillips, and 
Lawrence 2003, Deeds and Hill 1996). Large inter-organizational networks or alliances, such as 
research consortia, are advantageous because they bring together a “larger brain trust than any 
one firm could muster” (Barringer and Harrison 2000, pp. 373). For instance, the alliance in the 
early 1990’s that created the Advance Photo System was led by Kodak, and included Fuji, 
Canon, Minolta, and Nikon (Barringer and Harrison 2000). This massive concentration of 
expertise and creativity was a major factor in their success; it is highly unlikely that these firms 
could have accomplished this task alone or in smaller groups. Other scholars emphasize the 
importance of weak or non-redundant ties, which can foster innovative thinking by forcing actors 
to build relationships among multiple disconnected clusters of organizations (Burt 1992).  
Having diverse participation in a network or partnership, i.e. organizations with diverse 
perspectives, skills, and expertise, is generally thought to facilitate knowledge generation and the 
vetting of ideas (Sørensen and Torfing 2011, Rogers and Weber 2010, Lasker, Weiss, and Miller 
2001, Gray 1989, Rogers and Weber 2010, Innes and Booher 1999). Conversely, tight networks 
of homophilous organizations, or those that are closed to new participants (and thus new ideas), 
are less likely to break out of the mold of traditional thinking or question the status quo. Jones, 
Hesterly and Borgatti (1997) cite U.S. auto manufacturers as an example.  
For collaborative processes like consensus building, diversity means that there are always 
participants who disagree with, and are willing to challenge, the assumptions made by any other 
stakeholder group (Innes and Booher 1999). Dialogue among diverse interest can also lead to 
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“double loop learning”: groups reach an impasse due to their differences and have no choice but 
to reassess their goals and tasks, a process which generates new ideas (Innes and Booher 1999). 
Lasker, Weiss, and Miller (2001, pp. 184) describe the importance of bringing many “heads” 
together to discuss health policies: 
Much has been written about the capacity of collaboration to generate new and better 
ways of thinking about health issues. This capacity, which is reflected in partnership 
goals and plans, derives from the strengths that emerge when many "heads" or "voices" 
are brought together, particularly when the people involved contribute different kinds of 
knowledge and perspectives. Creativity is one expression of the improved thinking that 
can result from collaboration. Working together, through a process that encourages the 
exploration of differences, people involved in partnerships have the potential to break 
new ground, challenge accepted wisdom, and discover innovative solutions to problems 
(Lasker, Weiss, and Miller 2001, pp. 184).  
 
Further, consensus-building processes often strive to achieve equality among participants, at 
least within the time-and-space constraints of the process. Equality may foster innovation, as less 
powerful players are empowered to challenge the status quo and more powerful players are 
compelled to listen (Innes and Booher 1999).  
Based on the literature survey above, the benefit of innovation generation can be 
summarized by the following proposition, which will be explored in my empirical data: 
 
Proposition 2: (Innovation generation) 
Collaboration generates policy innovations as diverse organizations share and jointly process 
their varied experiences, ideas, and information, often through intense dialogue and 
negotiation.   
 
Note that I will only be exploring innovation generation, and not innovation diffusion, in my 
data. Collaboration scholars have found networks linkages and partnerships to be well-suited to 
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the transfer and diffusion of innovations from one organization to another (e.g. Sørensen and 
Torfing 2011, Brass, et al 2004, Berry, et al 2004, Lubell and Fulton 2008, Ahuja 2000, Mowery, 
Oxley, and Silverman 1996, Tsai 2001, Powell 1990). However, innovation diffusion is a 
conceptually different process from innovation generation, grounded in resource exchange and 
diffusion of innovation theories. Because my conception of resource exchange includes 
information (and thus innovative ideas), there is conceptual overlap between innovation diffusion 
and resource exchange benefits, and I will not explore them separately.  
 
Achieving coordinated action 
Coordinated action is a broad term that describes when individual organizations or groups align 
their actions or decisions to achieve some larger “good” at the organizational, community, and/or 
societal level. In Chapter 5, I narrow this definition to introduce what I call “harmonizing”, a 
more specific and conceptually developed process of coordinated action. When organizations or 
groups “harmonize” their decisions or actions, they approximate the actual scope of a problem 
and achieve collective (but not necessarily individualized) benefits at the community and/or 
societal level.  
“Coordinated action” benefits are best depicted by Huxham and MacDonald (1992), who 
argue that collaboration helps to avoid and/or manage specific “pitfalls of individualism”. The 
first pitfall, Repetition, is equivalent to duplication and occurs when “two or more organizations 
carry out an action or task which need only be done by one (pp. 51)”.  The second pitfall is 
Omission, whereby activities important to more than one organization, or to the larger society, 
fail to be carried out. Generally, omitted activities “fall through the cracks” either because they 
don’t specifically belong under any one organizations’ mandate, or because they are a shared 
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responsibility that each organization assumes the other is doing. Simple collaboration such as 
information exchange could prevent both repetition and omission. The third pitfall, Divergence, 
occurs when resources are spread so thinly that the “actions of the various organizations are 
diluted across a range of activities rather than used towards common goals (Huxham and 
MacDonald 1992, pp. 51).” Divergence is essentially a lack of coordinated resource targeting. A 
more complex form of collaboration, like partnerships or joint programming, would address 
divergence by mobilizing resources in a collectively rational manner.   
An example of collaboration that addresses these first three pitfalls is “integrated service 
delivery”, also called “service integration”, “one-stop service provision”, or “wrap-around 
services”, in which related services are provided in an integrated and coordinated manner, 
sometimes by co-locating offices in the same building (Zhang and Dawes 2006, Selden, Sowa, 
and Sandfort 2006, Goldsmith and Eggers 2004, Provan and Milward 1995). For instance, 
welfare services might be co-located with job-training, adult education, mental health, and child-
care. Clients can get the full range of care they need and are less likely to fall between the cracks 
as they are shuffled from agency to agency. Provan and Milward (1995) describe these benefits: 
 
“In addition, through coordination, an integrated system supposedly minimizes 
duplication of services by multiple provider agencies while increasing the probability that 
all essential services are provided somewhere in the system and that clients will have 
access to these needed services (Provan and Milward 1995, pp. 3-4).” 
 
The quote makes the connection between collaboration and two of Huxham and MacDonald’s 
(1992) pitfalls of individualism: Repetition (the integrated system “minimizes duplication”) and 
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Omission (the integrated system “increases the probability that all essential services are provided 
somewhere in the system”). Integrated service delivery also addresses divergence if the various 
service providers work together to divide labor efficiently and target scarce resources.  
The fourth and most damaging “pitfall of individualism”, Counterproduction, occurs 
when the actions of one organization working in isolation conflict with the actions of another 
organization. “At best, this may lead to a ‘cancelling out’ of the benefits of each action; at worst 
it could leave both [organizations] worse off than they were before (Huxham and McDonald 
1992, pp. 52).” The collective, societal benefits of organizational actions could end up being zero 
or negative.  
A common example of counter-production is when one organization or jurisdiction’s 
actions produce “spill-over effects” or “externalities” that negatively affect other organizations. 
Spill-over effects are a concern especially among scholars of state and local government, since 
jurisdictions will try to reap the benefits of activities (e.g. economic development) while passing 
on associated costs to their geographic neighbors (e.g. pollution, traffic, costs of human 
services). One solution is collaboration though mechanisms like regional governance 
organizations (Feiock 2009) or inter-jurisdictional agreements (LeRoux, Brandenburger, and 
Pandey 2010). In the terminology of counter-production, collaboration minimizes the actions 
taken by one organization which cause harm to other organizations or to society overall.  In some 
cases, like the jurisdiction that wants economic development but not pollution, efforts to shift 
costs are purposeful. Yet counter-production may occur through thoughtlessness and lack of 
communication, in which case basic information exchange will alleviate the problem.  
There are a few benefits related to “coordinated action” that don’t fit within the Huxham 
and MacDonald (1992) framework. First, collaboration standardizes activities and decisions of 
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organizations working on similar programs, creating greater consistency and predictability. In 
service delivery systems, this makes it easier for clients to attain care from multiple agencies 
without filling out new paperwork or learning a new system.  An example from watershed 
management is standardization of data collection or monitoring protocols, which allows agencies 
to combine their data and thus improve data availability overall (Rogers and Weber 2010).   
Second, collaboration ensures that the appropriate agencies are involved in solving a 
problem. Policy problems are often “wicked” and cannot be broken down into pieces and solved 
independently by isolated organizations (Rittel and Webber 1973, O’Toole 1997). Without 
collaboration, the policy problem is solved partially or advancements made in one area are 
tempered by the lack of progress in another (Beuren, Klijn, and Koppenjan (2003). Determining 
which organizations are needed to solve a wicked problem, and getting them to collaborate, is a 
key challenge for public managers. In watershed management, for instance, it is critical to 
involve multiple actors not directly working on water quality issues, such as local government 
land use managers who make zoning, development, and siting decisions, transportation 
departments that manage roadways, and health departments that manage sewer and septic 
systems (Born and Genskow 2000). Lubell (2004a) describes how collaborative structures are 
well-suited to this coordination task: 
“Proponents argue that…the collaborative structure of the  NEP [National Estuary 
Program]  is better suited to complex watershed problems, which span administrative and 
political boundaries, affect multiple environmental media (e.g.,  air, land, water), and 
have complex cause- and-effect relationships with often delayed or invisible 
environmental responses.  The  inclusive style of the NEP addresses boundary-spanning 
problems by reaching out to stakeholders previously confined to isolated subsystems, 
providing them the opportunity to interact, share information, pool resources, and 
integrate otherwise redundant or fragmented  policies (Lubell 2004a, pp. 552).” 
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Comprehensive thinking and action is another benefit that emerges when multiple organizations 
who work on various aspects or part of a problem collaborate. Multiple aspects of the problem 
are addressed simultaneously and in concert, as opposed to being addressed by different 
organizations at different times, different paces, and in different manners. As described by 
Lasker, Weiss, and Miller (2001), a holistic, comprehensive view of the problem is constructed, 
which forms the basis for action:  
 
“By themselves, partners frequently see only part of a problem. As a group, however, 
they can construct a more holistic view-one that enhances the quality of solutions by 
identifying where multiple issues intersect and by promoting broader analyses of 
problems and opportunities (Lasker, Weiss, and Miller 2001, pp. 184-185).” 
 
Based on the literature survey above, the coordinated action benefit can be summarized by the 
following proposition, which will be explored in my empirical data: 
 
Proposition 3: (Coordinated Action) 
By facilitating coordinated action, collaboration promotes a comprehensive, collectively 
rational approach to policy and avoids duplication, omission, divergence, counter-production, 
and other inefficiencies.  
 
Building Social Capital 
Putnam (1995, pp. 67) defines social capital as: “features of social organization such as 
networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.” 
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Putnam’s definition emphasizes social organization, while other scholars emphasize exchange 
and structural dimensions. For instance, the working definition provided by Adler and Kwon 
(2002), based on an extensive review of the concept, reflects concepts of resource exchange: 
 
Social capital is the goodwill available to individuals or groups. It source lies in the 
structure and content of the actor's social relations. Its effects flow from the information, 
influence, and solidarity it makes available to the actor (Adler and Kwon 2002, pp. 23).  
 
Social capital is purposefully presented as analogous to physical or human capital to emphasize 
that social networks are valuable and can be expected to produce future returns (Putnam 1995, 
Fountain 1998). Broadly, there are two ways in which social capital provides benefits, 
corresponding to the two types of social capital identified by Putnam (1995): bridging and 
bonding. Bridging social capital is generated between actors not already part of the same social 
organization or network, whereby relationships create a bridge between tightly bonded networks. 
Bonding social capital is generated and sustained by groups or individuals already in close 
relationships; it helps to maintain strong bonds and reinforce identities among homogenous 
groups (Putnam 1995). Investing in bridging capital produces benefits similar to those described 
under resource exchange (i.e. access to information, power, and solidarity), while bonding 
capital strengthens collective identity and improves the capacity of the network to engage in 
collective action (Adler and Kwon 2002). Bridging social capital is more important for my 
purposes because I study relationships among diverse organizations.  
 
How social capital is created through collaboration 
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Collaboration builds bridging social capital through repeated, reciprocal interactions among 
organizations, allowing them to demonstrate to each other that they are competent, sincere, have 
good intentions, and will follow through on promises (Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2006; Lubell 
and Fulton 2008; Innes and Booher 1999). Building social capital is similar to the process of 
“trust-building”. Although “trust” is too complicated for a full treatment here, suffice it to say 
that trust is a component of social capital that emphasizes the inter-personal, relationship-
building aspects of social capital over the exchange aspects. The process of building trust and 
social capital is similar, occurring through repeated interactions over a long period of time 
(Thomson and Perry 2006). For instance, Huxham and Vangen (2004) argue that trust is built 
through a cyclical trust-building loop, in which collaborative partners initially take small risks 
which, as trust is developed, eventually build to more ambitious investments in the relationship.  
Bridging social capital can be built even among organizations with highly conflicting 
values or beliefs (Schneider, et al 2003) or across deep political and social divides (Connick and 
Inness 2003). Connick and Innes (2003), for instance, describe in detail the process by which 
antagonistic stakeholders broke down barriers and built relationships while engaged in 
collaborative water policy-making: 
in the early stages of each project stakeholders representing diametrically opposing 
views, who often had fought each other in the courts or battled over legislation, tended to 
sit and talk mainly with others in their ‘caucus’. But as time passed, stakeholders having 
opposing views came to know one another and developed empathy for each other’s 
interests. They developed informal relationships over meals and/or through working 
together in groups. Participants forged personal bonds that cut across their ideologies and 
interests…. Individuals began to sit and talk with those representing different 
perspectives, sometimes to work on how to resolve differences, sometimes just because 
they enjoyed each other’s company. On more than one occasion a stakeholder 
representing the development community stopped a discussion from going forward, 
although it favoured his interests, because one of the key environmentalists was not there 
and he knew this individual would object (Connick and Innes 2003, pp. 184). 
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In some cases, the collaborative process or structure is explicitly designed to foster interactions 
among traditionally antagonistic parties. Schneider, et al (2003) find that the National Estuary 
Program (NEP) partnerships, compared to similar partnerships outside of the NEP program, were 
more likely to connect business and environmental interests because NEP estuaries had to meet 
certain public participation requirements to quality for funding. These “ideological boundary 
spanning networks” encourage negotiated agreements among traditional adversaries by exposing 
them to repeated, long-term interactions that developed social capital.  
 
Concrete benefits of social capital 
Most scholars are interested not in social capital itself but in the benefits it produces at multiple 
levels (Adler and Kwon 2002). At the personal level, social connections may improve 
professional opportunities and/or lead to friendships and emotional fulfillment. At the 
organizational level, social ties are the means for conferring both informational benefits and 
securing power (Adler and Kwon 2002, Burt 1992). Social ties facilitate the flow of information, 
while power may be secured either through relationships with powerful actors or by occupying 
network positions that offer control over key resources (Burt 1992).  
I am interested in societal or community level benefits of social capital. I focus on one 
key societal or community-level benefit: the formation of relationships that become the basis for 
future collaboration. This is discussed below. A second benefit tied to social capital, reducing 
conflict, is discussed separately.13 
                                                             
13 Other concrete benefits of social capital at the societal/community level that I do not address in my research 
include: 1) a reduction in transaction costs of collaboration and 2) building a better, more engaged society. These 
benefits, and my reasons for excluding them, are described below: 
1. Reduction in transaction costs of collaboration 
Frequent, repeated interactions among organizations reduce the transaction costs of collaboration according to 
several lines of reasoning. Most essentially, game theory predicts that participants in an exchange are less likely to 
seek personal advantage if they may be punished in future exchanges. In addition, repeated interactions and personal 
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Relationships strengthened by social capital provide an enduring institutional 
infrastructure that can be used to address new problems. Innes and Booher (1999) describe “spin 
off” partnerships that occur after the primary consensus-building process is completed (i.e. a 
second- or third-order effect), and are based on the relationships, shared meanings/goals, and 
social capital built during the initial process.  Similarly, they find some partners use social capital 
developed on one issue to reach consensus on a separate issue. In some cases, a concrete 
institutional structure— such as a collaborative organization or network organization— is 
created upon which future collaboration is built (Imperial 2005). In other cases, it is a social 
infrastructure (less tangible, but nonetheless real) of relationships and networks developed 
through collaboration, utilized to tackle new problems (Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2006). Social 
infrastructure may also include cooperative attitudes (Schneider, et al 2003), knowledge and 
experience with collaboration (Connick and Innes 2003) and mechanisms/ techniques learned to 
coordinate interactions (Gray 1989).   
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
contacts foster respect and consideration among parties, in some cases leading to behavioral norms for cooperation 
(Schneider, et al 2003). The development of trust again comes into play; trust among parties reduces the complexity 
of interaction (and thus transaction costs), as parties worry less about controlling opportunism and manipulative 
behavior (Thomson and Perry 2006; Ansell and Gash 2008). Finally, repeated interactions among partners allows for 
social mechanisms to emerge to govern and facilitate exchanges: the use of reputation to reward good behavior and 
punish bad behavior, development of a network-level macro-culture that socializes participants to follow shared 
behavioral rules and norms, and collective sanctions for bad behavior (Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti 1997, Ostrom 
1990). Without social capital built up from repeated interaction, these social mechanisms would not function.  
A reduction in transaction costs improves collaboration by making it smoother and less costly to participants. 
However, there is no independent benefit. The logical flow of benefits goes like this: collaboration leads to 
increased social capital which reduces transaction costs which improves collaboration. I am interested in the 
ultimate benefits of collaboration, rather than benefits that foster or improve collaboration itself.  For this reason, I 
do not further pursue the transaction cost-reduction benefits of collaboration. 
2. Building a better society through social capital 
A core argument of Robert Putnam (1993, 1995) is that social capital builds a better society. The argument, as 
summarized in Adler and Kwon (2002), is that engagement of citizens in civic organizations (and this could be 
extended to collaborative organizations) leads to habits and attitudes of cooperation and public-spiritedness which 
spill over into society, creating higher levels of trust and reciprocity, bridging political and social divides, and 
creating the basis for collective action.  Measuring this benefit is beyond the scope of my research; yet it clearly is 
important not only for achieving concrete policy goals but for creating a positive and productive policy-making 
environment. 
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“Spin-off” groups continue or extend the work of the initial collaborative partnerships. In 
fact, the secondary group may be successful where the primary one was not, especially if it 
benefits from improved working relationships and/or collective learning that occurred in the first 
go-round (Provan and Milward 2001). Improved working relationships and trust may help 
partners tackle policy problems separate from and unrelated to the original problem (Imperial 
2005). Social networks may also improve coordination among organizations that do not normally 
consult each other before making decisions (Connick and Innes 2003). 
The social capital benefit of collaboration, manifested by built relationships and 
institutional infrastructure, can be summarized by the following proposition to be explored in my 
empirical data: 
 
Proposition 4: (Social capital – building institutional infrastructure) 
Collaboration generates social capital among diverse organizations, building relationships 
and institutional infrastructure that can be used to address future problems.  
 
Reduced conflict14 
Reduced conflict is not universally touted as a benefit of collaboration but is emphasized in 
certain literatures, such as conflict resolution and negotiation, and by public management 
                                                             
14 Most collaboration scholars recognize that conflict is a natural and important part of the collaborative process and 
should not be completely eliminated. Conflict “promotes a healthy competition of ideas and stimulates policy 
change and learning” (Imperial 2005, pp. 311) and provided that it is managed well, it can “sharpen partners’ 
discussions on issues and stimulate new ideas and approaches” (Lasker, Weiss, and Miller 2001, pp. 193). Further, 
there are risks to the suppression of conflict. First, partnerships that work to avoid conflict might end up addressing 
only the easiest, “lowest common denominator” issues that all parties can agree on, making little progress on critical 
but less tractable problems (Poncelet 2001; Layzer 2008). Second, conflict avoidance may constrain radical, out-of –
box thinking needed to produce truly innovative solutions (Poncelet 2001). And finally, collaboration and conflict 
reduction may be a “cover” for dominance or co-optation by powerful interests (Poncelet 2001, Walker and Hurley 
2004, Amy 1987). 
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scholars that draw upon these areas of scholarship.15 These literatures emphasize the process 
aspects of collaboration— such as consensus-building, dialogue, and negotiation— and define 
collaboration as an alternative to adversarial or legalistic approaches. Ansell and Gash (2008) 
typify this perspective in the quote below defining collaborative governance:  
By contrast with decisions made adversarially, collaborative governance is not a 
‘‘winner-take-all’’ form of interest intermediation. In collaborative governance, 
stakeholders will often have an adversarial relationship to one another, but the goal is to 
transform adversarial relationships into more cooperative ones. In adversarial politics, 
groups may engage in positive-sum bargaining and develop cooperative alliances. 
However, this cooperation is ad hoc, and adversarial politics does not explicitly seek to 
transform conflict into cooperation. (Ansell and Gash 2008, pp. 547) 
 
According to this perspective, collaboration corrects weaknesses of adversarial policy 
approaches such as excessive cost, inflamed conflict and confrontation, and winner-take-all 
outcomes. In a table comparing collaborative and adversarial processes, for instance, Gray (1989, 
pp. 50) demonstrates how collaboration addresses several limitations of adversarial legal 
processes, including:  the difficulty of achieving innovative solutions due to restricted 
communication; polarization and hostility between parties; limitations on the use of full 
information; the inability of courts to deal with complex technical issues; and lack of 
representation of all stakeholders. 
My definition of collaboration is different from that posed by Ansell and Gash (2008). 
Collaboration is not defined in stark opposition to regulation or legal approaches, but can occur 
during or alongside them. My focus on structure means collaboration does not require special 
consensus-building or negotiation processes, and the neutrality of my definition does not require 
                                                             
15 My literature survey for this section focuses on public management and public policy scholarship, some of which 
draws upon insights and research from outside literatures such as conflict resolution, alternative dispute resolution, 
and negotiation. Some public management scholars have done excellent work drawing concepts from conflict 
resolution literature and legal literatures on alternative dispute resolution, negotiation, and mediation and applying 
these to collaboration scholarship. Relevant works include O’Leary and Bingham 2003, Gray 1989, Susskind and 
Cruikshank 1987, and Bingham and O’Leary 2006. These works were consulted in order to gain important insights 
on the conflict resolution benefit. However, an in-depth survey of the ancillary literatures was not conducted.  
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participants to be empathetic, to build trust, or to develop positive inter-personal relationships. 
Coming from this neutral, structural definition, there is no reason to assume that collaborative 
partnerships will succeed in resolving or reducing conflicts, or even attempt to do so. That said, 
conflict reduction has been identified as a benefit of collaboration by a large segment of scholars 
and is worth exploring.  
According to such scholars, the collaborative process helps to reduce conflict by 
“breaking logjams” among competing participants (Innes and Booher 1999, pp. 412). When 
traditional adversarial processes lead to an impasse, collaboration may “reopen negotiations” 
(Gray 1989, pp 22). Alternatively, using the collaborative process early may prevent an impasse 
from occurring (Gray 1989). Collaborations’ ability to end (or prevent) stalemates or impasse 
stems from special characteristics of the collaborative process – interactive dialogue among 
participants with diverse interests, mutually agreed upon ground rules that increase parties’ 
comfort level, and good facilitation—that loosen up previously withheld information and foster 
innovative solutions. Collaboration also resolves conflict by simply bringing adversaries together 
for repeated positive, friendly (or at least civil) interactions. As described, repeated interactions 
build social capital, reducing the likelihood of opportunistic behavior, fostering respect and 
consideration, and developing trust.  
Conflict reduction achieved through collaboration is manifested in two main ways: 1) a 
reduction in adversarial practices like lawsuits and advocacy and 2) a reduction in post-decision 
animosity (backlash) against decisions. First, organizations may back off from adversarial 
practices if collaboration meets their interests. This affects not only their current decision to 
pursue collaboration, but future decisions. As Innes and Booher (1999, pp. 415) put it:  
“[Participants] may conclude that  consensus building can work more effectively for them than 
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confrontational tactics, and in the future they may seek out dialogue rather than bringing lawsuits 
or creating opposing legislative proposals.”   
Connick and Innes (2003), for instance, found that the Water Forum – a collaborative 
dialogue centered on water supply in the Sacramento, CA region— ended a long stalemate 
between environmental groups and the East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD), the water 
supplier for the east side of San Francisco Bay. In nearly 20 years of legal proceedings, 
environmentalists had pushed to reduce diversions from the American River to protect 
endangered species of fish, while EBMUD was ramping up supply to meet demands of a 
growing population. The Water Forum stimulated productive dialogue and discussions that led 
stakeholders to withdraw from lawsuits and advocacy, and eventually agreement was reached.  
From this case and two similar cases, Connick and Innes (2003) conclude that collaborative 
dialogues lead to changes in in understanding and behavior that allow warring partners to “move 
off a collision course” (pp. 186). Collaborative dialogues, they argue, effected a remarkable 
transformation in the atmosphere of water policy in California: 
The California water policy arena has been a notoriously conflictual one, in which parties 
frequently were at odds with one another on multiple fronts simultaneously, fighting one 
another through regulatory and resource management agencies, the courts, Congress and 
the legislature and the voters. Today these diverse parties are engaging in collaborative 
dialogues, focusing on joint problem solving rather than mutual destruction, and more 
often than not going to the legislative bodies and voters with one voice in seeking 
remedies to their problems (Connick and Innes 2003, pp. 195). 
 
Similarly, Schneider, at al (2003) found that participants in collaborative National Estuary 
Programs were less likely than those in other estuary programs to consider litigation or other 
adversarial approaches; they preferred to resolve conflict within the partnership structure. The 
collaborative NEP program provided a non-adversarial venue for negotiated agreements among 
ideologically diverse interests.  
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A second way that collaboration reduces conflict is by minimizing post-decision 
backlash. The collaborative process brings key stakeholders together to hash out decisions. 
Stakeholders are less likely to turn to adversarial approaches in response to decisions they helped 
craft, in part because they feel a sense of ownership and in part because dialogue and negotiation 
has helped them reach a mutually agreeable solution. 
Connick and Innes (2003) discuss a CALFED procedure where small committees of 
expert water managers, representing all major government agencies and stakeholder groups, 
regularly share and evaluate new information on fisheries, water quality, and flows, and were 
given authority to respond immediately to threatening water quality conditions.  The key factor 
in this procedure’s success was that all regulatory agencies, plus stakeholders, were at the table 
together to discuss and make trade-offs among the slew of conflicting regulations related to 
water supply, flood prevention, and protecting endangered species. Previously, as soon as one 
regulation was violated, stakeholders supporting that regulation would file a lawsuit. Under this 
new system, the situation was evaluated and trade-offs were made immediately through 
negotiations, rather than through a post-decision adversarial process.  
Regulatory negotiation (reg-neg) serves a similar role, in that key stakeholders affected 
by a new rule or regulation participate in the decision process and shape the final decision. 
Weber and Khademian (1997) focus on rule-making by the EPA, which is normally subject to 
extensive post-rule litigation. Litigation is not only expensive and frustrating, but it leaves 
regulations in limbo as EPA is forced to repeal and rewrite rules over and over again. Reg-neg 
provides key stakeholders the opportunity to play a direct role in writing the rule, developing a 
sense of “ownership” among participants and ensuring that they understand what is expected of 
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them once the rule is finalized. After such involvement, stakeholders will be less likely to engage 
in post-decision litigation.   
Based on the literature survey above, the conflict reduction benefit can be summarized by 
the following proposition, which will be explored in my empirical data: 
 
Proposition 5: (Reducing/resolving conflict) 
Through interactive dialogue among organizations, collaboration breaks policy impasses and 
reduces the use of adversarial practices among parties in conflict.    
 
Note that even the most optimistic of scholars recognizes that participants who don’t get what 
they want through the collaborative process may afterwards utilize adversarial venues (Ansell 
and Gash 2008, Weber and Khademian 1997). Yet this risk can be minimized by a well-designed 
collaborative process that builds trust, reciprocity, and respect, deals effectively with conflict, 
breaks down barriers to information flow, and sets appropriate expectations.  For instance, 
Weber and Khademian (1997) discuss the importance of a three part “assurance mechanism” to 
reassure participants that final regulatory negotiation (reg-neg) agreements will be honored: (1) 
an entrepreneurial leader that can convince participants their interests will be protected if they 
participate in good faith, (2) commitment of the regulatory agency to carry out the negotiated 
decision, and (3) a set of formal, binding rules that commits the regulatory agency and other 
participants to abide by the negotiated decision.    
 
Conceptual and empirical development of the benefits of collaboration  
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The five propositions developed above will be explored using a rich empirical data set on 
collaboration in the Chesapeake Bay watershed and the Northern Virginia (NOVA) region. The 
purpose of my empirical analysis is conceptual development of these benefits of collaboration: to 
improve understanding of the nature of the benefits and the unique processes of collaboration 
that produce them. Empirical data illuminates how the benefits can be identified in practice, the 
different forms that the benefits take, and different contexts in which they emerge. 
As mentioned earlier, the focus of my empirical analysis is on Coordinated Action (or 
more precisely what I call harmonizing, a process of coordinated action emphasizing the need to 
address problems at their proper scope and scale). Aside from the work by Huxham and 
MacDonald (1992), the coordinated action benefit is conceptually under-developed in existing 
literature. Also, my most interesting and unique results came from analysis of coordinated action 
cases. For the other four benefits, a shorter analysis of key themes is presented, pointing towards 
future research opportunities.  
As mentioned in the introduction, my ultimate goal—and my long-term research 
agenda—is to evaluate the utility of collaboration. Do its benefits outweigh the costs? How can 
its benefits be maximized and costs minimized? Several scholars have already developed 
frameworks for evaluating collaboration, although none are universally accepted or applicable to 
all types of collaboration. For instance, the framework by Provan and Milward (2001) focuses on 
effectiveness of social service delivery networks at three levels of analysis: community, network, 
and organization/participant. Innes and Booher (1999) provide a framework featuring lists of 
process and outcome criteria by which to evaluate the “consensus-building” aspect of 
collaboration. Other scholars, such as Agranoff (2008) and Leach (2006), identify and categorize 
benefits of collaboration derived from the analysis of empirical data.  
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A common problem with these frameworks is that the benefits themselves are 
conceptually under-developed. For instance, one evaluative criteria on the list by Innes and 
Booher (1999) is “[production] of creative ideas” (also called “innovative strategies”). However, 
the authors provide little conceptual or empirically-based discussion of what the 
“innovation/creativity” benefit looks like, or how collaboration is uniquely poised to bring it 
about.  Presumably the benefits featured in these evaluative frameworks will be operationalized 
and applied to cases of actual collaboration. Without serious conceptual development of the 
benefits themselves, however, measures will be hollow and may inaccurately reflect the true 
nature of the benefit. My contribution is to elaborate, conceptually and empirically, on the 
benefits that will be entered into such conceptual frameworks. I apply insights from the literature 
to a rich set of empirical data, providing a multitude of examples of how each benefit is 
manifested through collaboration.  
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Chapter 4: Methods and Data 
 
The five research propositions developed in the previous chapter (each representing a key benefit 
of collaboration) are examined using an empirical data set.  Coding my data reveals hundreds of 
“instances” in which collaboration leads to one of these five concrete, policy-related benefits. 
Through analysis of these “instances” of collaboration I improve our conceptual understanding 
of the five benefits of collaboration – particularly the benefit of coordinated action – and 
processes of collaboration that bring about them about. I also utilize my data to explore the 
context under which collaborative benefits emerge. 
 
Key methodological decisions 
I start this chapter by summarizing and justifying four key decisions made regarding the type of 
data collected, case selection, and empirical analysis. Next I discuss case selection and introduce 
my two cases, providing an overview in this chapter and more detailed information in Appendix 
A.  I then describe my data sources and data collection methodology. I end the chapter with a 
description of my coding process and an overview of data analysis methods.  
 
Key decision #1: Qualitative data and analysis 
I collect qualitative data because in this project I aim to develop concepts and understand 
processes of collaboration, both of which require context-rich information. Also, my theory-
building goals require me to understand collaboration in depth from the perspective of variety of 
participants. The best means to get such information is in-depth interviews, which allow for 
planned and spontaneous variation in questions.   
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Qualitative analysis techniques are critical to my project because theory building requires 
iterative cycles of empirical analysis and concept development.  Every step of my project – from 
the literature survey presented in Chapter 3, to refinement of the coding scheme, to coding, to 
analysis and thematic development— was part of a conceptual development process. More than 
just rich empirical data, conceptual development requires working in close contact with the data. 
For me, analysis mainly involved using tables and spreadsheets to lay out examples of different 
codes, categorize and sort them, and pull out common themes. These methods allow me to work 
closely enough with the data to develop complex concepts, while retaining a systematic, logical 
approach.   
 
Key decision #2: Unit of analysis 
My unit of analysis is an “instance” of collaboration that produces one of the five identified 
benefits. Because I utilize a broad definition of collaboration, instances of collaboration analyzed 
for each benefit are diverse in geographical scope, time, and importance. For instance, all of the 
following were instances of collaboration in my data, categorized under the “Coordinated 
Action” benefit: 
1. Neighboring municipalities work together to ensure that shared walking/biking trails 
maintain consistency as they cross municipal lines. 
2. Maryland and Virginia, via a Bi-State Blue Crab Committee, cooperate to phase in 
harmonized, more stringent regulations for blue crab harvests.  
3. Two local government citizens committees, an environmental committee and a low 
income housing committee, worked together to reduce tree canopy requirements in 
exchange for energy conservation in low income homes. 
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4. Through the Chesapeake Bay Gateways Network, the National Park Service helps 
disparate public and private park sites coordinate an overall Chesapeake Bay educational 
and recreational experience. 
 
These four instances demonstrate a variety of collaborative partners, including municipalities 
working together (#1), states working together (#2), citizens’ committees working together (#3), 
and a variety of public and private park sites working together under the auspices of a Federal 
program (#4).  They also vary in time: for instance, #3 is a relatively isolated, short case, while 
#4 is a program that extended over many years and was mentioned several times in my data. 
Further, one could argue that some instances of collaboration, such as the historic agreement 
between Maryland and Virginia on blue crab regulations (#2) are more impactful and important 
than others, such as municipalities harmonizing trails (#1).  
What holds these instances of collaboration together is their illustration of the concept of 
“Coordinated Action”. My research fleshes out this theoretically derived concept by exploring 
the wide variety of collaborative arrangements in which it occurs empirically. My theory-
building goals require a wide variety of instances of collaboration illustrating each proposed 
benefit.  Drawing upon many instances, which occur in different contexts and under different 
conditions, builds a more comprehensive theory for each benefit.  
To present an analogy, the instances of collaboration are like “snapshots” of how each 
collaborative benefit plays out in real life. Using descriptive and typological analysis, I sort, 
describe, and display these snapshots to build a “collage” of sorts that illustrates each benefit. 
The “collage” is meaningful to the extent that I can draw out of these diverse arrangements, 
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occurring in different contexts and under different conditions, the common collaborative benefit 
they illustrate.  
 
Key decision#3:  A different kind of case study  
Unlike a traditional case study where cases themselves are the unit of analysis, my cases are used 
to collect hundreds of instances of collaboration which, as described above, are my units of 
analysis. The Chesapeake Bay restoration, for instance, is a hub of collaborative activity. 
Choosing this case defines or bounds the documents I read, the people whom I interview, and the 
universe of problems and activities I focus on. Once collected, this data generates a wealth and 
diversity of instances of collaboration to be categorized and analyzed.  
Rather than select cases, I could have used a random sampling of watershed managers, 
planners, and others from around the nation. This would generate instances of collaboration 
needed for my analysis and provide greater generalizability.  However, drawing instances of 
collaboration from hundreds of locations and water bodies all over the nation would make it 
impossible to develop the level of contextual knowledge needed to interpret each. Drawing data 
from a single case or a small number of cases greatly reduces the burden of contextualizing the 
collaborative instances, since they all occur within a similar context. This reduced need for 
contextual information is the main draw of a case study approach. 
 
Key decisions #4: Inductive approach to analysis 
The overall structure of my research project is deductive. I begin with a set of five research 
propositions, derived from existing literature, about the benefits of collaboration. These are 
translated into codes and used to analyze my data.   
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However, concepts represented by these “benefits codes” require further elaboration, and 
for this I take an inductive approach. For instance, the benefit of coordinated action was vague 
and under-developed in the literature until my development of the harmonizing concept. In the 
development of this and other concepts, I rely heavily on examples from the data, using tables 
and spreadsheets to sort and review examples, develop themes, and pull out insights. This 
inductive approach meshes with the theory-building emphasis of this project.  A major aim of 
this research is to elaborate on the benefits of collaboration as they manifest themselves in the 
real world in a diversity of contexts. As described, I pull together, synthesize, and sort various 
empirical “snapshots” of these benefits into a meaningful “collage”.  
 
Case selection  
For my purposes, a good case generates many "instances” of collaboration. It also standardizes 
some contextual aspects (to reduce the burden of collecting contextual information), while 
offering variation. For instance, cases where instances of collaboration occur in a constant 
regulatory and institutional context reduce the burden of collecting contextual information. 
However, to meet my theory building objectives cases should provide opportunities to interview 
people with different perspectives, who work in different policy areas, and/or interact within 
different institutional contexts.  
I meet these criteria by selecting one large case of watershed planning/management (the 
Chesapeake Bay watershed restoration) and one region embedded within the Chesapeake Bay 
watershed (the Northern Virginia, or NOVA, region).  In the following sections I briefly 
introduce the cases and explain my reasoning behind each case selection. More detail on the 
cases themselves can be found in Appendix A.  
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Chesapeake Bay Restoration case 
This case focuses on watershed management and restoration activities occurring in the 
Chesapeake Bay watershed under the auspices of the US-EPA Chesapeake Bay Program16  or 
through affiliated organizations. The US-EPA Chesapeake Bay Program partnership was created 
in 1983 under the first of three major Bay agreements.17 Central Bay Program partners are the 
US-EPA, the six states that comprise the watershed plus the District of Columbia, and the 
Chesapeake Bay Commission.18 However, there are many other partners, including fifteen more 
Federal agency partners, several academic institutions, and several NGOs (US-EPA Chesapeake 
Bay Program 2012a). In addition to Bay Program partners, a multitude of public and private 
organizations work on associated restoration activities within the confines of the Bay watershed. 
These organizations range from small NGOs and local governments to private companies and 
large regional organizations. Appendix A provides more detail on the U.S. EPA Chesapeake Bay 
Program Partnership and the inter-state agreements that govern it, as well as other key 
organizations involved in Chesapeake Bay restoration activities. (The appendix provides useful 
contextual background but it is not necessary for understanding my empirical analysis; relevant 
details will be provided as needed in the empirical chapters). 
                                                             
16 Although called the US-EPA Bay Program, this is not a program of EPA Central or any particular EPA region. 
Rather, it is a separate partnership in which US-EPA is one of the key partners. Its funding comes directly from 
Congress. 
17 Others have dated the beginning of the Bay Program to 1976, when Congress gave the US-EPA $25 million to 
conduct a 5-year study of the Chesapeake Bay. As part of this study, US-EPA was tasked with coordinating existing 
research on the Bay, establishing a data collection and analysis program, and making recommendations on 
Chesapeake Bay management. Although this was mainly a research program, it laid a foundation for the inter-state 
coordination solidified by the 1983 Bay Agreement.  
18 The Chesapeake Bay Commission is tri-state legislative assembly representing Maryland, Virginia and 
Pennsylvania. It assists these state legislatures in responding to Bay concerns and promotes, where appropriate, 
uniformity of state legislation.   
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Figure 4.1 shows a map of the Chesapeake Bay watershed, which covers 64,000 square 
miles of land area. It includes land in six states (Maryland, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and smaller 
parts of New York, West Virginia, and Delaware) and the District of Columbia.  
 
Figure 4.1: Map of the Chesapeake Bay Watershed.19 
 
 
 
There are three main reasons for selecting the Chesapeake Bay Restoration as my “large” case: 
(1) it is a hub for collaborative activity, (2) it features collaboration in a diversity of institutional 
settings (within the confines of a particular context), and (3) it is data rich. 
                                                             
19 Source: US-EPA (2012c). 
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The description of key collaborative organizations working on Chesapeake Bay 
restoration activities, provided in Appendix A, makes it clear that the region is a hub for 
collaborative activity (reason #1). Collaborative organizations and partnerships actively 
coordinate inter-jurisdictional and inter-organizational programs, plans, and projects at the Bay 
level and within embedded areas of the Bay watershed.  These organizations offer collaborative 
opportunities that vary from localized to regional, structured to unstructured, regulatory to non-
regulatory, and formal to informal.   
Because of the diverse geographical, demographic, and ecological makeup of the Bay 
watershed, the Bay Restoration case “features collaboration in a diversity of institutional 
settings” (reason #2).  There are key differences by state. For instance, the three States that 
comprised the original Bay Program (Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania) have long-standing 
Bay restoration institutions. Some are inter-state organizations such as the Chesapeake Bay 
Commission, while others are intra-state laws, organizations, or programs. The Bay is less 
central to environmental programming in New York, West Virginia, and Delaware, since a small 
portion of their total land area is in the watershed and they did not join the Bay Program until 
2000. The District of Columbia offers a completely unique institutional environment for the 
implementation of Bay-related policy. It is fully within the Bay watershed and has been part of 
the Bay Program from the beginning, yet it lacks the autonomy of its State partners.  
With so many States and D.C., there is great diversity in the regulatory structures used for 
Bay restoration. For instance, Maryland has a Department of Planning that runs its smart growth 
and green infrastructure programs; no other State has such an agency. Also, most states have 
regional satellite offices for their State environmental agencies, but Delaware (probably because 
of its small size) does not.  There are also differences in State regulatory culture and preferred 
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procedures. Historically, Maryland has had the most stringent environmental regulations related 
to the Bay, and its people have been more willing to accept State intervention. This 
“interventionist regulatory culture” is often compared to Virginia and Pennsylvania, where 
voluntary approaches are strongly preferred.   
Local governments also provide significant regulatory and procedural variation. More 
than 1,650 local governments are located within the Chesapeake Bay watershed, including cities, 
counties, towns, townships and boroughs, providing further opportunities to see how 
collaboration unfolds in a variety of institutional contexts. They vary significantly by size, 
capacity, authorities, and departmental structures.  This variation is significant for my policy 
interests because key decisions about stormwater management and land use are made locally.   
The Chesapeake Bay watershed includes areas that are rural, urban, and suburban. Cities 
and metro regions include Washington D.C.; Baltimore, MD; the Norfolk/Hampton Roads metro 
area in VA; Richmond, VA; and Harrisburg, PA.  All these, and many smaller cities, have 
suburban areas surrounding them or areas in transition from suburban to urban development. In 
fact, development pressure in the DC suburbs, the DC/Baltimore corridor, and around Harrisburg 
and Richmond is intense.20  Yet the Bay region has some quite rural areas, such as the Delmarva 
Peninsula on the east side of the Bay (this land is split between Delaware, Maryland and 
Virginia), the Shenandoah and Piedmont region of Virginia, and most of central Pennsylvania.21 
Diversity in population density indicates diversity in institutional and regulatory 
structures. Urban, suburban, and rural areas face different water quality impairments. The people 
who cause the impairments and/or are affected by them are different, and they handle these 
                                                             
20 See the 2030 expected population map by County from the Chesapeake Bay Program (US-EPA Chesapeake Bay 
Program 2012d).This can be compared to the 2010 map found on the same site. 
21 See the 2010 population map by County from the Chesapeake Bay Program (US-EPA Chesapeake Bay Program 
2012d). 
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impairments in different ways.  In rural areas, for instance, impairments tend to come from 
agriculture and are dealt with through agricultural cost-share programs where farmers are major 
participants. In urban-suburban areas, impervious surface and stormwater pollution are the major 
issues. Local plans and ordinances, plus MS4 permits22 issued under Clean Water Act 
regulations, are used to solve these problems. Environmental and development interests usually 
are involved. Finally, the Chesapeake Bay has a wide variety of natural landscapes, including 
forests, inland and tidal wetlands, and pasture. Some natural features fall under additional 
regulatory or incentive programs, adding institutional layers to watershed management.  
Variation in all these aspects – state regulatory structures, procedures, and culture; local 
government type, structure, and capacity; population density; and natural landscapes— means 
that Bay restoration will occur in a wide variety of institutional settings within the geographical 
confines of my case. Combined with the longevity of the Bay restoration project and the intensity 
of collaboration, I can expect a wide variety of collaborative partnerships and programs. At the 
same time, all “instances” of collaboration related to the Chesapeake Bay restoration are subject 
to the same broad management plans orchestrated by the US-EPA Chesapeake Bay Program. 
They face the same constraints and opportunities, such as the opportunity to apply for certain 
grants. This reduces my burden of collecting contextual information: there is no need to research, 
again and again for every instance, the main organizations that influence regional water quality 
efforts. At the Bay-scale, these organizations are already described in Appendix A.23   
                                                             
22 MS4 stands for Municipal Separate Storm Sewer Systems. MS4 permits are issued from US-EPA or its State 
affiliate agencies under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) stormwater program and 
require urbanized municipalities and Counties to regulate their stormwater runoff.  
23 There are smaller-scale regional organizations (such as the NVRC in Northern Virginia) and state-wide 
organizations (like the Virginia Outdoors Foundation) that will still be important on a case-by-case basis. It is only 
at the Bay-wide scale that the organizational context is the same for different “instances” of collaboration.  
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Finally, the Chesapeake Bay case is data-rich (reason #3). The restoration has been active 
since 1976, when US-EPA was given a $25 million grant to study the Bay. Bay restoration 
scientists, managers, and administrators have been prolific at collecting data, writing reports, and 
assessing progress. The available data and information is varied, as are the sources. Reporting on 
the Chesapeake Bay restoration goes all the way to the top of the Federal government; for 
instance, searching for “Chesapeake Bay Program” in the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) database yields 42 reports (GAO 2012). The following websites give a sense of the 
breadth and depth of data easily available: 
• The Chesapeake Bay Program publications page: 
http://www.chesapeakebay.net/publications 
• USGS publications by year: http://chesapeake.usgs.gov/publications.html 
• Chesapeake Bay Foundation publications page: http://www.cbf.org/page.aspx?pid=548 
• Chesapeake Bay Journal back issues, published by Chesapeake Media Service (used to be 
published by the Alliance for the Chesapeake Bay): 
http://www.bayjournal.com/backissues/ 
 
Northern Virginia (NOVA) case  
In addition to the overall Chesapeake Bay restoration case, I selected one case that is physically 
“embedded” within the Chesapeake Bay watershed .The Northern Virginia (NOVA) region 
encompasses several local governments, regional organizations, citizens’ groups, and 
partnerships. There was no single overarching collaborative project; rather the NOVA region 
includes many collaborative projects in various stages of planning and implementation. The 
same research questions apply to the Chesapeake Bay restoration and the embedded NOVA case. 
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However, because it is smaller in scope the NOVA case allows for examination of collaborative 
mechanisms in more depth and with a richer contextual understanding.  
Figure 4.2 shows a map of the NOVA region. I use the same regional boundaries as the 
Northern Virginia Regional Commission (NVRC), an organization described in Appendix A.24 
Washington, D.C. is located just northeast of Arlington across the Potomac River, as indicated in 
the figure by a light grey shaded area. In fact, the entire NOVA region is part of the Washington-
Arlington-Alexandria Metropolitan Statistical Area.   
  
                                                             
24 Other definitions of the region may include Fauquier County (located south of Loudoun and southwest of Prince 
William) and Stafford County (located directly south of Prince William). 
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Figure 4.2: The Northern Virginia region. 25 (The small picture in the bottom left shows the 
location in relation to the rest of Virginia)  
 
 
 
The jurisdictions from which I interviewed at least one government representative include four 
counties (Arlington, Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince William), four cities (Alexandria, Falls 
Church, Fairfax City, and Manassas), and one town (Leesburg).  All are featured in the Figure 
4.2 map except Leesburg, which is located in Loudoun County close to the Potomac River.26   
Illustrative statistics for NOVA jurisdictions are presented in Appendix A, but I will 
summarize them here. First, NOVA jurisdictions have relatively high population densities and 
face significant development pressures. This drives rapid land conversion and an increase in 
                                                             
25 Source: Northern Virginia Regional Commission (2012a) 
26 The map does not show towns because in Virginia they are not independent political jurisdictions. 
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impervious surface, which in turn can lead to flooding and stormwater pollution if effective 
stormwater controls are not put into place. Significant development pressures also mean private 
developers and the organizations that represent their interests are active in regional and local 
policy. Environmental groups and neighborhood groups are also numerous and powerful in the 
region. Second, residents of the region are wealthy compared to the rest of the State (and the 
nation), meaning that most NOVA jurisdictions have the tax revenue to fund a wide variety of 
environmental programs. Many NOVA jurisdictions also levy a stormwater tax, the revenue 
from which goes directly to flood control and stormwater projects. Finally, the relatively high 
education level of NOVA residents translates into high levels of citizen participation in the 
policy process and strong and organized citizen commissions, advisory groups, homeowners 
associations, and nonprofit groups.  Some citizen participants have powerful jobs in nearby 
Washington, D.C. where they influence policies that affect local government. 
The NOVA case provides a nice balance of contextual similarity and contextual 
variation. Compared to the Chesapeake Bay case, the NOVA region provides a tighter, less 
varied institutional context. State regulatory structures and regulatory culture are the same. 
Levels of wealth, education, and population density are similar. The same regional coordinating 
organizations provide opportunities and support. Although some commutes are further than 
others, the whole region is oriented to Washington DC.  
At the same time, the NOVA region captures significant variety in collaborative 
arrangements, in terms of structure, participants, goals, and challenges faced.  The obvious 
source of variation is the multiple local governments in the region, plus multiple government 
types including counties, cities, and towns. This leads to variation in both capacity and approach. 
Small towns and cities have fewer government employees and less land area, which limits their 
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capacity to do large scale projects. Also, a larger portion of their total land area borders on a 
County; thus, small cities and towns have a more compelling motivation for inter-jurisdictional 
work than the large Counties they border. For their part, Counties tend to have larger, more 
active governments than cities or towns, but their capacities vary significantly by wealth and 
political orientation. There is also variation in the stage of development. Some places are rapidly 
transitioning from suburban to suburban/urban (e.g. Prince William County), while others have 
been urban for a long time (e.g. Arlington County). This affects the type of stormwater and land 
use problems faced, solutions and their feasibility, and the groups who get involved.   
There are two reasons for selecting the NOVA region in particular, rather than another 
multi-jurisdiction region embedded in the Chesapeake Bay watershed: (1) it has several active 
regional coordinating organizations and (2) it has a high level of institutional complexity and 
diversity.   
Four NOVA regional organizations are described in Appendix A: the Northern Virginia 
Regional Commission (NVRC), the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG), 
the Northern Virginia Conservation Trust (NVCT), and the Northern Virginia Parks Authority.  
The fact that there are multiple regional organizations indicates many collaborative projects and 
activities are occurring (reason #1). Further, NVRC and COG are set up specifically for the 
purpose of facilitating collaboration on a regional basis. Both organizations have a Commission 
or a Board with representation from all member jurisdictions and multiple committees on which 
local government bureaucrats communicate with their peers; this indicates collaboration in both 
formal and informal settings.  
The NOVA region also has a high level of institutional complexity and diversity (reason 
#2). This helps with theory-building by allowing me to capture collaboration in many contexts. 
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Institutional complexity is a result of the regions’ large population, urban and suburban nature, 
and high education levels. High population regions, especially those that are mixed urban and 
suburban, tend to have thick institutional environments. There are multiple government 
jurisdictions and active groups supporting development, water quality, land conservation, farms, 
“community character” of particular neighborhoods, recreation, and other causes. With the high 
education and income levels of NOVA residents, these groups draw upon capable and persistent 
leadership and members. The institutional environment that results, thick with private and public 
organizations, offers the opportunity to witness collaboration among many types of groups.  
 
Combining data from the two cases 
One of my cases for this research is a 64,000 square mile watershed that covers parts of six 
states; the other is a smaller multi-jurisdictional region embedded in the first.  My data sources 
for each also differ significantly. For the Chesapeake Bay case, my main sources are articles 
from a monthly newsletter called the Bay Journal.  For the NOVA region, my main sources are 
semi-structured interviews with people working on water quality-related issues in the region. I 
code and interpret Bay Journal and interview data in exactly the same way. However, 
characteristics of the data sources themselves and their respective cases mean they tell different 
aspects of the same story.  
Data sources selected for the two cases make unique contributions, but are 
complementary.  My data on the Chesapeake Bay case covers the whole watershed. It is 
necessarily superficial and selective: there are 10-20 Bay Journal articles per monthly edition, 
which cannot begin to cover all Bay restoration activities that occurred over that time. Articles 
tend to focus on Federal and State government rather than local government activities, and on 
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tangible, visible events versus daily, informal interactions. This complements my interview data 
for the NOVA case, which has a bias towards local government actors and daily, routine 
interactions among organizations.  NOVA interview data also offers in-depth context and 
personal commentary from interviewees, neither of which are normally available from Bay 
Journal articles.    
Although the original Bay States (Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania) get the most 
coverage in the Bay Journal, events/activities from the whole watershed are addressed. Examples 
come from six states and the District of Columbia, rounding out the NOVA case focus on 
Virginia. Examples also range over urban, suburban, and rural parts of the watershed, rounding 
out the urban/suburban focus of the NOVA case. 
 
Data sources and collection  
As described, my main data sources were the Bay Journal (for the Chesapeake Bay case) and 
transcribed interviews (for the NOVA case). For the Chesapeake Bay case, I used additional 
sources not included in the final analysis. Preliminary interviews provided initial orientation and 
aided in the selection of the embedded case, while one month’s of articles from the Chesapeake 
Bay news were used to develop the coding scheme. Each source is described below. 
 
Preliminary interviews (Chesapeake Bay restoration case) 
Preliminary interviews conducted in the Spring and Summer of 2008 oriented me to the 
Chesapeake Bay restoration case, providing information about the structure of the overall 
restoration and some specific information on collaborative projects. They also aided in my 
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selection of the embedded NOVA case. Except for four interviews relevant to the NOVA region, 
however, these interviews were not included in my analysis.  
Twenty five preliminary interviews were conducted; these were semi-structured, over the 
phone, and about an hour long on average. The interview protocol was an earlier version of the 
one used for NOVA interviews (see Appendix B). Using the protocol as a guide, interviews were 
more conversational than structured. Also, individualized questions were added based on 
research prior to each interview. 
Tables 4.1a and 4.1b provide descriptive information about the 25 preliminary 
interviewees. Table 4.1a categorizes interviewees by type, generally the type of organization the 
interviewee works for. The most common category (with 11 interviewees) is “nonprofit 
organizations”. This includes two interviewees who work for land trusts, five who work for 
localized watershed associations27, three who work for Bay-wide non-profits (the Chesapeake 
Bay Foundation and the Alliance for the Chesapeake Bay)28, and one who works for a regional 
branch of Ducks Unlimited.  Another common type was a representative of a regional 
organization (7 interviewees). This includes five people who work for the US-EPA Chesapeake 
Bay Program, one person from the Interstate Commission for the Potomac River Basin, and one 
person from the Upper Susquehanna Coalition (a coalition of 19 Soil and Water Conservation 
Districts in New York and Pennsylvania).  
 
 
 
  
                                                             
27 These organizations focus on watersheds “embedded” in the Chesapeake Bay watershed. Note that for two of the 
“watershed association” interviews, the interviewee is a volunteer board member rather than an employee. In these 
cases, interview questions focused on the interviewee’s volunteer work rather than his/her “day job”.  
28 One of the two “Alliance for the Chesapeake Bay” interviewees was a retired director of that organization, but we 
discussed the interviewees’ past work with the Alliance rather than her current work.  
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Table 4.1a: Breakdown of interviewees by type (preliminary Chesapeake Bay interviews) 
 
Interviewee type # of interviewees 
Nonprofit 11 
Regional 
Organization 
7 
State government 2 
Local government 2 
Citizen activist 2 
Academic 1 
TOTAL 25 
 
Table 4.1b describes the same interviewees based on the geographic focus area of their work. I 
was trying to capture collaborative arrangements occurring at variously sized landscapes. The 
two most common are either the Bay watershed as a whole (8 interviewees) or some smaller, 
embedded watershed (8 interviewees). The other geographic focus areas are self-explanatory, 
except for “other”, which includes the Mid-Atlantic region (1 interviewee) and the Upper 
Susquehanna region (1 interviewee).  
 
Table 4.1b: Breakdown of interviewees by geographic focus area (preliminary Chesapeake Bay 
interviews) 
Type of geographical 
focus area 
# of 
interviewees 
Bay watershed 8 
Embedded watershed 8 
County 4 
City 1 
State  2 
Other 2 
TOTAL 25 
 
Bay News (Chesapeake Bay restoration case) 
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This source aided in the development of my coding scheme, a process described later in this 
chapter. The Bay News is a free daily e-newsletter, compiled by the Chesapeake Bay Program, 
with links to Bay-related news articles from newspapers and online sources around the Bay 
watershed. The newsletter, which comes every business day and contains somewhere between 5 
and 12 links, is an incredible source of data that has yet to be mined by researchers. For an 
illustration of the types of articles available, see the website: 
http://www.chesapeakebay.net/headlines.29  
Certain limitations of this data source convinced me to instead use the Bay Journal for 
the bulk of my analysis. First, information in the Bay News links is scattershot. Stories come 
from daily newspapers, whose job is to report on events that are “hot” at the moment. Without 
continuity from day to day, it is difficult to follow stories over time. The Bay Journal, on the 
other hand, is a monthly publication that focuses on the bigger, more lasting and impactful 
events and builds on previous stories.  Second, most of the Bay News stories are short and lack 
contextual background. This makes it hard to identify instances of inter-organizational 
collaboration, let alone determine the collaborative forum, groups that are collaborating, and 
benefits produced. Third, articles compiled by the Bay News vary in the thoroughness and 
accuracy of their reporting. Many come from small town newspapers that lack the staff time for 
in-depth coverage. More recently, the Bay News has been including blog posts which can vary in 
quality.  
Limitations aside, the Bay News is a phenomenal source of information. Because it 
describes a wide variety of events in locations across the Bay watershed, I used it to develop my 
coding scheme.  For this purpose, I downloaded and coded all of the Bay News articles (200 
                                                             
29 Note that there is a separate page for “Chesapeake Bay News” which is more like a blog for the Chesapeake Bay 
Program. What I used is found under the tab “In the Headlines”. 
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articles) from one month, December 2008.30 These articles, plus about 300 Bay Journal articles 
from 1997-1998, formed the basis for an intensive code development and refinement process 
described later in the chapter.  
 
Bay Journal (Chesapeake Bay restoration case) 
The Bay Journal, a monthly newspaper covering Chesapeake Bay related news, is my main data 
source for the Chesapeake Bay case.  Back issues from January 1994 to the present are available 
electronically from the following website: http://www.bayjournal.com/backissues/.   
From 1991-2010, the Bay Journal was produced and published— electronically and in 
newsprint— by the nonprofit Alliance for the Chesapeake Bay. Thus, the Alliance was the 
publisher for the 1997-2007 issues used my data analysis.31 The Bay Journal aims to “inform the 
public about issues and events that affect the Chesapeake Bay” (Chesapeake Bay Journal 2012). 
The US-EPA Chesapeake Bay Program Office provides the majority of its funding, 
supplemented by grants from the NOAA Chesapeake Bay Office, the Chesapeake Bay Trust, and 
other foundations and individuals.32 With two staff writers, three editors, and a photographer, 
they have the staff to do thorough and accurate reporting on a monthly basis.  
The Bay Journal is a serious news organization, not a newsletter. It is a member of the 
Associated Press and the recipient of the Renewable Natural Resources Foundation’s 2001 
                                                             
30 At the time this coding was done, this was the most current completed month. I did not want to go back too far 
because links sometimes become inactive.  
31 In March 2010, the Bay Journal was official taken over by the Chesapeake Media Service, a nonprofit formed in 
2008 with the mission to “expand independent, unbiased reporting” on the Chesapeake Bay (Chesapeake Media 
Services 2012). Chesapeake Media Service has kept the Bay Journal structure and reporting essentially the same, but 
added more in-depth stories covering a greater diversity of subject matter and wider geographic range. The biggest 
change was adding a separate syndication service, the Bay Journal News Service, which produces and distributes a 
weekly op-ed piece to newspapers around the Bay watershed (Blankenship 2010). 
 32 The Chesapeake Media Service has been trying to decrease the proportion of funding coming from US-EPA. 
Although their reporting is independent, this connection to the Bay Program makes people think they are in the 
EPA’s pocket (Brainard 2011).  
88 
 
 
Excellence in Journalism Award, which recognized the Bay Journal for “for its commitment to 
informing the public through accurate and scientifically based reporting on issues surrounding 
the Chesapeake Bay” (Blankenship 2001). In the May/June 2011 issue of the Columbia Journal 
Review (CJR), the Bay Journal editor Karl Blankenship was honored with an extended interview 
to commemorate the Bay Journal’s 20th anniversary.33 In the article based on the interview, the 
CJR credited the Bay Journal for "[chronicling] efforts to restore an ecosystem degraded by man-
made pollution with practically unparalleled attention" (Blankenship 2011). Karl Blankenship, 
who has been the editor for more than 20 years, has personally received several awards for his 
the Bay Journal work, including the June Sekoll Media Award from the Virginia Soil and Water 
Conservation Society in 1998, the Environmental Excellence Award from the Maryland 
Department of Environment in 1992, the Salute to Excellence Award from the Maryland 
Governor in 1992, and a Lifetime Achievement Award from the Chesapeake Bay Foundation in 
2006 (Chesapeake Bay Journal Facebook page 2012).  
Behind these awards and honors is a newspaper with high quality reporting and writing. 
They strive to be unbiased and accurate, interviewing people with various perspectives on an 
issue.  The writers and editors have developed broad knowledge of the Chesapeake Bay 
restoration, from the laws and regulations governing it, to the living resources and habitats of the 
Bay, to the effects of pollution on these living resources. Plus they have developed a network of 
scientists, regulators, and others to verify information. This depth of knowledge and their 
network of contacts allow them to write detailed and compelling stories, and build on/update 
these stories over time. It also helps them distinguish stories that are impactful and important, 
versus those that are the whim of the moment or are based on a personal “axe to grind”.  
                                                             
33 Excerpts from the interview can be found online (Brainard 2011).   
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The Bay Journal is known for its depth on scientific and technical issues. The Renewable 
Natural Resources Foundation, in awarding the Bay Journal with the 2001 Excellence in Journal 
Award, credited the Bay Journal with being “extremely successful in covering technical and 
often complex issues in a very readable and understandable way” (Blankenship 2001). In 
addition to technical and scientific issues, the Bay Journal provides significant depth on the 
plans, programs, laws, and regulations affecting Bay restoration.  These are usually at the State 
level (e.g. Pennsylvania and Maryland’s smart growth efforts) or at the Federal level (e.g. new 
regulations for large animal feedlots).  The Bay Journal was, and continues to be, especially 
thorough in its coverage of the Chesapeake Bay TMDL process.  
Finally, the Bay Journal has wide geographic and topical coverage. Geographically, it 
covers stories ranging over the entire Chesapeake Bay watershed. Topically, it covers stories on 
land use, land conservation, recreation, fisheries, solid waste, wildlife habitat, community- and 
neighborhood-development, environmental education, and more. This diversity provides 
contextual variation for my study of collaboration.  
All these qualities make the Bay Journal the “journal of record” for anyone chronicling 
Bay history. As noted by Karl Blankenship in his interview with the Columbia Journal Review: “ 
If you pick up most recent books about the bay and look at the bibliography—whether they’re 
positive or critical reports about [the] bay—they draw heavily on Bay Journal reporting” 
(Brainard 2011). 
The Bay Journal has some biases in reporting.  As a newspaper it focuses on tangible, 
visible, impactful events. Officially released plans, grants awarded, budget proposals, new 
legislation, and new regulations are usually reported on. On the other hand, I cannot expect to 
garner Bay Journal data on the daily formal and informal interactions between people, or to get 
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substantial personal commentary on events.  In addition, the Bay Journal has a bias towards 
Federal and State actions. This makes sense since it is largely funded by the US-EPA 
Chesapeake Bay Program, a State-Federal partnership. Further, in a monthly newspaper format 
and with limited staff resources it is impossible to cover all localized activity occurring within 
the Chesapeake Bay Watershed. Instead, they focus on regional and State efforts that affect 
multiple communities.34 
A total of 1,081 Bay Journal articles were uploaded into Atlas ti and coded, ranging over 
the years 1997-2007. For the years 1997-1998, every article from every month’s edition was 
coded, for a total of 291 articles. For the remainder of the Bay Journal articles (1999-2007), 
every article from every other month’s edition was coded, for a total of 790 articles.35 Switching 
to every other month should not significantly affect my data because critical events spawn 
articles spanning several months’ editions.  The decision to include every article in an edition, 
rather than choose based on content, was made to minimize my own selection bias. In addition to 
data analysis, the Bay Journal data from 1997-1998 was used to develop and refine my coding 
scheme, a process described later.  
 
Main in-depth interviews (NOVA case) 
In-depth interviews are the main data source for the NOVA case. There are a total of seventy-six 
(76) interviewees.36 This includes seventy-two (72) people interviewed in the Spring/Summer 
                                                             
34 Although this does not affect my analysis of data from 1997-2007, the Bay Journal has been expanding coverage 
of local governments in the past few years. Further, they intend to expand coverage of pollution management efforts 
in urban areas and upstream parts of the Bay (i.e. New York, West Virginia, and Delaware).   
35 For the years 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007, the editions coded included January/February, March, May, 
July/August, October, and December. For the years 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, the editions coded included 
January/February, April, June, July/August, September, and November. 
36 In three interviews, the main interviewee invited a second person to join in the conversation on speakerphone. 
However, for simplicity sake I only count one interviewee for these conversations. If these others are included, I 
spoke with 79 people regarding the NOVA case.   
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2010 and four (4) preliminary interviews from Spring 2008 relevant to the NOVA case.37  The 
total audio interview time is 86 hours, for an average time of 68 minutes and a median time of 65 
minutes per interview.  
Interviews were semi-structured using the protocol shown in Appendix B.  This protocol 
was emailed to interviewees ahead of time, along with a summary of my research. Interviews 
were done over the phone and all but two were recorded and transcribed. For the two 
interviewees who did not want to be recorded, notes were written up the same day and sent to the 
interviewee for corrections or additions.  
Although the protocol was used as a guide, interviews were conversational. Before each, 
I reviewed information online about the interviewees’ work and organization, and added a few 
tailored questions.  Most of the time, interviews began with either a tailored question or the 
general question “Which organizations or agencies do you collaborate with most often in your 
work”? Conversation would flow from there, with follow up questions that guided us back to the 
key themes of benefits and costs of collaboration.  
My main goal in selecting interviewees was to maximize the variety of perspectives on 
collaboration. Although most interviewees work on water quality issues, I purposefully pursued 
interviewees from related fields such as land use, land conservation, water supply, recreation, 
agriculture, transportation, and economic development. They shared collaborative experiences in 
their own fields and described how water quality initiatives affected their work.   A second goal 
in selecting interviewees was obtaining sufficient information on the context of collaboration. 
Thus it was important to interview people from regional organizations and the two main Virginia 
environmental agencies, the Department of Conservation and Recreation (DCR) and the 
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ).  
                                                             
37 There are actually 78 interview documents because two people were interviewed twice. 
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Table 4.2 illustrates the variety of interviewees by breaking them down into categories. 
Local government employees represent the largest category. This was purposeful, since key land 
use and stormwater management decisions are made by local government bureaucrats and their 
perspective is under-reported in the Bay Journal. Further, I wanted representation from as many 
NOVA counties and cities as possible. I also worked to achieve variation in the types of 
departments. Of the 29 local government interviewees, about an equal number focus their work 
on planning (7), stormwater management (7), watershed management (7), and 
economic/community development (6). The rest work on environmental issues in general (2).   
 
Table 4.2: Breakdown of NOVA interviewees by type 
Interviewee type  # of interviewees 
Local government  29 
State government  13 
Regional organization 10 
Nonprofit organization 6 
Citizen activist or advisor 5 
Local water utility 3 
Soil & Water 
Conservation District 3 
Academic 2 
Private sector1 2 
USDA-NRCS District 
Conservationist 2 
Farmer 1 
TOTAL 76 
1 Includes an environmental consultant and a land use attorney. 
 
Table 4.3 breaks down these 29 local government interviewees by jurisdiction. County 
governments are larger, and thus provided a larger pool of relevant employees than cities or 
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towns. Note that an interview with a stormwater manager from Stafford County (conducted in 
2008 as part of the preliminary interviews) was included because Stafford County is directly 
south of Prince William County and is included in some definitions of the NOVA region.  
 
Table 4.3: Number of local government interviewees from each NOVA jurisdiction. 
 
# of LG 
interviewees  
# of LG 
interviewees 
Arlington County 4 Alexandria 1 
Fairfax County 6 City of Fairfax 1 
Loudoun County 5 Falls Church 3 
Prince William 
County 5 
Leesburg 
(Town) 1 
Stafford County 
(2008) 1 Manassas 2 
TOTAL COUNTY 21 TOTAL CITY/TOWN 8 
 
 
State government employees are the second most common interviewee type. Virginia has two 
main environmental agencies whose work is relevant to water quality: the Department of 
Conservation and Recreation (DCR) and the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ). My 
interviewees included six (6) DCR representatives and three (3) DEQ representatives. I also 
interviewed one person each from the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT), Virginia 
Department of Forestry, the Virginia NEMO program38, and the Virginia Outdoors Foundation.  
Because of my interest in the NOVA region in particular, most State employees I interviewed 
either worked in a regional office or were focused on a region that included NOVA jurisdictions. 
                                                             
38 NEMO stands for “Nonpoint Education for Municipal Officials”. NEMO organizations offer workshops on 
stormwater and other water quality topics tailored to local government officials, helping them find the resources they 
need, in the form they need them and at the time they need them. 
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Eight (8) of the thirteen state government interviewees have a regional focus.  Regional 
organizations, the third most common interviewee type, included the following organizations, all 
described in Appendix A: the Northern Virginia Regional Commission (4 interviewees), Metro 
Washington Council of Governments (2 interviewees), Inter-state Commission on the Potomac 
River Basin (2 interviewees), the Northern Virginia Regional Park Authority (1 interviewee), and 
the Northern Virginia Conservation Trust (1 interviewee).39  
Table 4.4 breaks down the NOVA interviewees by the policy area they focus on. Most 
interviewees focus on watershed management, stormwater, land use or the environment more 
generally. However, one of the unique features of my research is my efforts to interview 
supporters and promoters of economic development (7 interviewees) and agriculture (8 
interviewees), two areas whose adherents often come in conflict with water quality regulations.  
 
Table 4.4: Breakdown of NOVA interviews by policy area 
 
Interviewee policy area  # of interviewees 
Environment, general 11 
Watershed planning or 
management 10 
Land use or planning 10 
Agriculture 8 
Stormwater 8 
Water supply/quality 8 
Economic development 7 
Water quality regulations 5 
Land conservation 2 
Recreation 2 
Scenic Rivers 2 
Other1 3 
TOTAL 76 
                                                             
39 Note that the NVRPA and NVCT are also nonprofits, but were categorized here because their regional character 
was more relevant than their nonprofit status for this research.   
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1 Other category includes Solid Waste (1), Transportation (1), and Urban Forestry (1) 
 
Interview data have distinct advantages, notably the ability to personalize questions and follow 
up with clarifying questions. The flexibility of a conversational interview allowed me to obtain 
in-depth information and personal commentary, providing a richer context for each instance of 
collaboration.  
 
Developing and refining my coding scheme 
Bay Journal articles and transcribed interviews were coded and analyzed in the same manner. 
My primary purpose in coding the data is to identify empirical manifestations of the five 
collaborative benefits as described by my research propositions. The first step is to translate the 
research propositions into a corresponding code to be applied to text passages. Note that 
propositions were specific and descriptive because they were developed through an analysis of 
existing empirical evidence. However, much of this detail must be stripped away to apply these 
propositions to the data; otherwise there is little space for inductive findings. The purpose of the 
empirical data is to extend, enrich, adjust, and flesh out findings from the literature survey. If the 
data is approached too narrowly, no new insights will emerge. For example, the first proposition 
(resource access/exchange) reads: 
Collaboration leverages financial, technical, human, and/or informational resources, 
expanding the resource base available to solve collective problems and overcoming 
resource constraints of individual organizations.  
 
This is translated into a code called “Resource access/exchange” denoting the following broader 
scenario: 
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Collaboration leverages financial, technical, human, and/or informational resources, 
generating a concrete, policy related benefit unique to the collaborative process.  
 
Once detail has been stripped away to form basic codes, detail can be added back through 
analysis of the empirical evidence. The codes must be fleshed out inductively using empirical 
data before being applied in earnest to the whole data set. This is what I call “code refinement”; 
it was conducted in two stages as described below.  
The first stage of code refinement utilized 200 Bay News articles from December 2008.40 
The Bay News was chosen because of its breadth. It covers the whole Chesapeake Bay 
watershed and has a broad scope of sources, since it pulls articles from hundreds of newspapers.  
Because the Bay News describes a variety of events in a variety of locations, it is a good source 
for developing an inclusive and widely applicable coding scheme. I began with bare-bones codes 
reflecting the initial research propositions. Codes were enhanced and broken down into sub-
codes as more articles were coded. After 200 articles were finished, quotes for each code were 
reviewed and the coding scheme was refined. The final coding scheme included the initial 
proposition codes, plus codes for related concepts that emerged from the data.  It was then 
applied to the 25 preliminary interviews to check its utility. 
The second stage was similar to the first process-wise, but used two years of articles from 
the Chesapeake Bay Journal (291 articles from 1997-1998). Rather than exporting the coding 
tree from the first stage, this second-stage coding scheme was developed separately, again 
starting from bare-bones codes reflecting the initial research propositions.   The results from the 
second stage of coding, which drew upon a different data source and different time period, 
                                                             
40 At the time this coding was done, this was the most current completed month. I did not want to go back too many 
months because some links become inactive. 
97 
 
 
confirmed the logic of the initial coding tree and most of the initial codes. Codes were further 
refined and edited.  Once I was satisfied with the new coding scheme, a codebook was written. 
Two separate code refinement stages might seem excessive. However, the important 
codes in this research are conceptual, which means they are difficult to use consistently. It 
required many rounds of applying these codes to empirical examples before their contours and 
bounds became clear. Further, development and refinement of the coding scheme is part of the 
conceptual development for this research. It is a dialectical process: propositions from the 
literature were applied to empirical data, while the empirical examples elaborated and shaped the 
propositions themselves and offered new, emergent concepts and ideas. Multiple iterations 
between theory and empirics solidified my research into concepts, like the concept of 
harmonizing, that can be applied consistently over time.    
 
Coding process 
After these two stages of code refinement, codes were ready to be applied to the remainder of the 
Bay Journal data and to the interview data.41  Bay Journal articles and interview transcriptions 
were coded together in a single Atlas ti hermeneutic unit, using the same code lists. After 
extensive work on the coding scheme, codes applied easily across different data sources. Three 
different “levels” of codes were applied, which I call primary, secondary, and tertiary codes.  
 
Primary codes 
                                                             
41 The 1997-1998 Bay Journal data was recoded using the codebook and included with the rest of data.  The 
December 2008 Bay News data, on the other hand, was left out of the final analysis because of the limitations of the 
source described above.  
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Primary codes represent the five research propositions or any other collaborative mechanisms 
(emergent in the data) that led to concrete, distinct policy-related benefits. In most cases, primary 
codes were broken down into sub-codes and sub-categories as the coding process proceeded.  
Primary codes are applied to text segments that clearly indicate collaboration is 
generating a particular collaborative benefit.  The “instance of collaboration” indicated by a text 
segment must meet my minimal definition of collaboration: I must be able to identify two or 
more organizations directly coordinating with the intent to cooperate. Also, the text must clearly 
identify a forum for collaboration and the groups/parties collaborating, so secondary codes can 
be applied. These criteria eliminate vague references to collaboration.  More than one primary 
code could be applied only if the two codes refer to analytically distinguishable aspects of the 
collaboration.  
 
Secondary codes 
Secondary codes describe key contextual aspects of each “instance” of collaboration. Whenever 
a primary code was applied, secondary codes were applied to the same text segment. This way, 
contextual information is physically linked to the description of each collaborative event.  
Secondary codes were developed inductively from the data; codes were added as needed and 
periodically reviewed and refined.  Three main categories of secondary codes were applied: (1) 
codes that describe the Forum of collaboration, (2) codes that describe the Groups that are 
collaborating, and (3) codes that describe the Policy Area in which collaboration occurs.  
 
Forum codes 
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Forum codes describe how collaboration occurs. Several point to particular motivating factors 
that facilitated or encouraged collaboration, such as a plan, regulation, or the assistance of a 
coordinating organization. Table 4.5 shows the five most commonly applied Forum codes and 
describes them briefly.  
 
Table 4.5: The most common secondary codes describing Forum for collaboration 
Common forum codes  Description 
Voluntary, independent 
coordination 
Parties collaborate voluntarily, informally, 
and of their own accord. 
Coordinating 
organization 
Collaboration is facilitated or administered 
by a coordinating organization 
Regulation or law A regulation or law requires or motivates collaboration. 
Financial incentives Financial incentives encourage or facilitate collaboration 
Plan Collaboration is facilitated or structured by a plan 
 
Groups codes 
Groups codes identify, for each instance of collaboration, the groups or parties involved in the 
collaborative exchange. Generally, they refer to types of organizations that are collaborating. For 
instance, the Groups code “Federal agencies and state agencies” indicates that a particular 
Federal government agency is coordinating with a particular state government agency. The code 
“Counties/municipalities with each other” indicates two particular counties or municipalities are 
coordinating.  
In some cases, Groups codes indicate coordination among organizations from different 
policy areas. For instance, the code “Agriculture and Environment” indicates some agricultural 
organization and environmental organization working together. This is useful auxiliary 
information, but does not substitute for Groups codes that identify the specific collaborating 
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organizations. If it is impossible to identify specific collaborating organizations, as a rule of 
thumb the quote is too vague to receive a primary code.   
Multiple Groups codes may be applied to a single quote; this is necessary if the 
collaboration involves more than two organizations.  Rather than list all Groups codes here, they 
will be described as needed in the empirical chapters.  
 
Policy area codes 
Policy Area codes were added to account for the variety of policy sectors in my data. Although 
my main policy context is water quality, there are a multitude of sub-areas, such as stormwater, 
watershed management, and wastewater treatment. There are also a multitude of distinct policy 
areas related to and affecting water quality, such as land conservation, land use/land 
development, fisheries, wildlife, recreation, agriculture, and transportation. Policy Area codes 
will be described as needed in the empirical chapters.  
Compared to Forum and Groups, Policy Area codes are less relevant to the dynamics of 
the collaborative event. However, they are useful for later analysis. For instance, they allow me 
to see whether patterns of collaboration apply across policy areas or are unique to one. This 
provides a test of generalizability, even if restricted to water quality-related policy areas.  
 
‘Resource type’ and ‘Resource provider’ codes 
Two additional secondary code categories were used only in conjunction with the “Resources 
access/exchange” primary code. Resource exchange relationships were coded as “resource 
provision”, where one organization provides resources to another, since resource provision is the 
basic process underlying other more complex interactions such as resource levering and 
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exchange. When instances of collaboration are defined as resource provision, however, it does 
not make sense to code Groups or Forum.  Instead, I use secondary codes to specify: (1) the type 
of resource provided, and (2) the resource provider.  
The most common codes for ‘resource type’ included: financial resources, technical 
expertise or resources, labor (separated into technical and nontechnical); information; policy 
legitimacy; and facilitation assistance. Like the Groups and Forum codes, these were inductively 
determined. Resource provider organizations ranged greatly, from the smallest nonprofit group, 
to private sector corporations, to the US-EPA.  They will be described as needed in the empirical 
chapters.  
 
Tertiary Codes 
Tertiary codes describe key concepts related to collaboration but not captured by primary or 
secondary codes. While tertiary codes do not directly answer my research questions, some have 
proven useful in describing collaborative mechanisms or explaining patterns in the analysis.  For 
instance, in my analysis I find that coordinating organizations were one of the two most critical 
“Forums” for Coordinated Action. Looking to the tertiary code “Facilitator Role” for an 
explanation, I found examples of the benefits and services coordinating organizations provide to 
facilitate collaboration.  
Table 4.6 lists selected tertiary codes and provides a short description. Although only 
some were useful in the analysis, they all had significant resonance and presence in my data and 
represent key concepts related to collaboration. This table provides a sampling of codes used 
outside of the strictly limited primary and secondary coding system, providing greater insight 
into the data collected and possibilities for future research.  
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Table 4.6: Sample of tertiary codes 
 
Tertiary codes (sample)  Description 
Limitations or challenges of 
collaboration 
Examples of limitations, challenges, costs, and constraints 
of collaboration. 
Failures of collaboration Examples where collaboration failed. 
Facilitator role 
Examples of individuals who facilitate inter-organizational 
meeting/workshops, or coordinating organizations that 
administer partnerships on a longer-term basis. 
Importance of getting the right 
people participating 
Examples illustrating benefits of including certain groups 
and/or getting the right mix/diversity of people.  
Importance of existing 
relationships 
Examples illustrating benefits of existing inter-
organizational relationships.  
Importance of personalities Example illustrating how personalities help or hinder collaboration. 
Organizational niches Description of the niche and the “value added” of certain organizations. 
Collaboration during the 
regulatory process 
Examples describing how collaboration is part of the 
regulatory process. 
Regulatory hammer hovering Examples where collaborating is occurring under the shadow of impending regulations. 
Regulation and Collaboration, 
other 
Other quotes describing the relationship between 
collaboration and regulation.  
Landscape level information 
Examples where single organizations utilize landscape 
level information. Could lead to coordination if plans are 
carried out at landscape level.  
Desire for fairness/equity Examples illustrating peoples’ desire for fairness during the collaborative process.  
 
Data analysis overview 
The central task of my data analysis is to elaborate on and flesh out the benefits of collaboration 
as identified in my five research propositions. Much of this analysis occurs through the coding 
process: as empirical instances of collaboration are put into the conceptual “boxes” of the 
primary codes, I flesh out the concepts behind these codes. Beyond categorizing, I use empirical 
examples to illuminate essential aspects of the primary codes. For instance, my in-depth analysis 
of the “Coordinated Action” benefit (Chapters 5 through 7) reveals that coordinated action solves 
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geographical and organizational cross-border problems through a process called harmonizing. I 
introduce a model and typology of harmonizing and describe the cross-border problems solved 
by each type. My analysis may be applied by future researchers to other policy contexts plagued 
by cross-border problems.  
Conceptual discoveries like harmonizing occur through a combination of theoretical and 
empirical work. Instances of collaboration in multiple contexts are categorized, sorted, and 
examined to look for important themes. This empirical work is combined with extensive efforts 
at conceptual development through review and recoding, consultation with the literature, and 
discussion with colleagues.  
My second data analysis task is to describe the context(s) in which collaboration is 
associated with benefits. Examining which secondary codes occur concurrently with the primary 
codes provides information regarding when, where, and how collaboration is most likely to 
provide benefits. These relationships are explored using qualitative analysis software by 
examining instances where primary codes co-occur with secondary codes.  This type of analysis, 
for instance, shows whether “Coordinated Action” happens most often through voluntary, 
independent coordination or via a coordinating organization. From this, I can make predictions 
(which would require further testing) regarding which kind of forum is most conducive to 
achieving the benefit.   
 
Preview of empirical chapters 
As described, my greatest contribution from this research relates to the benefit of “Coordinated 
Action”. Chapters 5 through 7 are devoted to a thorough, structured analysis of the “instances” of 
coordinated action found in my data. In particular, I identify and describe a process called 
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harmonizing common to all cases of coordinated action.  In the next chapter, I describe 
harmonizing both conceptually and empirically, and introduce an original typology. In Chapter 
6, I delve more deeply into the benefits of harmonizing, discussing how each type of 
harmonizing solves a distinct cross-border policy problem faced in many areas of policy, not just 
water quality. The analysis of harmonizing continues in Chapter 7, where I explore the context in 
which harmonizing occurs by presenting the results of an analysis of the secondary codes 
(collaboration forum, collaborating groups, and policy area) most commonly associated with 
harmonizing.  Finally, a less structured analysis is presented in Chapter 8 for the other four 
benefits, in which relevant themes were pulled from the data to illustrate the nature of each 
benefit and the processes/mechanisms of collaboration that generate them.  
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Chapter 5: Conceptual Development of the “Harmonizing” benefit 
 
The central task of my coding process was to apply five “primary codes” to the data, 
representing the five research propositions presented in Chapter 3.  For a primary code to be 
applied, it must be clear from the passage text that the benefit represented by that code (e.g. 
conflict reduction, resource access) emerges from a collaborative process. 
Table 5.1 shows how many times each primary code was applied. Resource exchange and 
coordinated action occurred on a frequent basis in the Chesapeake Bay and NOVA regions over 
my study period (243 and 99 times, respectively). Innovation and conflict resolution/reduction 
were both rare. This is an indication of the significance of the benefits in my cases. One caveat is 
that the nature of the data may have limited my ability to capture innovation and conflict 
resolution/reduction benefits, an issue discussed in the sections in Chapter 8 devoted to these 
benefits.   
Note the large total number of instances of collaboration identified in my data (456). 
Altogether, this represents a unique and valuable database of collaborative arrangements 
produced through original data collection and analysis which can be employed for other 
scholarly projects.  
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Table 5.1 Frequency of primary codes applied to the data 
 
Primary code Frequency 
Resource exchange/access 243 
Coordinated action 
(harmonizing) 99 
Social capital: relationship 
building 62 
Innovation generation  28 
Conflict resolution / reduction 24 
Total cases of collaboration 456 
 
The analysis in this dissertation focuses on the 99 coordinated action results. More specifically, it 
focuses on a process of coordinated action called “harmonizing” that I discover and develop 
through the empirical data. There are several reasons for focusing my energies on coordinated 
action. First, with 99 examples, it emerged as one of the two most commonly occurring benefits 
in my data, providing a wide base of empirical data to work with. Although the most commonly 
occurring benefit was resource exchange/access, this has received significant attention in various 
literatures and already has a well-developed theoretical basis.   
Coordinated action, on the other hand, is discussed superficially in the literature. Benefits 
are painted with broad brush strokes: coordination should lead to greater efficiency by reducing 
duplication and targeting resources; and to greater effectiveness because important actors are 
coordinating their work. Yet there is little prodding into what coordinated action means and why 
it produces benefits, leaving open the opportunity for conceptual development.  From my 
empirical examples of coordinated action, I build the concept of harmonizing, a process of 
coordinated action that solves specific policy problems and produces specific benefits. Public 
managers who apply harmonizing in their work can expect to generate these benefits.  
This chapter is dedicated to developing the concept of harmonizing. First, I explain the 
term and describe how cases were identified in the data. Second, I describe, in conceptual terms, 
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three types of harmonizing: geographical/spatial, organizational, and ecological. Third, I 
illustrate each type using cases from my data. In Chapter 6, I delve more deeply into the benefits 
of harmonizing, discussing how each type of harmonizing solves a distinct policy problem 
(called a “boundary problem”) faced in many areas of policy, not just water quality. I also 
discuss benefits related to efficiency and standardization. The analysis of harmonizing continues 
in Chapter 7, where I explore the context in which harmonizing occurs by presenting the results 
of an analysis of the secondary codes (collaboration forum, collaborating groups, and policy 
area) most commonly associated with harmonizing.  
The analysis in Chapters 5 through 7 is thorough, structured conceptual development of 
the coordinated action benefit. A less structured thematic analysis is presented in Chapter 8 for 
the other four benefits, in which relevant themes were pulled from the data to illustrate the nature 
of each benefit and the processes/mechanisms of collaboration that generate them.  
 
Terminology: “Harmonizing” and “Coordinated Action”  
Coordinated action is a broad term. It occurs when organizations or groups align their actions or 
decisions to achieve some larger “good” at the organizational, community, and/or societal level. 
Upon exploring cases of coordinated action in the data, a particular process common to my 
empirical examples took shape. This process, which I call “harmonizing”, describes how 
coordinated action works and why it produces benefits. When organizations or groups 
“harmonize” their decisions or actions, they achieve collective benefits by acting in a way that 
better approximates the true scope of a problem. I also call this working across the appropriate 
“problem landscape”.  
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Harmonizing fleshes out the broad brush concept of coordinated action from the 
literature.  Coordinated action is the broader term, and not all instances of coordinated action 
involve harmonizing or fit within my harmonizing typology. As it turns out, all 99 examples in 
my data fit in both categories; in fact, it was through examining the instances of coordinated 
action in my data that I recognized and developed the concept of harmonizing.  
I chose the term “harmonizing” because it is expressive of the essence of coordinated 
action. Coordinated action is about individual actors coordinating their decisions or actions in a 
way that, collectively, is “harmonious”. The analogy to harmonizing in music is helpful. When 
harmonizing, each singer must find the right pitch and tone that fits with all the other singers. 
When they harmonize correctly, they collectively produce something better and more beautiful 
than if they sang alone. On the other hand, if each singer picks the pitch and tone that works best 
for him individually, the result will likely be bad. Similarly, when individual actors “harmonize” 
their actions or decisions, they chose actions or decisions that, when added together, make sense 
on a collective level and produce good collective outcomes. On the other hand, when each actor 
makes decisions or take actions appropriate only for their own needs, these actions are unlikely 
to be “harmonious” at the collective level.  Disharmony may lead to missed opportunities or, 
even worse, create outcomes that leave everyone (collectively) worse off.  
For the primary code “harmonizing” to be applied to a text passage, two things must be 
clear in the text, either explicitly or implicitly: (1) Organizations/jurisdictions are addressing the 
problem more holistically than they would if acting in isolation, and (2) Policies, decisions, or 
actions were improved because of the holistic, regional, or landscape-level perspective applied 
to decision-making or action.  When both occur, organizations are acting in a way that achieves, 
or at least approximates, the appropriate scope for addressing a problem.   
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As shown in Table 5.1, the “harmonizing” code was applied to ninety-nine (99) cases of 
collaboration. These cases form the basis for my analysis in this chapter and chapters 6 and 7. 
Before presenting a sampling of cases, I will present my conceptual model of harmonizing and 
my typology. Both are original and based on extensive analysis and interpretation of the 
empirical data.  
 
Definition of harmonizing 
Harmonizing can be defined as the process by which independent organizations purposefully 
coordinate their decisions or actions at a scale that approximates the actual scale or scope of the 
problem. When organizations harmonize their decisions and actions, they are taking into account 
actions, concerns, and/or events outside of their normal self-centered view of the world. The 
result should be better collective outcomes—outcomes that make sense from a broad, 
comprehensive, or holistic perspective— even if outcomes do not improve for all individual 
organizations.  
Imagine a policy problem where the “problem landscape” (i.e. the space, physical or 
institutional, that the problem affects) is larger than the units with the legal or institutional 
capacity to manage the problem. In this situation, it behooves the management units to work 
together so that they can manage the problem on the proper scale. 
Take the case of polluted stormwater. Most regulatory decisions about managing 
stormwater are made by local governments, but the physical “landscape” of the stormwater 
problem is a watershed, which includes multiple local governments and possibly multiple states. 
In this scenario, some of the units (jurisdictions) affected by the stormwater problem might 
decide they cannot solve the problem on their own. Pollutant-laden stormwater is, quite literally, 
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spilling over their borders from neighboring jurisdictions. Even stringent management on their 
part could be undone by the actions of their neighbors. Knowing that the watershed is the proper 
management scale, jurisdictions might form a watershed-wide arrangement through which they 
coordinate to address stormwater problems.   
The stormwater example focuses on the appropriate spatial management scale. Because 
of topography, all rain that falls within a watershed eventually end up in the same shared 
waterbody. However, “appropriate management scale” can be thought of in less physical ways. 
Consider how stormwater gets polluted. It collects pollutants as it runs off the land, such as 
sediment from construction sites, fertilizer from farm fields, salt or other chemicals from 
highways and roads, and pet waste from private properties. If stormwater pollution is to be 
minimized, people who put this pollution on the land, and the agencies that regulate its 
application, must be involved. Local government planning departments that decide where and 
how land development occurs, agricultural agencies that regulate the application of fertilizers, 
private homeowner associations that regulate the collection of pet waste: they must all be 
involved. These organizations have their own core interests, most of which have little to do with 
stormwater.  Yet they comprise the appropriate management landscape for the stormwater 
problem, where the landscape is conceptualized in an organizational sense, rather than a 
physical or spatial sense.  
A third way to think about an “appropriate management landscape” is to consider 
ecological interdependencies. Let’s say that high stormwater flows are a threat to in-stream 
aquatic species. However, high flows are critical for survival of certain near stream amphibian 
species that live in temporary pools created by stormwater scouring.42 Here you have two 
potentially important species whereby proper management of one may negatively affect 
                                                             
42 This is a hypothetical example. As far as I am aware, this is not a problem in the Chesapeake Bay region. 
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management of the other. A landscape level approach which takes into account this 
interdependency is necessary to address both problems. If the in-stream species and the near-
stream species are managed by different agencies, collaboration between these agencies will 
more closely approximate the appropriate management landscape. 
Overall, harmonizing can be conceptualized as striving, through collaboration, to achieve 
a more appropriate management landscape over which to solve a shared problem. Here I 
conceptualize landscapes in geographical, organizational, and/or ecological terms because these 
are the three types identified in my data (other landscapes might be considered). Through 
harmonizing, organizations representing all or a significant portion of the relevant parts of the 
“problem landscape” are mobilized collectively to solve a problem.   
 
Typology of harmonizing 
I divided instances of harmonizing into three categories based on the character of the problem 
landscape:  “geographical/spatial”, “organizational”, or “ecological”. This distinction illuminates 
key aspects of harmonizing and how it occurs. In the next three sub-sections, I describe these 
types in conceptual terms. Afterwards, I provide illustrative empirical examples.   
 
Geographical or spatial harmonizing 
Geographical harmonizing addresses a “spatial mismatch” whereby the appropriate spatial 
management area for a policy problem is physically larger than the units with authority to 
manage the problem. If management units continue to focus only within their jurisdictional 
boundaries, they will not solve the problem. Or, more likely, they will solve the problem within 
their own jurisdiction by shifting it into neighboring jurisdictions.  
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Figure 5.1 illustrates the “spatial problem landscape” and the “management units” for a 
typical example of geographical harmonizing in my policy context: watershed management. This 
map of Virginia shows the boundaries of Virginia’s main watersheds (the darker lines) 
superimposed over the boundaries of counties, municipalities, and cities. Note that the James, 
York, Rappahannock, Shenandoah, and Potomac watersheds are all sub-sheds of the Chesapeake 
Bay Watershed. 
The geographical or spatial “problem landscape” for each watershed is marked by the 
watershed boundaries. Within the watershed boundaries are a multitude of counties and 
municipalities, marked by the lighter boundaries on the map, which constitute “management 
units".43 The dilemma is that these management units each have their own independent 
governments that make independent decisions and take independent actions. For instance, the 
Rappahannock watershed includes all or part of 15 counties and several independent cities. To 
properly manage the watershed, actions and decisions of these independent actors must be 
harmonized.44 Otherwise, you run into the problems typically associated with “disharmony” and 
described in general terms by Huxham and MacDonald (1992): duplication of efforts, omission 
of important management tasks, a lack of resource targeting, and actions or decisions taken by 
one management unit that counteract actions of others or undermine collective management 
goals.  
                                                             
43 Counties and municipalities are not the only relevant management units for watersheds. State agencies play a 
major role, as do non-profit watershed organizations. Private landowners may take on some responsibility for 
watershed management actions on their property. However, counties and municipalities have the most power over 
stormwater management and land development decisions and therefore are the most relevant management units.  
44 Note that the Rappahannock is a relatively simple case because the entire watershed falls within Virginia. Other 
watersheds contain multiple states. For instance, the Potomac watershed (also nested within the Chesapeake Bay 
watershed) includes all or part of 18 counties in Virginia plus several counties in West Virginia, Maryland, and the 
southern part of Pennsylvania. Harmonizing management units over this geographic range and between multiple 
states is quite challenging; in this case harmonizing tends to occur in smaller clumps rather than over the whole 
problem landscape. For instance, the Potomac Roundtable includes only representatives from Virginia. Another 
option, used by the Chesapeake Bay Program, is to simplify coordination by treating the States, rather than counties 
and municipalities, as “management units”. 
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Figure 5.1: Virginia watersheds are comprised of multiple management units, such as counties, 
towns, and cities (Source:  USGS 2012) 
 
Harmonizing may occur through spontaneous, voluntary cooperation among these management 
units or, more likely, via some kind of coordinating organization. (Forums will be discussed in 
Chapter 7). Ideally, all management units with responsibilities and authorities in the problem 
landscape would coordinate so the problem is addressed across the entire problem landscape. 
Typically, however, not all management units participate, meaning that geographical 
harmonizing will better approximate the appropriate problem landscape but not fully achieve it.  
Geographical harmonizing addresses the physical connectivity between management 
units, whereby actions by one organizational actor physically affect actors located nearby. This 
physical connectivity applies not just to polluted stormwater, but to shared fisheries, trails that 
cross geographical borders, shared water supply, and invasive species.  Addressing issues that 
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physically cross borders requires a more comprehensive approach that, as much as possible, 
accounts for the actions and decisions of physically connected management units.  
With geographical harmonizing, the “problem landscape” and its component 
management units are defined in geographical (or spatial) terms.  As I demonstrate below, the 
problem landscape and its components may also be defined in organizational terms and by 
ecological components.  
 
Organizational harmonizing 
Policy problems such as water quality impairment are often “wicked problems” that cannot be 
solved by organizations working in isolation (Rittel and Webber 1973, O’Toole 1997, Bueren, 
Klijn, and Koppenjan 2003).  Frequently with wicked problems, organizations take independent 
actions or make independent decisions that aggravate, alleviate, or change the nature of the 
problem. Further, the problem’s effects spread outwards to many different organizations, 
creating uncertainty about the set of organizations that should be responsible. As described by 
Bueren, Klijn, and Koppenjan (2003), institutional uncertainty of wicked problems “results from 
the fact that decisions are made in different places, in different policy arenas, in which actors 
from various policy networks participate…the institutional setting in which complex problems 
are dealt with is thus highly fragmented…decisions are only loosely coupled and sometimes not 
at all (pp. 194).” 
Organizational harmonizing occurs when organizations, each of which addresses some 
piece or portion of a policy problem, coordinate their decisions and actions. In conceptual terms, 
organizational harmonizing is knitting together the actions and decisions of the various 
organizations that comprise the relevant “problem landscape”.   
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Figure 5.2 is an original schematic diagram created to illustrate a hypothetical “problem 
landscape” for stormwater management defined in organizational terms. I chose stormwater 
management to continue the example above, but a similar diagram could be created for other 
policy challenges. The diagram illustrates how, in order to fully and properly manage 
stormwater, the decisions and actions of various organizations must be coordinated. Also note 
that, for most organizations, stormwater is not their only or even their primary task, as illustrated 
by the fact that only a small portion of their “shape” is included in the problem landscape. 
 
Figure 5.2: Diagram of a hypothetical “problem landscape” for stormwater, as defined in 
organizational terms.45 
 
                                                             
45 This is not meant to be an accurate picture of what these organizations or the stormwater issue look like. It is 
simply a schematic for illustrating the concept of “organizational harmonizing” 
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Note the similarity of Figure 5.2 to the watershed diagram in Figure 5.1. In the watershed case, 
the “problem landscape” (the watershed) does not correspond with the boundaries of its 
constituent “management units” (counties and municipalities). To property manage the 
watershed, actions and decisions of these counties and municipalities must be coordinated. In 
stormwater case, the “problem landscape” does not correspond with the purview of any one 
organization. To properly manage stormwater, organizations that comprise the problem 
landscape must coordinate their decisions and actions.   
Achieving organizational harmonizing requires some person or group to assemble the 
organizational “landscape”. Which organizations impact the problem, whether or not they know 
it? Which organizations are actively working on the problem, in whole or in part? Which 
organizations are affected by the problem? Ideally, all these organizations would be integrated 
into efforts to address the problem.  
There are numerous challenges.  Some organizational actors may feel removed from the 
problems of polluted stormwater and be unaware of their impact. Transportation planners, for 
instance, might not recognize the water quality effects of impervious surface and the use of road 
chemicals; these problems lie outside their normal purview. In other cases, relevant organizations 
understand their impact but have little incentive to address a problem outside their core mission. 
For transportation departments, dedicating resources towards stormwater control detracts from 
priorities such as easing traffic congestion and maintaining road safety.  Similarly, some 
organizations perceive coordination as extra work with little reward.  For instance, developers 
have little incentive to install innovative low impact development (LID) techniques if they can 
get what they want through a development-friendly city council.  
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Given the above limitations, organizational harmonizing tends to occur unevenly, 
generally among small groups of organizations that recognize how their work is intertwined, 
work well together, and/or have some history of working together on unrelated projects. These 
“clumps” of organizations comprise some portion of, rather than the full, problem landscape. 
Although this falls short of the ideal situation portrayed by Figure 5.2, it is a more appropriate 
“problem landscape” than if organizations worked in isolation.  
 
Policy sector harmonizing (a special case of organizational harmonizing) 
Another way to conceptualize the organizational landscape is by policy sector. Of 49 examples 
of organizational harmonizing in my data, 34 reflected coordination of actions/decisions among 
organizations representing different policy sectors. For instance, organizations focused on water 
quality frequently harmonize their actions with organizations focused on land use planning, 
agriculture, economic development, and/or transportation.  
This inter-sectoral relationship is hinted at in Figure 5.2, where the “problem landscape” 
includes organizations representing various policy sectors. However, policy sector harmonizing 
is more specific than organizational harmonizing because it excludes coordination among 
organizations in the same policy sector. In Figure 5.3 below, I adapted Figure 5.2 to reflect 
“policy sector harmonizing” for stormwater management.  The “problem landscape” of 
stormwater management is shown in terms of its policy sector components, such as surface water 
quality, flooding/erosion, transportation, agriculture, and planning.   
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Figure 5.3: Diagram of the “problem landscape” for stormwater, as defined by policy sectors.46  
 
Figure 5.3 illustrates visually how stormwater management encompasses parts of multiple policy 
sectors.  Managing stormwater over its full problem landscape requires coordination of the 
decisions and actions of organizations from these policy sectors. 
 
Ecological harmonizing 
Ecological harmonizing occurs when managers of interdependent ecosystem elements coordinate 
their decisions and actions to make sense from a broader, ecosystem perspective. In this case, the 
“problem landscape” is the particular ecosystem being managed, such as a tidal wetland, stream 
segment, or forest region. The constituent “units” are different elements of that ecosystem, each 
of which may be managed by a different organization or set of organizations. Ecosystem 
                                                             
46 This is not meant to be an accurate picture of what these policy sectors or the stormwater issue look like. It is 
simply a schematic for illustrating the concept of “policy sector harmonizing” 
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elements are interdependent and connected via ecological relationships. For instance, aquatic 
plant species provide habitat and food for fish species, and tree species in the riparian zone of 
streams provide leaf litter for bottom-dwelling stream macro-invertebrates. Because of this 
interdependence, management practices applied to one species or element affect the others. 
Figure 5.4 uses the same schematic as Figure 5.2 and 5.3 to illustrate how ecological 
interdependence creates the need for ecological harmonizing. It shows an ecological “problem 
landscape” for a hypothetical ecosystem, in this case an in-stream segment of the Potomac River. 
The geometric shapes represent ecosystem elements that comprise the “problem landscape”, such 
as species of fish, trees and wildlife in the forested areas surrounding the river (called the 
riparian zone), air quality, and water quality. Because these ecosystem elements interact, this in-
stream river segment cannot be properly managed without coordinating management of all 
relevant ecosystem elements. This means the actions and decisions of different organizations 
managing these ecosystem elements must be harmonized over the ecological problem landscape.  
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Figure 5.4: Diagram of the ecological “problem landscape” for a hypothetical in-stream segment 
of the Potomac River.47  
 
Further, any one ecosystem element cannot be properly managed without attention to the others. 
In fact, it is often management of a target species which stimulates interest in collaboration. In 
an example described later, managers of the beloved Chesapeake Bay blue crab crossed 
traditional boundaries to work with marine agencies on conserving submerged aquatic vegetation 
(SAV), a critical habitat for juvenile blue crabs.   
When the goal is management of a target species— rather than management over a whole 
ecosystem— ecological harmonizing looks different. The diagram in Figure 5.5 adjusts Figure 
5.4 to indicate the “problem landscape” for a particular target species, Fisheries species 2.  
Fisheries species 2 has ecological interdependencies with all other ecosystem elements included 
                                                             
47 This is not meant to be an accurate or full picture of all relevant ecological elements. It is simply a schematic for 
illustrating the concept of “ecological harmonizing” 
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within its problem landscape. Proper management thus requires harmonizing decisions and 
actions of management agencies with responsibility for these other elements. Even if 
harmonizing does not stretch across the entire problem landscape, it should, at a minimum, 
include the elements most critical for survival and health of the target species.  
 
Figure 5.5: Diagram of the ecological “problem landscape” for the management of a hypothetical 
target species, called Fisheries species 2.48  
 
Ecological harmonizing, like all collaboration, requires inter-organizational coordination, in 
this case between different organizations that manage ecosystem elements. A single organization 
                                                             
48 This is not meant to be an accurate or full picture of all relevant ecological elements. It is simply a schematic for 
illustrating the concept of “ecological harmonizing” 
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that broadens its perspective to include, say, predators or habitat in its management plan is 
addressing the ecological interdependence problem but is not harmonizing.49  
 
Empirical examples of harmonizing 
Table 5.2 below shows the categorization of my 99 cases of harmonizing into the three types 
described above.  The number of cases of geographical and organizational harmonizing is 
approximately equal in the data. There are very few cases of Ecological harmonizing. Although 
single organizations frequently write ecologically holistic plans, there is often no evidence they 
carry out these plans via collaboration. For instance, a fisheries agency may write a management 
plan with harvest rates that account for interrelated ecosystem elements like habitat features, 
predators, and prey. In this case, the harvest rates are determined through “landscape-level” 
thinking; i.e. by accounting for the ecosystem “problem landscape”. Yet the planning process 
does not require coordination with organizations managing the habitat, predator species, or prey 
species.50  
 
                                                             
49 I emphasize this point because, in the literature, an “ecosystem approach” by single organizations is often 
incorrectly conflated with collaboration. A comprehensive, ecosystem-based plan is seen as “collaboration” because 
it identifies ecological and organizational interdependencies underlying a complex policy problem. However, if the 
plan was written by one organization and does not lead to inter-organizational coordination, it cannot be 
collaboration. Instead, it is a comprehensive ecosystem-level thought process. One proposition in Layzer’s (2008, 
pp. 24) optimistic model of collaboration, for instance, goes like this:  
 
Integrated scientific assessment  Awareness of relationships among ecosystem elements & processes  
A comprehensive plan that accounts for these relationships 
 
This whole chain can be accomplished by a single organization. To turn this into harmonizing, there would have to 
be evidence that, for instance, the agency managing some ecosystem element was directly coordinating with the 
agency managing an interdependent ecosystem element. 
50 I applied a tertiary code, called “Landscape level information”, to indicate when organizations engage in 
comprehensive or “landscape-level” thinking or planning but do not follow this up with collaboration. This would 
include not just ecosystem-level thinking, but also holistic, comprehensive thinking or planning along other problem 
landscapes (e.g. a spatial landscape or an organizational landscape). This code contained 105 passages, so it was a 
relatively common phenomenon.  At some point, this type of comprehensive thinking might lead to comprehensive 
action that includes collaboration. 
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Table 5.2: Number of examples of each harmonizing type found in the empirical data, in total 
and broken down by data source.51 
Harmonizing type All (N=99) 
Bay 
Journal 
(N=30) 
Interviews 
(N=69) 
Geographical (GEO) 48 20 28 
Organizational (ORG) 49 8 41 
Ecological (ECO) 2 2 0 
 
A “case” of harmonizing is generally indicated by a single text passage (of varying length) coded 
from the Bay Journal or the interview data. To meet criteria for a primary harmonizing code, 
passages should indicate that (1) there is collaboration occurring according to my definition, (2) 
collaborating organizations are addressing a problem or issue more holistically than they would 
if acting in isolation, and (3) there is some benefit achieved through their harmonized decisions 
or actions. The example must be specific enough that secondary contextual categories (forum, 
collaborating groups, and policy area) can be coded. Finally, I must be able to identify the 
example as a case of geographical, organizational, or ecological harmonizing.   
I provide sample passages in Appendix C. Passages were selected to represent the two 
data sources and the two main types of harmonizing in the data (geographical and 
organizational). I also present Table C.1, which summarizes 16 harmonizing cases including 7 
cases of geographical harmonizing (GEO), 8 cases of organizational harmonizing (ORG), and 1 
case of ecological harmonizing (ECO). Of the 8 cases of organizational harmonizing, 5 fit the 
“policy sector” formulation of organizational harmonizing described above and are labeled 
ORG-POL. Secondary codes applied to these cases are also shown, including the Forum for 
                                                             
51 Interviews produced more than twice as many cases of Harmonizing as the Bay Journal data. With interviews, it is 
possible to ask a follow up question to ensure collaboration occurred. In Bay Journal passages, it was sometimes 
hard to tell whether organizations actually collaborated, were planning collaboration, or were just “talking a good 
game” about collaboration. If it was unclear whether collaboration actually occurred, no primary Harmonizing code 
was applied.   
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collaboration, Groups that are collaborating, and Policy area. These 16 examples are a good 
representation of the 99 total cases and demonstrate the diversity of harmonizing that occurred in 
my study areas.  
Where the source description indicates multiple data sources, the same “incident” of 
harmonizing was described in more than one text passage. Most often, this occurs with Bay 
Journal data, where the same harmonizing event (especially a significant or complicated one) is 
discussed in multiple articles. For instance, the signature of Memoranda of Agreement between 
upstream Bay States (New York, West Virginia, and Delaware) and the Bay Program to meet the 
2000 nutrient reduction goals (case #3 in Table C.1) was discussed in several articles as the 
process unfolded over time. 
In the following sections, I use selected cases from Table C.1 to illustrate the three types 
of harmonizing. Throughout, I emphasize benefits of harmonizing that will be described in more 
detail in Chapter 6.52   
  
Geographical harmonizing 
Geographical harmonizing addresses a “spatial mismatch” whereby the appropriate spatial 
management area for a policy problem (the spatial “problem landscape”) is physically larger than 
the units with authority to manage the problem. Further, the shared problem being addressed is 
caused by some kind of physical connectivity between collaborating actors, whereby the actions 
or decisions by one organizational actor physically affect actors located nearby. The classic 
                                                             
52 Interviews and Bay Journal articles used in the course of data analysis will be cited in footnotes rather than in the 
References section. To maintain anonymity, interviewees have been given random numbers ranging from 1-100. In 
the three cases where I talked to two interviewees on speaker phone, there will be one interviewee number and 
interviewees will be distinguished by letters (e.g. Interviewees 19a and 19b). Bay Journal articles will be referred to 
by their month, year, and article title. 
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example is when polluted stormwater physically spills over borders from one jurisdiction to 
another. However, examples described below provide a sense of the broader concept. 
 
Joint TMDL plan for Maryland, Virginia, and D.C., coordinated by ICRPB (Case #4 in Table 
C.1) 
In this example, the Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin (ICPRB) assisted three 
jurisdictions (Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia) in developing a combined Total 
Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) plan for the Potomac River and its tributary, the Anacostia 
River. The jurisdictions’ other option was to write separate plans that apply only to their own 
portion of these watersheds but take into account upstream contributions.  US-EPA, however, 
wanted a joint TMDL plan, especially because the impairment being addressed (PCBs, or 
polychlorinated biphenyls) was the same for all jurisdictions. In conceptual terms, the 
appropriate “problem landscape” for the PCB impairment was the whole watershed. This is 
mismatched with the management units which are, for the purpose of TMDL regulations, the 
States and D.C. The logic for inter-jurisdictional harmonizing in this case was described to me 
by an ICPRB employee: 
each of the three jurisdictions, Maryland, Virginia and the District of Columbia, each had 
a PCB impairment, and each was upstream of one other jurisdiction, and downstream of 
one other jurisdiction. The way the Anacostia and the Potomac flow, you get that 
upstream downstream issue and if you have an individual TMDL for Maryland, as an 
example, for PCBs, they can impact both Virginia and the District. And it’s the same 
thing with Virginia, they can impact both Maryland and the District. So it became 
obvious that we should try to do one TMDL rather than having three TMDLs. So that’s 
what was done. 53 
 
The logic for geographical harmonizing in this case is the upstream/downstream relationship. 
Jurisdictions are physically connected because polluted river water flows from one to the other, 
                                                             
53 Interviewee #29a 
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clearly affecting their independent ability to address pollution problems. The appropriate spatial 
landscape for this PCB problem is to include all connected jurisdictions (or as many as possible). 
Thus, this example illustrates the theme that geographical harmonizing addresses a problem on 
a more appropriate, more comprehensive spatial landscape.  With upstream/downstream 
relationships, there is also the potential for upstream communities to pass costs off downstream 
(i.e. create negative externalities for their downstream neighbors). This is less of an issue under 
TMDL regulations because upstream jurisdictions have responsibilities under a TMDL plan 
written by downstream jurisdictions, but it comes up in other contexts.  
A little later in the interview, the second ICPRB employee indicated the joint TMDL 
produced other benefits: 
 
[with] the PCB TMDL, [the jurisdictions] were using ICPRB as a platform for 
collaboration [and this] has resulted in reduced replication of effort and some serious 
economic advantages to the individual jurisdictions. 54 
  
In addition to addressing the PCB problem at a more appropriate spatial scale, harmonizing in 
this case reduced replication, which is good for overall efficiency and saves time and money for 
the jurisdictions. This links to the idea by Huxham and MacDonald (1992) that collaboration 
can help to avoid the pitfall of duplication and its associated inefficiencies.  
 
Launching the Mid-Atlantic Regional Panel on Aquatic Nuisance Species (Case #1 in Table 
C.1) 
                                                             
54 Interviewee #29b 
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In this case, mid-Atlantic states including Maryland, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Delaware, West 
Virginia, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, and the District of Columbia formed a joint 
panel to address invasive aquatic species that spread across state lines. The panel is writing 
“rapid response plans” to stop the spread of invasive species across borders and developing 
regional management strategies for established problem species.55 
Although their movement is slower, invasive species travel across borders just as polluted 
river water does. Like all problems addressed by geographical harmonizing, there is a critical 
physical connectively between jurisdictions. For aquatic invasive species, this includes all 
jurisdictions connected to “infected” areas by rivers, streams, wetlands or other water features 
that have climates, soils, and other conditions suitable for growth of the species.  By including all 
Mid-Atlantic states and North Carolina, this new Panel has approximated the appropriate 
management scale for invasive species affecting the Chesapeake Bay region. This example, then, 
illustrates the theme that geographical harmonizing addresses a problem on a more 
appropriate, more comprehensive spatial landscape than if jurisdictions were working alone.  
Another problem arising from physical connectivity is when management actions (or the 
lack of management actions) by one jurisdiction negatively affect its neighbors. The story at the 
beginning of the source article for this case is about New York’s failure to prevent invasive zebra 
mussels from taking hold in the Susquehanna River headwaters, even after warnings from 
downstream neighbors. It illustrates the concept of “counter-production”, one of the pitfalls of 
individualism described by Huxham and MacDonald (1992) whereby the actions of one 
organization working in isolation conflicts with the actions of another, leading at a minimum to 
“cancelling out” of benefits and at worst to a negative overall effect. In the zebra mussel case, 
                                                             
55 The coded passage for this case is copied in Appendix C; it is not necessary to repeat it here because the main 
ideas have already been paraphrased.  
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counter-productive actions generated a harm that affected downstream neighbors and the region 
as a whole. This is exactly the type of problem that the new Panel hopes to avoid in the future. 
By harmonizing the actions and decisions of physically connected jurisdictions, this Panel has 
the additional potential benefit of avoiding counter-production.   
Two of the other “pitfalls of individualism” identified by Huxham and MacDonald 
(1992) are omission and divergence. Omission is when important activities “fall through the 
cracks” either because they don’t belong under any one organizations’ mandate, or because they 
are a shared responsibility that each organization assumes the other is doing. Divergence is when 
a lack of coordinated resource targeting dilutes the collective effectiveness of organizational 
actions. A separate passage from the source article for this case indicates the Panel will address 
both omission and divergence problems. This passage features a quote from a biologist with the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s Chesapeake Bay Field Office:  
Despite the magnitude of the issue, combating-and even monitoring-foreign invaders is 
typically not an explicit responsibility for most agencies. “It is sort of an orphan issue, 
and it competes with a lot of other issues,” Thompson said. “It’s important to really pool 
our resources among the states and make sure that we are not just doing things randomly, 
that we are really trying to work together strategically to prevent and control invasive 
species.” 56 
  
The statement that combatting foreign invaders is “not an explicit responsibility for most 
agencies” and “is sort of an orphan issue” points to the problem of omission, while the 
exhortation that States need to “pool their resources” so they are “not just doing things 
randomly” alludes to solving the problem of divergence through coordinated resource targeting. 
It is not guaranteed that the Panel will ultimately be successful in preventing the problems of 
omission, divergence, and counter-production. What is clear is that the Panel hopes and plans to 
alleviate these problems, and that they are doing this by coordinating the decisions and actions of 
                                                             
56 Bay Journal, May 2005, "Regional agencies join forces against exotic invaders" 
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relevant jurisdictions over the appropriate geographical landscape (i.e. by geographical 
harmonizing). 
 
Intertwined stormwater systems and coordinated action (Case #5 in Table C.1) 
In this case, geographical harmonizing occurs between neighboring jurisdictions that operate 
their own MS4 permits for stormwater management.57 MS4 permits, issued by the State under 
the Federal National Pollution Discharge Elimination Program (NPDES), require urbanized 
municipalities over a certain population to control stormwater flows and associated pollution 
impacts. Permit requirements include development and maintenance of stormwater management 
infrastructure, controlling illicit discharges, regulating construction site runoff, and conducting 
stormwater education.  
Each municipality is responsible for its own MS4 permit which covers the stormwater 
system and flows within its jurisdictional boundaries. In Virginia, there is an added twist: the 
Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) maintains its own MS4 permit that applies to all 
the State’s roads and highways. Thus, VDOT’s MS4 permit, following the road network, runs 
like ribbons through the MS4 permits of urban and suburban localities.  
Stormwater, of course, does not recognize MS4 boundaries between neighboring 
municipalities, or between VDOT-controlled roads and the municipalities they criss-cross. 
Stormwater simply moves unimpeded over the landscape. Thus, municipal and VDOT 
stormwater systems are physically intertwined or interconnected – water runs from one into the 
other— but are regulated separately. In conceptual terms, you have a mismatch of the “problem 
landscape” and the “management units”. The problem landscape is the area of physically 
connected municipalities and roads over which stormwater actually flows, while the management 
                                                             
57 MS4 stands for municipal separate storm sewer systems. 
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units are municipalities and VDOT, their jurisdictions defined by municipal boundaries and the 
State road network, respectively.  
Proper management of stormwater systems requires coordination between neighboring 
municipalities and between VDOT and all of Virginia’s MS4 communities. The extent of actual 
coordination varies. In the interview exchange below from the source article for this case, a 
County stormwater manager explains that coordination is good with the town embedded within 
his County’s jurisdiction, but poor with VDOT:  
Interviewee: the MS4 communities have to work a little bit with each other from the 
boundary areas.  So there’s some collaboration that goes on there and that’s very 
successful so far…. We border on [Town X] with our MS4 - great cooperation with 
[Town X].  They have some water that goes into our systems.  We have some that goes 
into theirs and total cooperation on that. On the other hand, …[the Virginia Department 
of Transportation, or VDOT is] required to have a stormwater permit to supposedly 
control the water that runs off the streets.  And because they border on our permit - and 
virtually everybody else’s  -  because they run as ribbons throughout the permit, they’re 
supposed to collaborate with us on the pollution that comes off and basically there’s no 
collaboration there…. 
 
Rachel: Okay so VDOT runs its own MS4 then? 
 
Interviewee: Right.  Right. And, like I said, there’s virtually no cooperation there.  What 
we found is we’re better off pretending they’re not there and go out and just extend our 
efforts into the streets than to try to work with them on it… 
 
Rachel: You said you have good cooperation with [Town X].  Do they have some of their 
own authority to manage stormwater within the town? 
 
Interviewee: Yeah.  They basically run their own permit and everything within the town 
limits is their jurisdiction and everything outside the town limits is ours.  But there are 
places where the storm sewer systems comingle.  And so we have to cooperate on that 
and there’s no real problem with that.  They work with us really well. 58 
 
By coordinating with Town X on their intermingled stormwater systems, this County is engaging 
in geographical harmonizing – that is, they are addressing the stormwater control problem on a 
more appropriate, more comprehensive spatial landscape.  They are not working within the full 
                                                             
58 Interviewee #23 
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spatial “problem landscape”, however, in part because they lack coordination with VDOT over 
embedded road networks and in part because they are not, as far as I can tell, concerned about 
stormwater that flows outside of the County boundaries. However, they are working at a more 
appropriate spatial scale than if the County and Town acted in isolation.  
Harmonizing in this case has both individualized and collective benefits. From the 
County stormwater manager’s perspective, harmonizing decisions and actions is necessary for 
proper management of his own system. He can ensure that neighbors are not pushing off their 
stormwater problems onto the County. Thus, like other cases above, harmonizing helps to avoid 
counter-productive actions and decisions. Management over a more appropriate problem 
landscape should also improve the stormwater system as a comprehensive whole, since it makes 
it harder for individual jurisdictions to “fix” their stormwater problems by shifting them to 
neighbors.  
 
Other geographical harmonizing examples 
Other geographical harmonizing examples in Table C.1 repeat the same themes. In one example, 
Maryland and Virginia harmonize their harvesting regulations for the blue crab. Since fish, crabs, 
and other mobile aquatic species flow freely between state fisheries, harmonized regulations help 
to avoid counter-production, where strict regulations by one state are undermined by another 
state’s lenient regulations. In another case, Northern Virginia localities develop a coordinated 
emergency response system for drought conditions. By harmonizing actions of major water users 
in the region, they conserve water for the system overall and prevent individual localities from 
monopolizing water in times of scarcity. This is especially important for river sources, where 
upstream jurisdictions can easily take more than their share to the detriment of downstream 
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neighbors. In another interesting case, Prince William County and the embedded city of 
Manassas coordinate to ensure that recreational trails do not end or die off at the city/county 
border. Without coordination, counter-production can occur: if, for instance, Manassas decides 
not to continue a trail, or does not properly maintain its portion of a trail, the utility of that trail is 
decreased for everyone regardless of how nicely it is maintained by Prince William County.   
 
Organizational harmonizing 
Organizational harmonizing involves coordinating the decisions and actions of various 
organizations that comprise the relevant “landscape” needed to solve a policy problem. Because 
each organization addresses some piece or portion of a policy problem and/or is affected by the 
problem, assembling them in a coordinated way generally leads to more comprehensive and 
collectively rational solutions. Harmonizing also addresses the fragmentation of authority, 
jurisdiction, expertise, and information associated with “wicked” policy problems.  
Policy sector harmonizing, a more specific type of organizational harmonizing, 
harmonizes the decisions/actions of organizations working in different policy sectors. Because 
water quality problems have a wide range of causes, some originating in other policy sectors 
such as transportation, agriculture, and land development, the majority of organizational 
harmonizing examples in my data fit this description. Thus I included several examples of policy 
sector harmonizing in Table C.1, identifying them with the special abbreviation ORG-POL to 
distinguish them from general organizational harmonizing (ORG).   
Organizational harmonizing is a broader concept than geographical harmonizing because 
it does not require physical inter-connection or a spatial relationship between coordinating 
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actors. The examples provided below, pulled from Table C.1, illustrate the concept and 
demonstrate its breadth.   
 
State agencies coordinate to ensure consistency of their regulations (Case #11 in Table C.1) 
In this example, the state agency overseeing implementation of the Virginia Chesapeake Bay 
Preservation Act (known as the “Bay Act”) coordinates with “sister” state agencies to ensure 
their actions are consistent with Bay Act regulations. Regulations inconsistent with the Bay Act 
make compliance difficult for local governments and undermine the Act’s effectiveness.  
The Bay Act requires Virginia localities in the tidal part of the Chesapeake Bay 
watershed to adopt certain land use regulations into their local codes; these regulations are 
designed to protect sensitive tidal wetlands, streams, and other features by restricting 
development in and around them. Local governments are responsible for adopting and enforcing 
these codes, but the state Chesapeake Bay Local Assistance Department (CBLAD), part of 
Virginia DCR, helps local governments stay in compliance by clarifying the regulations and, in 
some cases, providing enforcement assistance.  
Bay Act land use regulations affect disparate land development activities, many 
instigated by agencies that know or care little about water quality. For instance, State and local 
health departments make decisions about septic system requirements which impact both 
groundwater and surface water pollution. Also, the State Transportation department (VDOT) 
makes decisions about road placement and stormwater management. These agencies may not be 
aware of Bay Act restrictions, in part because water quality is not foremost in their minds and in 
part because the regulations only affect Virginia localities in the tidewater region. As a result, 
decisions and actions taken by these other agencies may be inconsistent with, or even counter-
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productive to, the Bay Act. CBLAD recognizes the potential for conflict and works with “sister” 
state agencies to ensure consistency between their regulations and the Bay Act. The quote below 
from a CBLAD employee (the source for this case), describes this effort:  
In addition, we’ll work with the Health Department. Like over the last couple of years 
they are revising their regulations to accommodate these new types of septic systems that 
are out there. And we’re kind of working with them so they don’t put anything in their 
regulations that would conflict with what’s in the Bay Act regulations. So we’ll interact.  
 
[Then there is the State Department of Transportation (VDOT), which has] promulgated 
some regulations regarding streets and things like that and different development patterns 
and development requirements that [have a] a bay water quality impact, so we’ll tend to 
work with them on a few things as well….as they revise their regulations and 
requirements, we’ll provide input into that saying, “Hey, look, you’re doing something 
here that’s not completely consistent with the Bay Act,” that kind of stuff. 59 
 
CBLAD is working hard to ensure that actions/decisions by other State agencies are harmonious 
with Bay Act goals, and for good reason. If other departments’ regulations truly conflict with 
Bay Act regulations, local governments will find it impossible to comply with both. This 
illustrates the counter-production problem described by Huxham and MacDonald (1992). 
Counter-production in this case appears to result from simple oversight rather than a true conflict 
between health/transportation priorities and environmental priorities. If this is true, instituting 
basic communication and coordination between the State agencies, as CBLAD has done, 
prevents unnecessary obstacles to compliance with the Bay Act.  
Above is the practical argument for organizational harmonizing. Framing this example in 
conceptual terms, the true “organizational problem landscape” for protecting Bay water quality 
includes these other State agencies and the policy sectors (Health and Transportation) they 
represent. By bringing them into the conversation about Bay Act regulations, CBLAD is working 
to address Bay water quality at a more appropriate organizational problem landscape. In fact, 
                                                             
59 Interviewee #19a. 
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these agencies, whose own policy priorities are far removed from water quality, may not realize 
they are part of the problem landscape and may need CBLAD to remind them to consider water 
quality impacts of their actions.   
There are also efficiency benefits to CBLAD’s coordination efforts. Uncoordinated 
regulations create inefficiencies and inconveniences for regulated entities. Later in the interview, 
the same CBLAD employee describes this problem when asked about the “value added” of 
coordination with the Health and Transportation Departments:  
Rachel: [What is] the value added of [your coordination with the other State 
departments]?  
 
Interviewee:  The value added is you avoid redundancy. You provide for consistency of 
message and consistency of requirements. And I think nobody hates it more than when 
two governments agencies, particularly if they’re somewhere related, tell you two 
different things.... And also, you have government agencies that have similar 
responsibilities over the same kind of thing. If you think of a given project that somebody 
wants to do that’s kind of complicated and it has environmental impacts of some sort, 
there are going to be multiple entities that put their hands in it. 
 
And what these people don’t like is when they’re getting twenty different responses and 
it’s because everybody’s looking at it from a different perspective. They don’t get their 
stuff together beforehand and make sure that they’re not conflicting with each other [and] 
the person doing the project has to sort it out... And so that’s why we try to collaborate 
with some of these agencies before we go out, to understand what they’re going to say, 
and you just try to avoid it getting kind of ugly in front of your constituents. 
 
And you know how people like developers or property owners, they’ll have some awful 
experience, and they’ll come out going, “Why don’t these guys talk to each other?” 
They’ll point to three or four government agencies and say, “Why don’t you guys talk to 
each other? You’re all the Commonwealth of Virginia.” or, “You’re the same 
department, why aren’t you talking to each other? You’re in the same building.” That’s 
what you want to try to avoid. It’s just a colossal waste of time and you can’t do that. 60 
 
In addition to greater efficiency for regulated entities, harmonizing regulations has collective 
efficiency benefits. A lack of coordination is equivalent (conceptually) to fragmenting the 
organizational “landscape”. As a result, efforts to solve the shared problem will be piecemeal and 
                                                             
60 Interviewee #19a. 
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resources spread thinly, as each agency pursues its own separate programming. This is the 
Divergence pitfall described by Huxham and MacDonald (1992), whereby resources are 
dispersed inefficiently and in an uncoordinated fashion, undermining the collective ability to 
solve a shared problem.  
In the quote below, for instance, a County watershed planner describes how 
uncoordinated regulations undermine his ability to address water quality problems. Two major 
regulations (the MS4 permit and the TMDL) address similar water quality problems but are 
implemented differently and enforced by separate sets of regulators. Beyond being an 
inconvenience, this causes a Divergence problem where the County has to split its limited 
resources between the programs, such that they never have enough money and time to properly 
implement either. According to the interviewee, the more “efficient, cost effective way” to 
address water quality would be for TMDL regulators and MS4 program regulators to coordinate 
their programs: 
Interviewee:  [In 2002] I was sitting on a statewide group that they had put together of 
local jurisdictions to brainstorm on how do we come up with plans and what would be a 
strategy going forward…. [W]e told them, “Look, rather than having all these different 
requirements that require different resources allocated, why not try to have just one thing 
that satisfies everything?”   And that would the most effective, cost efficient way 
because, basically, we’re after the same goal……. So it seems like, over the years, we’re 
just talking in isolation on different things.  And the EPA itself, the folks who write 
[MS4] permits are different from the people who develop TMDLs and so sometimes 
there’s a big disconnect - TMDL goals and what’s realistic and what can satisfy your 
permit and also satisfy your TMDL.  It’s like, okay, you know? 
 
Rachel: Yeah.  I guess I hadn’t thought about that but that’s true - that the TMDL 
Program is separate from the [MS4] Program. 
 
Interviewee: Right.  And sometimes the folks don’t even talk and they’re probably in the 
same building.…  So it’s a big challenge for us because we’re going to have, like I said, 
limited resources or capacity to go back to taxpayers and say, “Okay, this is what we 
want to do and this is how much it’s going to cost you.”  By the time you finish 
explaining that for one program, you don’t want to go back and explain, “Well, we have 
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this other program over here that we’re going to need additional.”  You just want to go to 
them one time and, hopefully, your program will cover everything. 61 
 
With these additional quotes, I have drawn attention to complications that can arise from a lack 
of coordination, such as inefficiency, divergence (i.e. a lack of resource targeting), and 
fragmentation of the organizational “problem landscape”. These complications are minimized by 
assembling the appropriate landscape to address a policy problem and harmonizing the 
decisions/actions of organizations across this landscape. In the Bay Act case, CBLAD did not 
assemble the full “landscape” of organizations necessary to address Bay quality, but moved in 
that direction by harmonizing key decisions/actions of the State Health and Transportation 
departments.  
  
Stormwater managers coordinate with County agencies on MS4 permit requirements (Case 
#12 in Table C.1) 
In this example, a County stormwater manager coordinates with other County agencies to 
improve stormwater management and compliance with the county MS4 permit. She gets 
involved in early planning stages for these agencies’ capital projects so improved stormwater 
treatments can be considered:   
I think what we’re trying to educate people on is that this is a countywide permit; it’s not 
just a stormwater permit…. And we’re doing a lot better coordination more recently with 
the schools and with parks to try to be aware of when they’re doing [in terms of capital 
projects]. [We ask them:] Can we be involved early on in the planning stages so that we 
can help give you ideas about how you might treat your stormwater in a different way or 
provide additional stormwater treatment than you would otherwise? And we’re even 
willing, in some cases, to help fund some of that. But the idea is you can spend all of your 
money going and trying to patch things up after people have done what they’re going to 
do, or you can try and work with them ahead of time and your money goes a lot further 
when you’re preventing impacts rather than trying to fix them. 62 
                                                             
61 Interviewee #54 
62 Interviewee #4 
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For these other agencies (the two mentioned are Parks and Schools), stormwater is not a high 
priority. However, because Parks Departments and School Districts own and manage large 
swaths of land, how they handle stormwater affects the Counties’ ability to meet MS4 
requirements. Further, since the County has limited ability to make stormwater improvements on 
private land,63 it often uses public lands such as schools, parks, and libraries as places to install 
stormwater infrastructure or demonstration projects. Addressing County stormwater issues in a 
comprehensive manner, then, requires involvement of these agencies (plus others not mentioned 
in the quote, such as transportation, agriculture, water supply, and health). In other words, 
stormwater must be addressed at the appropriate organizational landscape. 
MS4 regulations explicitly require participation by multiple agencies of County 
government. As the interviewee puts it, it is a county-wide permit, not just a stormwater permit.  
This requirement is rarely enforced, however, and most agencies like Parks and School districts 
do not realize their obligations under the permit, especially because their own priorities and goals 
seem quite removed from stormwater. This highlights the common situation where organizations 
may not realize they are part of the appropriate “organizational landscape” for solving a 
problem. The same situation applied above when the VDOH and VDOT proposed regulations 
conflicting with the Bay Act.  
Another theme shared with the CBLAD example is that the organizational landscape 
was “assembled” by an actor for whom the problem is most central.  Just as CBLAD actively 
pursued coordination with VDOH and VDOT because of its responsibility to protect Bay water 
quality, the County stormwater manager actively attempts to harmonize decisions and actions of 
County agencies (particularly in regard to capital projects) with stormwater management 
                                                             
63 This is because of constitutional restrictions that limit spending tax dollars for improvements on private property. 
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priorities. In conceptual terms, she is incorporating these agencies into the “organizational 
landscape” for stormwater. This active pursuit might be necessary if, as described above, the 
agencies do not recognize their obligations under the MS4 permit.   
The rationale for coordination in this example is preventing negative stormwater impacts. 
If left to their own devices, county agencies are likely to install poor stormwater systems that 
will later need to be “fixed” by County stormwater managers. “Fixing” mistakes is much more 
expensive than preventing them, and could quickly drain the stormwater budget. If, on the other 
hand, these agencies coordinate with County stormwater managers initially, their decisions are 
likelier to be harmonious with stormwater priorities. In conceptual terms, the interviewee is 
talking about avoiding counter-production, whereby organizations working in isolation take 
actions that “cancel out” or undermine the benefits produced by other organizations’ actions 
(Huxham and MacDonald 1992). By harmonizing decisions and actions of these agencies with 
stormwater priorities, inefficiencies could be avoided.  
 
District Conservationists and SWCD employees coordinate cost-share decisions (Case #10 in 
Table C.1) 
USDA-NRCS District Conservationists are local implementers for cost-share programs funded 
by the Federal government, in particular the Natural Resource Conservation Service (NRCS) 
programs under the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). Under these programs, 
they assist interested farmers in installing best management practices (BMPs) on their farms and 
maintaining them properly. Soil and Water Conservation District (SWCD) employees have a 
similar job except their main responsibility is to promote State rather than Federal cost-share 
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programs. District Conservationists and SWCD employees work together closely. In fact, the 
District Conservationist is often co-located in the SWCD office or in the same building.  
District Conservationists and SWCD employees tend to harmonize decisions and actions. 
In fact, decisions are often made jointly regarding which programs (Federal or State) are most 
appropriate for a farmer based on his/her desires and the specifics of his/her farm. In conceptual 
terms, they harmonize their decisions and actions towards what is best for the land and the 
farmer, even if this decision is incompatible with their individual organizations’ programmatic 
goals.  
This coordination relationship was described during an interview with a District 
Conservationist and an SWCD employee who work in the same office. Note that the quoted 
interviewee is the SWCD employee and that she calls state-funded programs “local” since they 
are administered at the local level by the SWCD: 
Interviewee 43b: When you are meeting with a landowner for the first time it’s not 
uncommon for a federal and a local staff member to be there. And then you don’t talk 
which programs are federal and which programs are local, you just talk about the 
conservation and then figure out which program is best suited for the farmer and handle 
that behind the scenes back at the office. 
 
Rachel: Is there any competition? You were saying before about how the reporting is 
separate and how people want to take the credit? 
 
Interviewee 43b: That’s happening in the state offices. That’s happening in Richmond. 
That’s not happening in the field. There is no competition in the field. 64 
 
In the field, both parties harmonize their decisions/actions towards what is best for the farmer 
and his land. To the extent that competition occurs, it happens in the administrative offices at the 
State level where employees are directly responsible for meeting State targets. Ostensibly, 
                                                             
64 Interviewee #43b 
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however, the “team” on the ground does not let this competition creep into their working 
relationship.   
In terms of the “organizational landscape” for agricultural BMPs, the District 
Conservationist and the SWCD are critical organizational components but not the only relevant 
actors. The farmer, although not an organizational actor, is critical, as are the State and Federal 
offices that fund and oversee these programs, farmer advocacy groups, and others. Therefore, 
this example represents harmonizing over a small “clump” of actors with close working 
relationships, rather than coordination over the whole organizational landscape. This is 
significant, however, since field staff have great influence over which management practices get 
installed.  
 
Ecological harmonizing 
Ecological harmonizing occurs when managers of interdependent ecosystem elements coordinate 
their decisions and actions to make sense from a broader, ecosystem perspective. There are two 
ways to view the ecological “problem landscape”. The first conceptualizes the problem 
landscape as the set of ecological elements relevant to managing a particular ecosystem, such as 
a stream segment or a wetland. The second conceptualizes the problem landscape as the set of 
ecological elements relevant to managing a target species, such as the blue crab or Atlantic 
Sturgeon. Either way, the problem landscape is comprised of a set of critical ecological elements 
(such as species of plants and animals, aspects of water chemistry, soils, and forest components). 
Organizations managing these ecosystem elements are the “management units” whose actions 
and decisions are harmonized.  Another critical aspect of ecological harmonizing is the 
interdependence of ecosystem elements comprising the problem landscape. Because they are 
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connected via ecological relationships, management practices applied to one element affect the 
others and the health of the system as a whole.  
The example of ecological harmonizing presented in Table C.1 is best understood using 
the second conceptualization of ecological harmonizing because it revolves around protecting a 
target species, the beloved Chesapeake Bay blue crab. Harmonizing occurs primarily between 
managers of the blue crab and managers of a critical habitat feature called submerged aquatic 
vegetation (SAV).  SAV beds are found in shallow areas of the Bay and its tributaries and serve 
as protective habitat for juvenile blue crabs. Unfortunately, SAV grasses have been dying off 
because of sediment in the water (which blocks light), pollution, and dredging.  During the time 
of my research, the survival of blue crab population was a concern due to lost habitat and 
overharvesting.  
In the late 1990s, fisheries managers in the Chesapeake Bay were considering the novel 
idea of including habitat protection in their fisheries management plans. Traditionally, fisheries 
management plans set harvest levels of target species, restrict the times/places for harvesting, 
and restrict types of equipment used. However, the need for an expanded approach became clear 
as dwindling or impaired habitat threatened the survival of various species. 
Most times, habitat features like vegetation or water quality are regulated and managed 
by different entities than fisheries. Appropriate management of blue crabs, then, requires (at a 
minimum) coordination of decisions and actions between fisheries agencies, State marine 
agencies who manage SAV beds and other habitat features, and Federal and State environmental 
agencies who manage water quality. A 1998 Bay Journal article, the source for this example, 
discusses a new blue crab plan sponsored by the Bay Program and signed by the governors of all 
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three Bay States (Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania) which requires coordination among 
these executive agencies:  
The new policies recognize that protecting aquatic habitat isn't just for fisheries agencies: 
It's also a job for state environmental departments that manage water quality. The blue 
crab plan - signed by the governors of all three Bay states - flatly says, "It is the 
responsibility of all executive agencies, not simply the fishery management agencies, to 
carry out and abide by the habitat protection and restoration provisions in the Plan.” 65 
 
Although it is unclear how much coordination ultimately followed from this plan, it was an 
important starting point. Generally, Bay Program directives like this one carry significant weight 
because they have been developed by high level officials and signed by the Governors of Bay 
States.  
 
Wrap up and preview of coming chapters 
Although my data yielded results on all five benefits of collaboration, I focus my analysis on 
coordinated action – a benefit that not only yielded many empirical cases but lacks conceptual 
development in existing literature. Upon exploring coordinated action cases, I identified a 
process common to them called harmonizing, an intriguing concept which deserved further 
study. By harmonizing, organizations achieve collective benefits by acting in a way that better 
approximates the true scope of a problem, or by working across the true “problem landscape” 
In this chapter, I presented my original conceptual model and typology of harmonizing. 
Three types were identified (geographical/spatial, organizational, and ecological) and illustrated 
with empirical cases from my data. The next two chapters continue my analysis of harmonizing. 
In Chapter 6, I further develop the conceptual model to explain how each type of harmonizing 
addresses a particular policy problem common to complex policy environments (not just water 
                                                             
65 Bay Journal, Jan/Feb 1998,“Growing respect for grass” 
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quality). I also describe specific benefits that can be expected through harmonizing, including 
more comprehensive, holistic policy, greater efficiency, and standardization.  In Chapter 7, I 
present a contextual analysis of harmonizing that examines the secondary codes (collaboration 
forum, collaborating groups, and policy area) most commonly associated with harmonizing. 
Finally, in Chapter 8 I present the results from a less structured thematic analysis of the other 
four benefits.  
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Chapter 6: Benefits of Harmonizing 
 
In Chapter 5, the process of harmonizing is discussed conceptually and empirically. In this 
chapter, I provide more specific details on the concrete, policy-related benefits that can be 
expected when harmonizing occurs.  
As described in Chapter 5, harmonizing solves a problem at the appropriate “landscape”, 
whether this landscape is defined in geographical, organizational, or ecological terms. This 
means policy problems are addressed comprehensively and holistically, accounting for many 
interrelated elements and actors critical to solving the problem effectively. Thus, we can expect 
harmonizing to result in more comprehensive, thoughtful, and ultimately sustainable and 
implementable policies. This is the most central benefit of harmonizing.  
Explaining how harmonizing links to holistic policy requires adding another conceptual 
layer to my typology. Each type of harmonizing generates more comprehensive and holistic 
policies, but in different ways. For instance, geographical harmonizing uses a comprehensive 
spatial or physical approach, while organizational harmonizing uses a comprehensive 
institutional approach by assembling the right organizations, with the right resources and 
authorities. One way to explore these different paths is to think about the problems or obstacles 
that stand in the way of comprehensive, holistic policy making and how each type of 
harmonizing addresses them. I have discovered that each type of harmonizing is a solution to a 
different problem plaguing policy-makers. Further, these problems are not unique to water 
quality; they occur in other complex policy environments.  
My thoughts are illustrated by Table 6.1 below. The terms chosen to represent the three 
“problems” solved by harmonizing are the “Border” problem, the “Stovepiping” problem, and 
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the “Species- or media-specific programming” problem. These problems are associated, 
respectively, with geographical, organizational, and ecological landscapes. As a group, I call 
them “boundary problems” because they describe situations where artificial boundaries fragment 
the true problem landscape. For instance, state and municipal boundaries break up watersheds, 
which are the true geographical problem landscape for addressing water quality problems (this is 
the “Border Problem”).  Departmental boundaries between Planning and Public Works 
departments break up the true organizational problem landscape needed to reduce stormwater 
pollution (this is the “Stovepiping Problem”). Finally, programmatic boundaries based on 
specific ecosystem elements such as species or media (air, water, soils) fragment the true 
ecological problem landscape needed to manage a target species. 
Table 6.1 also indicates that a “landscape-level approach” (i.e. harmonizing 
decisions/actions over the appropriate problem landscape) alleviates boundary problems. For 
instance, geographical harmonizing helps to alleviate the “Border” problem, while organizational 
harmonizing helps to alleviate the “Stovepiping” problem. When harmonizing is not present, the 
problems persist.  
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Table 6.1 Types of harmonizing, the boundary problems they solve, and the benefits they create 
 
  Landscape Level Approach Result if yes    No Yes 
Character of 
landscape 
Geographical/
Physical 
Border 
problem 
Geographical 
harmonizing 
Holistic policy 
from a spatial 
perspective 
Organizational Stovepiping problem 
 Organizational 
harmonizing 
Holistic policy 
from an 
institutional / 
policy sector 
perspective 
Ecological 
Species- or 
medium-
specific 
programming 
Ecological 
harmonizing 
Holistic policy 
from an 
ecosystem 
perspective 
 
 
The final column of Table 6.1 indicates the result (i.e. the benefit) associated with each type of 
harmonizing. These benefits relate to achieving more comprehensive, holistic policy decisions 
and outcomes, but in different ways. For instance, geographical harmonizing generates policy 
that is more comprehensive from a physical, spatial perspective, while organizational 
harmonizing generates policy that is more holistic from an institutional perspective, often 
incorporating relevant policy sectors. Ecological harmonizing generates policy that is more 
holistic from an ecosystem perspective.  
The holistic policy benefits described in the final column of 6.1 are the concrete 
benefits associated with harmonizing. By coordinating decisions and actions over the 
appropriate geographical, organizational, and/or ecological landscapes, policies are more 
comprehensive, taking into account all or most relevant factors that affect policy success. For 
instance, how will a water supply policy affect downstream neighbors or be affected by upstream 
neighbors (a geographical issue)? How will a stormwater policy be affected by regional 
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transportation plans (an organizational/policy sector issue)? Will management actions taken on a 
predator species affect its prey species (an ecological issue)? Addressing these interrelationships 
should lead to better, more robust policies.  
Harmonizing leads to other related benefits. For instance, greater efficiency was brought 
up frequently in the Chapter 5 examples. By coordinating actions and decisions, organizations 
were able to pool their resources, utilize existing resources rather than generate new ones, avoid 
creating problems that other organizations would have to fix, avoid programmatic redundancies, 
and target their combined resources more efficiently. These efficiency gains can largely be 
understand, in conceptual terms, as avoiding the “pitfalls” of independent action described by 
Huxham and MacDonald (1992). Avoiding the pitfalls of duplication, divergence of resources, 
and counter-production are especially critical for achieving efficiency gains. A separate benefit, 
which received less attention in the examples already described, is standardization.  Harmonizing 
can lead organizations to standardize their procedures or programs in ways that make 
programming more logical, effective, or fair.  
In the remainder of this chapter I elaborate on the holistic policy benefits of harmonizing 
and the benefits of efficiency and standardization, illustrating them with empirical examples. For 
holistic policy benefits, I again organize my discussion based on the three types of harmonizing, 
this time focusing on the three “boundary problems” that harmonizing solves.66  
 
Solving the Border Problem through Geographical Harmonizing 
Like all boundary problems, the Border Problem occurs when artificial boundaries fragment the 
problem landscape needed to solve a policy problem. Boundaries are geographical, most often 
                                                             
66 Because these concepts were already introduced, there is some repetition, for which I apologize. However, the 
boundary problems are a critical conceptual piece to understanding why Harmonizing produces benefits, and as such 
they deserve separate treatment. 
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between local jurisdictions or States.  Because each jurisdiction has independent authority within 
its borders, coordination is needed to address the problem at the appropriate spatial landscape. In 
the previous chapter, I called this a “spatial mismatch”, where the appropriate spatial 
management area for a policy problem is physically larger than the units with authority to 
manage the problem.  
Another characteristic of a border problem is physical connectively, where the actions or 
decisions by one actor physically affect actors located nearby. This “spill-over effect” may be 
literal, like polluted stormwater moving over the land. Other spill-over effects are less literal, 
such as when a jurisdiction engages in sprawl development that increases traffic and pollution for 
its neighbors, or depletes the fisheries stock available to neighboring jurisdictions by over-
harvesting.  
The “Border problem” was explored during data analysis by applying a tertiary code to 
cases where physical connectivity causes one actor to suffer harm because of its neighbor’s 
actions.67 The code was applied to 72 text passages, which form the basis for my analysis. Table 
6.2 provides a brief description of some common “border problems” from my data, organized by 
the policy area in which they occur. Those identified with an asterisk are illustrated with 
empirical examples in the following sections.   
 
  
                                                             
67 This phenomenon is commonly referred to as a negative externality; yet the border problem refers only to 
negative externalities stemming from physical connectivity and physical proximity of neighbors, whereas the term 
“negative externality” is more general. 
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Table 6.2: Border problem examples by policy area (those marked with an asterisk will be 
described in more detail)  
Policy area Border problem description 
Surface water 
quality * 
In-stream pollutants flow from upstream to downstream 
jurisdictions. High flows caused by poor upstream management 
actions scour downstream sections of streams/rivers. 
Stormwater Stormwater flows across land managed by different jurisdictions and may carry pollution, cause flooding, or scour streambanks. 
Water supply * 
Water users draw from the same river, such that water supply for 
downstream users may be depleted during drought. (Similar 
problems apply to shared reservoir or groundwater sources). 
Land use and 
sprawl * 
Incompatible land uses on shared borders affect neighbors. For 
instance, cross-border effects of sprawl include polluted 
stormwater and fragmentation of open space.  
Fisheries Lax regulations and high catches by one jurisdiction jeopardize the stock for others.  
Invasive 
species 
Lax prevention or eradication efforts by one jurisdiction increase 
the threat of invasive species spreading from one jurisdiction to 
another.  
Recreation * 
Trails and some open spaces cross jurisdiction borders. Poor 
maintenance by one jurisdiction decreases the utility of these 
trails/parks for residents of the others. 
 
 
Border problems related to managing surface water quality 
The border problem that directly affects surface water quality management is the upstream to 
downstream flow of pollutants. This could be expanded to include water quantity, since high 
flows cause damage downstream through scouring and flooding. An interviewee who handles 
watershed management for Prince William County identified this problem in general terms: 
We had an interaction with a board member whose comment was, “You need to just tell 
that county that that’s their problem.” …. They were saying that the county above us, 
Fauquier County, has a lot of agriculture and….that a lot of the problems with the stream 
were coming into the county from them. My point was, that may be true, but [we] drain 
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into a county too and so you’re saying all our problems coming in at the top are from 
Fauquier County, all our problems coming out of the bottom go to Stafford County. 68 
 
Water quality border problems are sometimes successfully addressed through collaborative 
partnerships. For instance, Case #3 in Table C.1 (Appendix C) describes how the “upstream 
states” (New York, Delaware, and West Virginia) signed Memoranda of Agreement with the 
Chesapeake Bay Program to work towards the nutrient reduction goals of the Chesapeake 2000 
agreement. This was not a totally altruistic decision on the part of upstream states; a looming 
regulatory stick and the promise of financial assistance prodded them. The Chesapeake Bay 
TMDL, expected in 2010, was likely to impose regulatory controls on the upstream states’ 
contribution to the Bay.  Also, the Bay Program offered direct funding to upstream states for 
nutrient reduction and access to Bay Program grant programs. Still, the decision of these states to 
take on responsibility for the Chesapeake Bay, located hundreds of miles away, was remarkable. 
A December 2007 passage from a Bay Journal article illustrates the effect of this distance. It 
starts out with a quote from Jim Curatolo of the Upper Susquehanna Coalition, an organization 
working in the upper reaches of the Bay watershed in New York: 
"You ask anyone if they've ever been to the Chesapeake Bay..." Curatolo said, shaking 
his head. "It's like going to the moon. Flooding is what people worry about." [Nowhere] 
is the Bay more distant than New York. …Most people have no idea they live in the 
Chesapeake basin, said Steve Lorraine, who heads the Madison County Soil and Water 
Conservation District, which includes the northernmost reaches of the Chesapeake Bay 
watershed-fully 444 miles upstream of the Bay. "I didn't, either, until I started working 
here," added Lorraine, whose office is about an hour's drive from Lake Ontario and six 
hours from the Chesapeake (emphasis added). 69 
 
While the distance in this case is extreme, essential characteristics of the border problem are the 
same. These upstream, or “headwater” states, contribute large portions of the Bay’s nutrient and 
                                                             
68 Interviewee #72 
69 Bay Journal, December 2007, “Far upstream, New York lays plans to stem tide of runoff to the Bay” 
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sediment loads. In 2002, it was estimated that about 11 percent (or 32 million pounds) of the 
nitrogen and about the same percent of phosphorus entering the Bay in an average year comes 
from the three headwaters states.70 Dual quotes from a June 1997 Bay Journal article indicated 
frustration and concern that upstream states were not participating in the cleanup, especially as it 
became clear that the Bay Program was not going to reach its 40% nutrient reduction goal: 71 
"The only effective way to manage water resources is with a whole-basin approach," said 
Keith Gentzler, of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection. "To 
exclude major portions of the basin based on political boundaries is almost certain to 
create situations where priority water quality problems cannot be addressed."….. 
 
"It's coming to more of a head than it ever has in the past because it is getting more real 
in terms that we are not going to be able to do nutrient reductions alone," said Rich 
Batiuk, associate director for science with the EPA's Bay Program Office. 
  
The solution to the border problem was clear: include the upstream states as partners in the Bay 
restoration. This was done in 2000, as the governors of each of the three upstream states signed a 
memorandum of agreement (MOA) committing their States to the water quality goals of the 
Chesapeake 2000 Agreement. This is a classic case of geographical harmonizing: jurisdictions 
(in this case, States) adopted the appropriate spatial management scale through collaboration 
with neighboring jurisdictions.  
 
Border problems related to managing water supply 
When water users draw from the same river, conflict often erupts between upstream and 
downstream users in times of low flow or drought, since it becomes possible for upstream users 
take a large share and leave downstream users dry.72  In the case of upstream/downstream 
                                                             
70 Bay Journal, April 2002, “Bay Program gives headwater states funds to help reduce runoff”  
71 Bay Journal, June 1997, “Some suggest adding all watershed states to Program”.  
72 Note that drawing from the same reservoir or groundwater source creates similar problems, but has less of a 
geographical element because there are no “upstream” and “downstream” users.  
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management of water quality, upstream communities have some incentive to reduce pollutant 
loads and stormwater velocity because these cause localized problems like flooding and 
scouring. These incentives are weak, but combined with financial incentives and a looming 
regulatory hammer, they were, for instance, enough to convince “upstream states” to join the 
Bay Program. In the water supply case, however, there are no localized benefits to taking less 
water during a drought. This may be why water supply border problems seem to require a 
coordinating organization with the authority to exercise regulatory powers. In my data, 
coordination on watershed management problems was frequently achieved without a 
coordinating organization, yet all cases of harmonizing related to water supply were achieved 
with one.   
The water supply border problem and its solution were discussed in multiple stories about 
the Susquehanna River Basin Commission (SBRC) and the Interstate Commission on the 
Potomac River Basin (ICPRB), two organizations that coordinate water supply and quality on 
their respective rivers. Both were formed by inter-state compacts, signed by the states that 
comprise their respective watersheds, and formally adopted by Congress. They help water users 
manage water supply at the appropriate spatial landscape.  It was evident from an exchange with 
two ICPRB employees whom I interviewed on speaker phone that even upstream users recognize 
the value of achieving the appropriate management scale: 
Interviewee 29b: …if there wasn’t cooperation among the [water] utilities, in a severe 
drought some of the utilities would become unable to meet their plentiful water demand. 
The river demand can get to be about, what, almost 600 mgd? 
 
Interviewee 29a:  Almost 600 mgd, million gallons per day. 
 
Interviewee 29b: From the heat of summer and the low flow of the river was about 688, 
so back in the ‘60s, when that happened, there was an epiphany of sorts among the 
utilities and among local governments that something had be done or there were going to 
be severe water supply shortages during the summer. 
154 
 
 
 
Rachel:  Okay, so they sort of agreed that for their best interest they needed some larger 
entity that could look at the big picture… 
 
Interviewee 29a:  That is correct. That’s a pretty good statement. The commission staff, 
along with some folks from Johns Hopkins University, did a series of computer runs and 
visits to the utilities…and then modeled the system and came up with the theory, and it’s 
still valid today, that operating as a cooperative venture is much better and there’s 
much more assured water supplies for everybody if it’s done cooperatively, rather 
than individual water supply organizations taking the water on their own without 
this big picture overview and big picture cooperation and coordination. They look at 
it as a big system….. (emphasis added). 73 
 
Border problems related to land use and sprawl 
Jurisdictions’ land use decisions affect their neighbors. For instance, one county might create a 
peaceful park on its side of the border while its neighbor moves ahead with a large-scale 
commercial development. Or one county sets aside forested land for a wildlife refuge while its 
neighbor clear cuts the other side of the border, fragmenting the forest and limiting its ecological 
value.  
County and municipal planners have little control over their neighbors’ actions and 
decisions, regardless of how detrimental spill-over effects might be.  Further, because each 
municipality is (understandably) committed first and foremost to serving its own residents, 
spending taxpayer dollars to coordinate with neighboring municipality is unlikely.   
Regional-level organizations will sometimes identify potential land use conflicts and 
provide a neutral space and staff resources for municipalities to work through them. The 
Northern Virignia Regional Commission (NVRC), for instance, runs a Conservation Corridors 
project that maps existing open space in the region, identifies areas across municipal boundaries 
that could be conserved, and works with municipalities to make this conservation happen. They 
run up against the land use border problem, as described by one NVRC employee: 
                                                             
73 Interviewees #29a and #29b (joint interview). 
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….there are some competing land use types.  For example, the western side of Fairfax 
County and the eastern side of Loudoun County: It’s the furthest west for Fairfax County 
from Washington DC, so it’s a little bit more suburban… but in Loudoun County it’s the 
closest to Washington DC, so they’re concentrating…their development there….And so 
as Fairfax County looks to conserve some lands, it abuts the boundary of Loudoun 
County and that’s where they’re trying to concentrate some developments. 74  
 
This exact issue was pointed out in a different context by an interviewee from Prince William 
County, this time referring to the Prince William / Fairfax border. She said: “Our Northern most 
boundary is of course our most inhabited because it is close to Washington D.C. whereas on the 
reverse side, the Fairfax side that is the most rural, that is the most protected to them”. 75 
These quotes illustrate the tension between regional planning objectives and the 
independence of local jurisdictions. From a regional perspective, it is irrational to have 
development abutting semi-rural protected areas.  Yet from the perspectives of Fairfax, Loudoun, 
and Prince William County individually, their decisions were rational. What we see is a spatial 
mismatch between units with the authority for land use (counties and municipalities) and the 
appropriate management scale, which is regional. This is a difficult problem to fix, since land use 
is commonly thought of as an exclusively local government function, and a cherished one at that. 
Regional organizations like the NVRC can achieve some coordination via consensus building, 
but have few regulatory powers.  
This problem was well-described in a Jan/Feb 2005 Bay Journal article about sprawl. The 
article discusses a Regional Lands Assessment tool, developed by the Chesapeake Bay program, 
which graphically shows the location of ecologically valuable lands most threatened by nearby 
development. This tool was being promoted to local planners and land trusts, in hopes that they 
                                                             
74 Interviewee #76 
75 Interviewee #97 
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would use the regional-level information to inform local decision-making. The tool promoters 
recognized the difficulty of convincing local decision-makers to adopt a regional-level approach.  
The passage starts with a quote from Dan Marcucci, a regional planner with the Pennsylvania 
nonprofit South Central Assembly for Effective Governance: 
“The county planners are good at looking at what is going on inside their borders, but 
there is really no mechanism that enables us to look more regionally, and even more 
importantly, within the context of the larger Baywide region,” he said. As a result, local 
planning can help protect local farms, forests and waterways. But if the impact is merely 
to push development into the next jurisdiction, there is little net benefit from a Bay 
perspective. 76 
 
Solving the land use border problem requires geographical harmonizing among neighboring 
jurisdictions whose actions and decisions create cross-border effects. However, as the Lands 
Assessment tool promoters realized, jurisdictions are reluctant to coordinate for several reasons: 
they are busy with what is happening within their borders, uninterested in regional benefits if 
there are no direct benefits to their own jurisdictions, and reluctant to spend time and money on 
coordination that might not go anywhere.  
 
Border problems related to recreational areas 
This border problem has little impact on water quality, but provides an excellent visual 
illustration. It arises when trails or open spaces are maintained or treated differently across 
jurisdictions. Users experience discontinuity as they cross between jurisdictions, decreasing the 
utility of the recreational space. This problem was raised in different contexts by five 
interviewees. One interviewee called the Potomac Heritage trail a “hodge-podge” because its 
segments are each managed by a different agency. She continued: 
 
                                                             
76 Bay Journal, Jan/Feb 2005, “Maps show where Bay's treasures are threatened by development” 
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[the Potomac Heritage Trail doesn’t] have the continuity of character because…parts of it 
in Arlington County are paved, in Prince William County there are paved bike trails and 
in Loudoun County they’re dirt hiking trails.  You have different experiences along the 
trail because there are so many different managing agencies. 77 
  
Another interviewee expressed frustration regarding what he sees as the unwillingness of some 
Northern Virginia jurisdictions to connect their trails to their neighbors’ trails: 
Especially where you have trail networks, you do want to make sure that the trail 
networks connect and that takes a lot of work on both sides of the jurisdictional line. 
[You have to say], “So instead of this, why don’t you re-route the trial this way because 
then it will connect to the trail in the other jurisdiction”, and a lot of times they don’t 
care…. 78  
 
Later on, this interviewee singled out one jurisdiction for its lack of concern for connectivity and 
regional approaches. I will call this City Y, and its adjacent County will be County X.   
[For instance], you look at City Y and if you look at all the plans, it looks like an island. 
No, it’s not an island.  All those trails, they’ve got to connect to the other side, the 
jurisdiction next to them.  They’ve got to connect to County X.  You’re not an island.  
You’re just part of a regional system.  You don’t want to look at a map and actually see 
where the political boundaries are just by looking at an aerial photograph.  “Look at this, 
there’s this big swath of green space on one side of the line and on the other side of the 
line is all houses.”  You want to have some kind of continuity across these jurisdictional 
lines. 79 
 
This interviewee points out a key element present in all examples of the border problem: 
individual jurisdictions or organizations act as if they were not an integral part of a larger 
regional system. This is generally not because of ignorance or malicious disregard. The most 
common reason is the lack of incentives to take actions that are rational on the regional level but 
offer little chance of localized benefits. It is especially difficult to expend resources if there is a 
                                                             
77 Interviewee #66 
78 Interviewee #74 
79 Interviewee #74 
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possibility that neighboring jurisdictions (who are your economic competitors) will receive more 
of the benefits.  
Border problems related to trail or park discontinuity are solved easily (or, even better, 
prevented) in many cases by voluntary coordination among neighboring municipalities. One case 
of coordination between Prince William County and the city of Manassas is summarized in Table 
C.1 (Case #6). There did not seem to be any conflicts between the municipalities regarding the 
use of this land for trails— just concerns that the trails are properly connected and similarly 
maintained.   
 
Geographical harmonizing: a solution to the border problem 
Geographical harmonizing solves the border problem. Like all boundary problems, the Border 
Problem occurs when artificial boundaries break up or fragment the true spatial problem 
landscape. Through coordination, jurisdictions are breaking through these “artificial boundaries” 
to address policy problems at the proper scale.  Addressing policy problems at the proper 
geographical scale generates more holistic, comprehensive (and presumably better) policy. Such 
policies consider and incorporate the needs, concerns, and ideas of all jurisdictions comprising 
the affected landscape.  
 
Solving the Stovepiping Problem through Organizational Harmonizing 
With complex policy problems, various organizations address some piece or portion of the 
problem and/or are affected by the problem. Further, key resources needed to solve the problem, 
including authorities, expertise, and information, are fragmented among various organizations. 
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Ideally, all organizations that comprise the relevant organizational landscape will be assembled 
to address the problem in a coordinated way.  
The “Stovepiping Problem” refers to the common phenomenon that organizations tend to 
be concerned with a narrow set of goals related to their own needs and interests. They work 
within their own “stovepipe”, separate from the “stovepipes” of organizations around them.  By 
focusing so intently on their own goals, “stovepiped” organizations may fail to recognize effects 
of their work on others or effects of other organizations’ work on their own.  As a result, they fail 
to identify opportunities to coordinate in a way that is collectively rational from a community or 
societal perspective.   
The prevalence of Stovepiping was described by many interviewees. For instance, the 
County government water manager quoted below admitted that his department is very 
“compartmentalized”, but has recently broadened coordination efforts with other County 
agencies:  
[We’re] so compartmentalized...  How do we get a comprehensive view?  How do we 
look from a thousand feet up…?  What we’ve been attempting to do is these watershed 
management plans where we try to look a little bit more holistically….   
 
We’re starting to include other agencies, like Planning and Transportation and saying, 
“Hey, do you guys want to look at some stuff too while we’re out here doing this?” … 
That’s been relatively new for us because previously, everything was very 
compartmentalized.  We had storm water pond maintenance, drainage management, dam 
safety, and site inspections and no crossover. 80 
 
A tertiary code for the “Stovepiping Problem” was applied to cases where an organization failed 
to coordinate or communicate with other organizations engaged in solving the same, similar, or 
related problems. It was also applied to general quotes, like the one above, describing the 
                                                             
80 Interviewee #72 
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Stovepiping problem. The following analysis is based on the 76 text passages to which this code 
was applied. 
 Stovepiping occurs between all sorts of organizations, but is especially common among 
organizations in different policy sectors because they may not understand each other’s work. 
They are also less likely to see each other at events, workshops, and conferences. Perhaps 
because of these obstacles, most stovepiping examples in my data involve organizations in 
different policy sectors.  Although many policy areas share the same problem space as water 
quality, three are chosen for illustration: 
1. Water Quality and Land Use. 
2. Water Quality and Transportation. 
3. Water Quality and Agriculture 
Below I address the three policy area combinations in turn, presenting at least one empirical 
stovepiping example for each.  
 
Stovepiping related to water quality and land use 
Surface water impairments are almost always the result of pollutants washed off the landscape by 
stormwater, so the type of landscape matters. High percentages of impervious surface hasten 
stormwater flows, preventing infiltration and filtering. Forested and vegetated areas, on the other 
hand, absorb stormwater and filter out pollutants before they reach waterbodies.  
Several interviewees were puzzled and frustrated by the lack of attention to land use by 
water quality managers. One woman interviewed in 2008, for instance, expressed concern about 
the lack of attention the Bay Program was putting towards land use: 
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Have you ever noticed.... it drives me crazy.... that the biggest single problem is the 41% 
impervious surface increase in the watershed, but when we get to land use, everyone 
sidesteps the issue? Have you ever noticed that no one really wants to engage this issue? 
Well guess what, boys and girls, if we don't deal with land use [we are not addressing the 
problem]…..I'm going to say this until I die: "The best stormwater implementation in the 
world is not going to adequately compensate for really bad land use management." 81 
 
Two years later, I asked the same woman about this issue. She responded positively this time, 
saying that stormwater concerns were being fully integrated into the land development process in 
her home County in Northern Virginia. 
Rachel: [Last time] we talked about how land use is so critical when it comes to 
stormwater. Do you feel like there has been some integration between the water quality 
work and land use? 
 
Interviewee: There is still an issue there.  But I will tell you this, and this is something 
that I’ve heard from within even [the Planning Department].  A lot of people who used to 
do development, they would do the development plans, and then [say], “Oh yeah.  We 
need to do something about stormwater,” and fit it in afterwards.  My sense from the 
development community….is that stormwater is [now] part of the integrated design of 
development.  It’s not an afterthought.  And that’s a biggie.  It’s a huge biggie.  It means 
you’re going to do things like build in swales and rain gardens and infiltration trenches 
into your design…..And I saw that happening. 82 
  
Another interviewee from a County Planning Department described a “big wall” between his 
County’s regulatory efforts related to water quality, which are “largely based on enforcement of 
regulations handed down from the state” and land use planning.83  To truly manage water 
quality, he said, we need to “bridge the gap”. Otherwise, rather than preventing water quality 
problems, water quality managers are waiting for poor land use decisions to cause water quality 
problems and then solving them. Apparently, coordination between planners and watershed 
                                                             
81 Interviewee #48 (2008 interview) 
82 Interviewee #48 (2010 interview) 
83 At the request of the interviewee, this interview was not recorded, yet I managed to copy some phrases verbatim 
in my notes. Interviewee notes were also reviewed, edited, and approved by the interviewee.   
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managers improved after high-level discussions were initiated between the leadership of the 
Planning and Public Works Departments. 84  
A lack of coordination between land use and water quality managers can lead to 
inefficiencies. A high level manager in a County Stormwater agency describes one example 
below, in which the Planning Department approved water quality devices that are difficult and 
expensive for the Stormwater agency to maintain: 85 
Interviewee:…the [Planning] Department is the one that reviews new construction 
coming in.  Well sometimes the engineers…. will propose water quality devices that are 
particularly difficult or expensive to maintain.  And since we maintain them we will 
contact the [Planning] Department and say, “No.  We don’t want that kind of thing 
because that’s going to create some real problems for us.”  And they don’t usually 
cooperate with us on that one.  So that creates a little bit of a problem.  It doesn’t get in 
the way of the permit but it increases internal costs, which you would think you could 
develop some cooperation on but we’re having some problem there. 
 
Rachel: So, I guess, whatever their goals are that they’re trying to meet are better met by 
buying this fancier piece of equipment?  
 
Interviewee: Basically they don’t want to take on the role of dictating to developers 
specific types of solutions because it ends up running afoul of competition or suppliers of 
those types of facilities.  For example, there’s a lot of proprietary devices out there….if 
we tell the [Planning] Department not to allow those systems, then the manufacturer of 
that system comes down to the [Planning] Department….and they’re not interested in 
getting involved in that, so the county, instead, ends up with an added cost of maintaining 
those types of things.  Whereas if we had somebody that was over all of these different 
functions to the stormwater then they could make that decision and it would be a county 
decision that, “Okay, the manufacturers don’t like it but that’s what we do in this 
county.” 86  
 
In this case, Stovepiping between the Planning and Stormwater agencies led directly to 
inefficiencies and extra costs for the County. At the end of the quote the interviewee expresses 
his wish for coordination (i.e. organizational harmonizing) to solve this problem.  
                                                             
84 Interviewee #91 
85 To protect the interviewee, the uncooperative department is generically called the “Planning Department” rather 
than its full name. 
86 Interviewee #23 
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Stovepiping related to water quality and transportation 
Transportation decisions with major effects on water quality include the number and placement 
of roads (which can promote sprawl), the width of roads and the existence of features like cul-de-
sacs (which increase impervious surface), decisions about salting and sanding, and decisions 
regarding stormwater management techniques used to handle runoff.   
Stovepiping between these policy areas is widely recognized as a problem.  One article 
from the Jan/Feb 2002 edition of the Bay Journal discussed a directive signed by the Chesapeake 
Bay Program Executive Council which, among other things, encouraged more aggressive 
stormwater actions by State Transportation Departments. The following quote illustrates the 
novelty of even this basic level of coordination. It starts with a quote from Kelly Shenk, who 
oversees stormwater issues for the EPA Bay Program Office: 
“This is the first time that we’ve had the departments of transportation at the table talking 
about how to manage stormwater on roadways,” Shenk said. “Highways and streets make 
up a large portion of our impervious surfaces in the watershed.” In fact, she said, it’s 
estimated that about two-thirds of the impervious surfaces in urban areas are roads and 
parking lots. “So if we really want to see a reduction in pollution loads and flooding, we 
have to tackle roadways,” she said. 87 
 
Several interviewees echoed the idea that transportation departments must be brought into the 
process of managing stormwater in a more integrated fashion. An employee of a program that 
educates local government officials about stormwater management argued that transportation 
(and health) departments were acting as quasi-planning agencies without taking responsibility for 
the effects of their actions: 
 
                                                             
87 Bay Journal, Jan/Feb 2002, “Developing a better watershed: Executive Council agrees to lead by example with 
stormwater controls” 
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One of the things we are trying to [do] is get transportation to the table, which is not 
typically involved… Transportation drives a lot of growth, you put a bypass in and [if] 
VDOT says “sure you can do a median break here and a curb cut” there is going to be a 
strip mall there before you know it. [Departments of Transportation and Departments of 
Health] serve as quasi planning agencies without wanting the responsibility of being that 
planning agency. They set roads, they set septic rules, they set these limits and 
requirements on site distances and separations between curb breaks and lights and 
intersections that ultimately plan what a community will grow into. [So these 
organizations] need to be at the table. 88 
 
Stovepiping related to water quality and agriculture 
Agricultural agencies have long been involved in controlling nonpoint source pollution. Federal 
cost-share programs managed by the USDA Natural Resource Conservation Service (NRCS) and 
the Farm Service Agency address problems of nutrient and sediment runoff and animal waste 
management on a farm-by-farm basis. State agricultural agencies run similar cost-share 
programs. 
On the ground, however, agricultural and water quality programs are managed in 
isolation from each other. This lack of integration starts at the top with USDA and US-EPA, and 
continues down the line to States and localities. State agricultural agencies and regional Soil and 
Water Conservation Districts (SWCDs) manage Federal and State agricultural cost-share 
programs, while state environmental regulatory agencies and local stormwater departments 
manage EPA regulations like TMDLs, erosion and sediment control, and MS4 permits. They 
come together on certain projects, like watershed planning or TMDLs, but their day-to-day work 
is accomplished within separate “agricultural” and “urban stormwater” silos.89  
Various efforts have aimed for greater integration.  At the local level there is significant 
coordination between SWCDs and stormwater agencies on educational programs, like promoting 
                                                             
88 Interviewee #46 
89 Even the terminology is different. “Stormwater” generally refer only to runoff in urban or suburban areas, while 
agricultural runoff is just called runoff. This is nonsensical since stormwater flows over agricultural lands, suburban 
areas, and urban areas in the same manner; basically, it is an artifact of the way they are managed separately.   
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best management practices for suburban/urban landowners.  Other efforts focus at the Federal 
and State level. For instance, a key objective of the Federal “Clean Water Action Plan” was 
greater coordination between the EPA and the USDA. It was recognized that the two agencies 
have very different “cultures”, stemming in large part from their history, clients, and the 
regulatory and non-regulatory tools they have at their disposal: 
Top environmental and agricultural officials from all six states in the Bay watershed met 
with their federal counterparts in late May to discuss working together to improve rivers 
and streams. The meeting was in response to President Clinton’s Clean Water Action 
Plan unveiled in March. A large part of the plan was aimed at having the EPA and the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, as well as their state counterparts, working more closely 
together. That means breaking down some “cultural barriers,” said Bill Matuszeski, 
director of the EPA’s Bay Program Office, who helped to organize the summit. 
Historically, agricultural agencies have sought to achieve their objectives through 
incentives such as cost-sharing programs and technical assistance, while environmental 
agencies have often relied on regulations.90 
 
An article published almost 10 years later indicated that coordination between EPA and USDA 
fell short of what was needed to achieve the 2010 goals for nonpoint source pollution reduction. 
The article describes the results of a report published jointly by the EPA and USDA. Rather than 
placing the blame on “cultural barriers”, however, it describes the coordination problem as a 
classic example of Stovepiping:  
The Bay region is unlikely to meet its cleanup goals by 2010-and may not for decades-
because of a failure to substantially promote and fund pollution control efforts by 
farmers, a federal report concludes. The report, an unusual combined effort by the 
inspector generals of the EPA and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, found that efforts 
to engage the agricultural community in Chesapeake cleanup activities have been 
hampered by the failure of the two agencies to work together and a lack of funding. “At 
the federal level, EPA and USDA are key to accomplishing the environmental goals of 
the Chesapeake Bay watershed,” the report said. “However, in the past, their 
relationship has been one of two independent entities, often constrained by their 
mandated goals and directions, rather than partners with a common objective.” 
(emphasis added).91 
                                                             
90 Bay Journal, July/Aug 1998, “Six Bay states meet to discuss working on clean water plan”. 
91 Bay Journal, Jan 2007, “Agencies must to more to control farm runoff: Inspector generals of EPA and USDA cite 
failure of both agencies to work together and a lack of funding” 
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Organizational harmonizing: a solution to the stovepiping problem 
Recall that all boundary problems occur when artificial boundaries fragment the “true” problem 
landscape. For Stovepiping, “artificial” organizational boundaries fragment the set of people 
needed to properly address the problem; because these people work within their own 
organizational “stovepipes” they do not coordinate. Organizational harmonizing breaks down 
these artificial boundaries so decisions and actions are coordinated at the proper scale.  
The concrete benefit of addressing policy problems over the “true” organizational 
landscape is more holistic, comprehensive policy. Organizations who work on some aspect or 
piece of the problem are able to adjust their decisions and actions to avoid the “pitfalls” of 
individualism – things like omission of critical tasks and counter-productive actions. 
Organizational harmonizing also addresses the fragmentation of authority, jurisdiction, expertise, 
and information often associated with wicked policy problems. Perhaps most importantly, 
organizational harmonizing provides access to critical information that improves policy.92 For 
instance, one example above described how water quality managers have critical information 
regarding which stormwater devices are inexpensive and easy to maintain, versus those which 
cost the county extra money. When the Planning department acted without consulting the 
Stormwater agency, inefficient decisions were made. Solving the Stovepiping problem through 
organizational harmonizing, then, is more than just a “feel-good” approach. It has real 
consequences for the quality of resulting policy and the efficient use of taxpayers’ money.  
 
 
                                                             
92 This overlaps with the Resource Exchange benefit, illustrating that many benefits of collaboration are 
interconnected.  
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Solving the problem of “Species- or medium-specific programming” through Ecological 
Harmonizing93 
As described in Chapter 5, there are two ways to view the ecological “problem landscape”. In the 
one which centers on management of a “target species”, which is more relevant to empirical 
examples in my data, the problem landscape is the set of ecological elements – such as predator 
and prey species, aspects of water chemistry, soils, and habitat features— affecting the survival 
and health of a particular target species. To properly manage the target species, decisions and 
actions of organizations that manage these critical ecosystem elements must be coordinated. 
However, coordination is frequently hindered by the fact that species and environmental media 
(such as air, water, and soils) are managed in isolation by different agencies. “Artificial” 
organizational boundaries fragment management of ecosystem elements comprising the problem 
landscape.   
Species-by-species and medium-by-medium management would be fine if not for the fact 
that ecosystem elements are ecologically interdependent, i.e. intimately connected by 
ecological relationships like food webs, chemical cycles, and erosion.  Management practices 
applied to one species or element affect the others and/or the health of the system as a whole, 
making a fragmented approach to ecosystem management ineffective. The real problem, 
therefore, is the clash (or incompatibility) between ecological interdependence and species or 
medium-specific management.   
During data analysis, I applied the tertiary code “ecological interdependence” to cases 
where species- and medium-specific management was insufficient to manage ecologically 
connected systems.  Most of the 12 coded passages revolved around fisheries policy, describing 
                                                             
93 Since ecological harmonizing was so rare in my data, I have little empirical evidence to contribute; thus, my 
discussion of this problem and its solution will be short. 
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how traditional species-by-species management was insufficient to address the wide variety of 
stressors on target species. Stressors are caused by ecosystem elements (e.g. predator species, 
prey species, or habitat) managed by separate agencies.   
For instance, it was discovered that health problems affecting striped bass (rockfish), the 
Bay’s most popular recreational fish, were partly the result of low menhaden stocks. Menhaden, 
a small oily fish, is a key food source for striped bass. From this and similar discoveries, fisheries 
managers converged on the idea that traditional “single species” management was not effectively 
accounting for conditions of ecological interdependence:   
 
Stock by stock, species by species, fish are usually managed, as one official put it, "with 
blinders on," as if each lives in its own little ocean. By tracking things such as the number 
spawned and harvested each year, managers try to set harvest levels that won't jeopardize 
the stock. Interactions between species are not accounted for.94  
 
The striped bass problem was resolved by writing joint management plans for striped bass and 
menhaden that accounted for their ecological interdependence. In this case, there was no inter-
agency coordination because the same coordinating organization developed management plans 
for both species. All that was needed was to incorporate relevant ecological information and 
adjust both plans accordingly. Generally, however, the solution is ecological harmonizing, 
where managers of interdependent ecosystem elements coordinate their decisions and actions 
over the appropriate ecological “problem landscape”.   
The concrete policy benefit of ecological harmonizing is holistic policy that makes sense 
from an ecosystem perspective. Managers are better able to understand and, with the help of 
                                                             
94 Bay Journal, May 1998, “It’s a fish eat fish world”. 
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partners, control multiple factors causing problems for their target species. For instance, fisheries 
managers under traditional “single species” management have limited options for how to 
maintain their target stocks: they can reduce harvest levels, adjust harvest locations and times, 
and restrict the use of certain equipment. By harmonizing actions and decisions with managers of 
other species and media, however, they have a wider range of options to pursue, such as 
restoring degraded habitat, improving water quality, or increasing the stocks of prey species.  
 
Efficiency benefits of Harmonizing 
In addition to holistic policy, it is typical for harmonizing to generate efficiency benefits. 
Through coordination, organizations utilize existing resources rather than generating new ones, 
avoid creating problems that other organizations have to fix, avoid programmatic redundancies, 
and target their combined resources more efficiently. 
A good way to discuss efficiency benefits is to use, as a framework, the “pitfalls” of 
independent action described by Huxham and MacDonald (1992). Avoiding these pitfalls, 
particularly duplication, divergence, and counter-production, largely explains the connection 
between coordinated action and efficiency. Thus, in the sections below I discuss how 
harmonizing helps to avoid each pitfall and how this avoidance is associated with efficiency 
gains (or, equivalently, stemming efficiency losses).   
 
Avoiding Duplication 
The first pitfall of individualism identified by Huxham and MacDonald (1992) is Repetition, or, 
as I prefer to call it, Duplication. Duplication occurs when “two or more organizations carry out 
an action or task which need only be done by one” (Huxham and MacDonald 1992, pp. 51). 
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Clearly, this is an inefficient use of organizations’ collective time and effort. Fortunately, 
duplication is a relatively simple problem that coordination or even communication among the 
“duplicating” organizations can fix.  
One example discussed in Chapter 5 was the coordination by ICPRB of a joint TMDL 
plan for Maryland, Virginia, and DC. All three entities were required to write a plan for the same 
PCB impairment. Further, because of upstream/downstream relationships among the 
jurisdictions, the appropriate spatial landscape to address this shared impairment was the whole 
Potomac/Anacostia watershed. Writing a joint plan, then, not only addressed the problem at the 
proper scale, it also: “resulted in reduced replication of effort and some serious economic 
advantages to the individual jurisdictions”, according to an ICPRB employee. 95  
Another example involves the two premier regional organizations in Northern Virginia: 
the Northern Virginia Regional Commission (NVRC) and the Metropolitan Washington Council 
of Government (MWCOG). NVRC is a Planning District Commission (PDC) created under 
Virginia State law to coordinate regional programming and planning for NOVA localities. COG 
serves the metropolitan Washington DC area, including the District and surrounding Counties 
and municipalities in Maryland and Virginia. There is significant overlap between the 
organizations in programming and functions. For instance, they both have “water supply” 
committees through which local water utilities managers coordinate their work, “green 
infrastructure” programs that encourage regional and cross-border land conservation, and 
regional transportation planning programs.  Employees from both organizations recognize the 
overlap and try to avoid duplication where possible. An NVRC employee described how the two 
organizations “split” environmental work based on their respective jurisdictions. COG, taking 
                                                             
95 Interviewee #29b 
171 
 
 
advantage of this employee’s efforts in the NOVA region, focuses their environmental efforts on 
Maryland: 
I hate to say it but there is a lot of duplication in many areas between COG and ourselves 
but the difference is that [COG’s] sphere of influence is Washington DC, the southern 
portion of Maryland, and the northern portion of Virginia. They are geographically 
spread out much larger and their area of concern of course tends to be that larger area 
whereas here, all I’m worried about is Virginia. COG at least on the environmental side is 
probably geared a little more towards the Maryland portion than they are the Virginia 
portion and that is simply because of the relationships that exist between COG and 
myself. There are Virginia members who rely on me for a lot of things so they tend not to 
be as active on some of these environmental committees as the Maryland folks are. The 
Maryland folks don’t have a NVRC comparable entity.96 
 
Interviews with COG employees echo the idea that the two entities work to minimize 
duplication. In meetings between staff members from NVRC and COG, they have discussed 
merging and/or coordinating their efforts related to stormwater education, green infrastructure, 
and other problems. One interviewee described the reasoning behind these coordination efforts: 
Another is, like you say, we don’t want to be duplicating efforts; we want to make our 
efforts complementary to the extent that we can do it… I don’t know a ton of the staff 
over there, but I know at least the ones that work in the environmental area. To the extent 
that we can do it, we try to work collaboratively on things as opposed to duplicating 
things. We just had a meeting with them last week on green-infrastructure mapping. They 
are doing some things now, and we’re looking at doing some things under what’s called 
our Region Forward Initiative. Again, we wanted to have a meeting up front and make 
sure we’re not reinventing the wheel. If they’ve already done something, let’s take 
advantage of that and not duplicate it. And likewise, if we have something we’re planning 
to do that they could take advantage of, let’s do that. So, we try to look for opportunities 
like that as much as we can, where we can work together. Obviously, our members 
appreciate that. 97 
 
Duplication is a simple problem, but is not necessarily easy to fix. Each organization has its own 
mission, objectives, and requirements to fulfill; failure to do so threatens the success and 
sometimes the survival of the organization. Although another organization may be doing similar 
                                                             
96 Interviewee #42 
97 Interviewee #50 
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work, it may not be adequate to simply use their product or adopt their results. First, products 
created by other organizations many not fit with what an organization needs. Research might be 
conducted differently or ask different questions; programs might not address key concerns or 
may be closed to certain constituencies. Second, organizations will not be able to take credit. For 
the organization’s donors, funders, or stockholders, it may not be enough to say that some other 
organization is implementing the expected work. Finally, the lack of control is problematic, 
especially for critical products or programs. How does an organization know their partner will 
continue to produce the product or run the program?  What if the quality declines or they are not 
done on time? Because of these concerns, most organizations retain control over key programs 
and products, even if these are duplicated elsewhere.  Although harmonizing reduces duplication, 
it does not eliminate it. 
 
Avoiding Divergence 
The pitfall of Divergence occurs when resources are spread so thinly that the “actions of the 
various organizations are diluted across a range of activities rather than used towards common 
goals (Huxham and MacDonald 1992, pp. 51).” It is essentially a lack of coordinated resource 
targeting. This is inefficient if key goals go unaccomplished because resources have been 
diverted across a variety of less critical projects.  
Harmonizing helps avoid divergence by building and sustaining relationships needed for 
resource pooling and targeting. One example from my data is a shared stormwater education 
program that will be discussed in Chapter 8. This program, run through the NVRC, pools money 
from NOVA municipalities and water utilities for shared radio and television spots on 
stormwater education. All municipalities with MS4 permits are required to conduct stormwater 
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education, yet it would be expensive and duplicative for them to each pay for their own media 
outreach, especially when they share the same media outlets. Several interviewees confirm that 
this program allows them to do higher quality stormwater education than they could afford on 
their own.  
Although this is clearly a case of resource pooling, organizational harmonizing is 
occurring below the surface. What allows resource pooling to occur is the set of relationships 
among NOVA municipalities created and sustained through repeated interactions and 
programming over the regional landscape. These relationships are important for the success of 
even this basic resource pooling activity for several reasons.  First, the municipalities must 
jointly agree on how much money each contributes to the fund, and there is no “fairest” way to 
distribute the burden (they decided to contribute on the basis of population). Second, they have 
to jointly agree on the content of messages; they solve this problem by allowing NVRC to write 
the messages, pending approval by all partners. 
A second relevant example is the Chesapeake Bay Gateways Network (Case #9 in Table 
C.1).  Administered by the National Park Service (NPS), the Gateways Network coordinates 
Bay-related activities of a host of separate park sites, trails, open spaces, and museums into a 
combined Chesapeake Bay “education experience”. In fact, the concept was developed as a less 
expensive alternative to a single Chesapeake Bay National Park. NPS coordinates the program, 
produces brochures and a website to guide visitors, and provides technical and financial 
assistance. 
The Gateways Network avoids “resource divergence” by pooling the unique resources of 
each site and targeting them towards the common goal of Chesapeake Bay education. Without 
coordination, the Bay education visitors received from visiting multiple sites (if any) would be 
174 
 
 
scattershot and ineffective. Further, this Network is a cheap, efficient way to provide Bay 
education: through small adjustments made by individual sites and easy coordination tools like 
the website and brochure, the overall Bay education experience is improved dramatically. The 
other option, creating a single Chesapeake Bay National Park, is prohibitively expensive.  
 
Avoiding Counter-production 
The pitfall of Counter-production occurs when actions of one organization working in isolation 
conflict with actions of another organization working in isolation. “At best, this may lead to a 
‘cancelling out’ of the benefits of each action; at worst it could leave both [organizations] worse 
off than they were before (Huxham and McDonald 1992, pp. 52).” Further, the collective, 
societal benefits of organizational actions could end up being zero or negative.  
Avoiding counter production means organizations adjust their actions to be 
complementary or at least neutral. Note that, while the benefits of avoiding duplication and 
divergence are almost all efficiency-related, avoiding counter-production produces more holistic 
and thoughtful policy as well as greater efficiency. By accounting for the actions and needs of 
partners, organizations don’t just save money but make better policy.  
Harmonizing is the central process at work in avoiding counter-production. By 
coordinating their decisions and actions across a problem landscape, organizations avoid 
undermining each other. There are two relevant examples in Table C.1 (cases #1 and #2). The 
first, described in Chapter 5, was the formation of an inter-state Panel to address aquatic invasive 
species management in the mid-Atlantic region. With invasive species, coordination is sorely 
needed to avoid counter-production and associated inefficiencies. Good management practices 
by one jurisdiction, perhaps undertaken at significant expense, may be undermined or undone by 
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neighbors’ poor practices or judgment. In this case, the Panel aims to avoid counter-production 
and its inefficiencies by developing joint “rapid response systems” for species that are “on the 
move” between states, as well as regional management plans for entrenched species.  
A similar situation is addressed by Case #2 in Table C.1, where Maryland and Virginia 
harmonize blue crab fisheries regulations through the joint Bi-State Blue Crab Committee. Blue 
crabs cross freely between the two states’ fisheries, making management of the stock prone to 
counter-production. One state’s strict regulations, perhaps implemented at some expense to its 
own fishermen and fishing industry, may be easily undermined by the other state’s lax 
regulations. Worse, the situation could deteriorate into a “tragedy of the commons” whereby the 
resource gets quickly depleted as each State rushes to acquire as much as possible of the 
resource.  In this case, harmonized action between the two states avoided counter-production; by 
passing identical regulations each state is assured its efforts will not be undone.  
In both the invasive species and the blue crab cases, a coordinating organization helped 
form and sustain interstate relationships. In the first case it was the Mid-Atlantic Regional Panel 
on Aquatic Nuisance Species and, in the second, the Bi-State Blue Crab Committee. Although 
these States have developed working relationships on a variety of issues, each State has their 
own goals and priorities for the policy area, their own institutional structure, their own 
procedures, and their own political culture—all of which may have to be adjusted to mesh with 
the other. Because this is difficult, it is common for harmonizing to occur through special 
coordinating committees or organizations.  
 
Avoiding Omission 
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The pitfall of Omission occurs when activities important to more than one organization, or to the 
larger society, fail to be carried out. Generally, omitted activities “fall through the cracks” either 
because they don’t specifically belong under any one organizations’ mandate, or because they 
are a shared responsibility that each organization assumes the other is doing. Compared to the 
other pitfalls, the benefits of avoiding omission are less about efficiency gains and more about 
achieving holistic, comprehensive, and thus more effective, policy. Omitting important aspects 
of a policy might lead to needy clients who do not get services, environmental problems that do 
not get solved, or key stakeholder groups left out of decision-making.98  
It is only through coordination that organizations are able to identify problems “falling 
through the cracks” and devise a plan to address them. In the article discussing the Mid-Atlantic 
Regional Panel on Aquatic Nuisance Species (case #1 in Table C.1), a biologist from the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service’s Chesapeake Bay Field Office described how invasive species 
policies suffer from omission (although she does not use this term):  
 
Despite the magnitude of the issue, combating-and even monitoring-foreign invaders is 
typically not an explicit responsibility for most agencies. “It is sort of an orphan issue, 
and it competes with a lot of other issues,” Thompson said. 99  
 
This new Mid-Atlantic Panel will address omission by assigning specific responsibilities for 
invasive species management to officials in each State. This way, the problem will no longer go 
unaddressed or get passed off from agency to agency.   
                                                             
98 It is less clear how avoiding omission leads to greater efficiency. Yet, I keep this section here so I can address in 
one place all four pitfalls identified by Huxham and MacDonald (1992). 
99 Bay Journal, May 2005, "Regional agencies join forces against exotic invaders" 
177 
 
 
Another example relates to the Fairfax County Environmental Coordinating Committee 
(ECC), composed of department heads and one other designee from each environmental agency 
of the Fairfax County government. A watershed planner from Fairfax County praised this 
committee for coordinating environmental programs across a vast County bureaucracy, 
enhancing communication among department heads, and prioritizing a long list of desired 
environmental programming. The interviewee also describes how ECC avoids omission: “We 
also use the ECC as a mechanism to respond or address issues that really don't fall clearly within 
any one agency’s responsibility.” 100  For instance, the ECC receives several recommendations 
annually from a citizens’ committee called the Environmental Quality Advisory Council 
(EQAC).  Because EQAC’s recommendations are often not specific to a single agency of County 
government, the ECC has a process by which the recommendations are distributed to all relevant 
County government agencies for responses, which are then compiled by ECC staff into a 
comprehensive and holistic County response for each. Without ECC and this process of cross-
county coordination, some EQAC recommendations would likely fall through the cracks since 
they do fit comfortably within the purview of a single agency.   
 
Standardization benefits of Harmonizing101 
Here I discuss a final benefit of harmonizing that does not fit into the Huxham and MacDonald 
(1992) framework: Standardization of policies and programs. Standardization is associated with 
greater clarity, effectiveness, and fairness. For instance, standardized policies are less confusing 
                                                             
100 Interviewee #60 
101 Note that standardization most often occurs via central directives rather than collaboration. For political 
jurisdictions, the most common route is for higher levels of government to pass regulations that affect lower levels. 
For instance, water quality standards for TMDL development are automatically the same between Fairfax and 
Loudoun County, because they are developed by Virginia. When standardization is accomplished via a central 
directive, it does not require individual organizations or jurisdictions to work together (and is therefore not 
collaboration). 
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for those affected by them.  They know what is expected, and that it won’t change when dealing 
with another organization or travelling to another jurisdiction. For regulations, standardization 
should also improve compliance.  
One example where harmonizing led to standardization was the ICPRB effort to 
standardize law enforcement on the Jennings Reservoir. Jurisdiction for the reservoir was shared 
by Maryland, West Virginia, and the Army Corps of Engineers (ACOE). At the time of the 
ICPRB intervention, each state and the ACOE maintained their own set of fishing and boating 
laws. This was not only confusing to reservoir users, but caused conflict and animosity among 
the regulators. ICPRB helped the States and ACOE negotiate a compact to standardize 
regulations:  
One of the examples where we became heavily involved was on the Jennings Randolph 
Reservoir. It’s a Corps of Engineers reservoir that was created back in the early 80s [by 
flooding the north branch of the Potomac River], which served as the border between 
Maryland and West Virginia. When it did flood that area, that little dashed line that you 
see on the maps disappeared. It’s on the bottom of the lake someplace. You can’t see it 
now. And it became an issue that you’ve got Maryland and West Virginia, as well as the 
federal government, with law enforcement people enforcing fishing laws, boating laws, 
drunk boating laws. And so we were instrumental in pulling the parties together to come 
up with a compact to advise, assist and adjudicate how things were going to be done law 
enforcement wise on the reservoir.  Whose laws would be enforced if [Person X] were 
caught drunk boating on Jennings Randolph reservoir? So there is a compact in place that 
we helped to pull together to bring the parties together. 102 
 
ICPRB’s intervention was a harmonizing process since the ultimate result was to coordinate 
decisions/actions of organizations working within the same “policy landscape”.  The key 
harmonizing benefit was standardized law enforcement practices, which increased fairness to 
reservoir uses, eliminated confusion, and avoided further conflict among the regulating entities.  
Because of the high level of conflict, harmonizing was done via a highly orchestrated conflict 
                                                             
102 Interviewee #29a 
179 
 
 
resolution process led by the ICPRB, a neutral party that all participants trusted. Thus, this 
example fits under both the harmonizing and conflict reduction benefits.  
Standardization may also improve policy results by making the work of organizations 
compatible. For joint projects, this means they don’t waste time in translation or in arguing 
whose procedure should be used. Even the work they do individually becomes more valuable to 
the other. One example (case #8 in Table C.1) was the standardization of procedures for catching 
and testing striped bass for mycobacteriosis, a bacterial infection that affected a large portion of 
the striped bass population in the early 2000’s. Striped bass, as mentioned, is the Bay’s most 
popular recreational fishery. After extensive research, scientists had still not come to agreement 
on the infection’s causes, in part because they were using an array of different survey and 
laboratory techniques. Eventually, scientists from several Federal and State government agencies 
(the US Geological Survey (USGS), the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Maryland Department of 
Natural Resources, and Virginia Institute of Marine Science), plus the University of Maryland, 
agreed to conduct standardized surveys of striped bass health: 
The standardized surveys will to help determine whether [differences found in symptoms 
and causes of the disease] are real, or result from different survey and laboratory 
techniques and interpretations. “If we are all on the same page, the results will be more 
easily compared and thus be of higher quality,” said Chris Ottinger, an immunologist 
with the U.S. Geological Survey’s National Fish Health Laboratory in West Virginia.103  
 
Standardization was critically important to compare study results, compile findings, and replicate 
studies. And standardization was unlikely without coordination among the major research 
bodies, whose work comprises the bulk of Bay-related fisheries research.   
Standardization is difficult, however, because of the cost of changing organizational 
procedures. Procedures that are collectively better might not be ideally suited to achieving an 
                                                             
103 Bay Journal, November 2002, “States, Feds to coordinate study of striped bass infections in Bay” 
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organizations’ individual mission.  Changing procedures has tangible costs: perhaps new 
manuals have to be written and new equipment bought. Previously collected information may no 
longer be useful. At the same time, the reward is uncertain. Other jurisdictions or organizations 
may refuse to follow through, or procedures may have to be changed again in the future. These 
uncertainties result in a “chicken game” where all organizations or jurisdictions hope the others 
will change first.  
 
Wrap up and preview of next chapters  
In this chapter, I described the concrete, policy-related benefits that emerge from the 
harmonizing process. The most central benefit is the creation of more holistic, comprehensive 
policy by coordinating the decisions and actions of actors across the relevant “problem 
landscape”, whether this landscape is defined by geography, organizations, or ecology.   
A further conceptual innovation was connecting each type of harmonizing to the solution 
of a particular “boundary” problem. Geographical harmonizing solves the “border” problem, 
organizational harmonizing solves the “stovepiping” problem, and ecological harmonizing solves 
the problem of “species- or media-specific programming”. The three problems were described 
conceptually and illustrated with examples from my data. Because these boundary problems 
occur in multiple policy areas, harmonizing may be a useful concept and practice across many 
fields.  
In addition, harmonizing may create efficiency gains by avoiding the “pitfalls of 
individualism”, particularly duplication, divergence, and counter-production. In some cases, 
harmonizing may standardize policies and programs across organizations, leading to greater 
clarity, effectiveness, and fairness. 
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Chapter 7 focuses on the context in which harmonizing occurs by analyzing the 
secondary codes that most often co-occur with cases of harmonizing. Finally, in Chapter 8 I 
present the results from a thematic analysis of the other four benefits. 
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Chapter 7: Contextual analysis of the Harmonizing benefit 
 
In this chapter, I analyze the context in which harmonizing occurs. I identify collaborative 
forums that facilitate successful harmonizing and explain why these forums are important.  Other 
contextual variables described include policy areas in which harmonizing occurs and the groups 
that tend to harmonize their actions and decisions.  
The most interesting result from my analysis relates to the “Coordinating Organization” 
forum code. This code, when applied, indicates that some type of coordinating organization 
oversaw or managed the collaborative process. I find, first off, that facilitation by a coordinating 
organization is more common for geographical harmonizing (GEO) than for organizational 
harmonizing (ORG). This difference is linked to the fact that GEO harmonizing generally 
involves INTER-jurisdictional coordination (coordination between different municipalities, 
counties, or states) while ORG harmonizing is more likely to involve INTRA-jurisdictional 
coordination (coordination among agencies within the same municipality, county, or state). I 
postulate that harmonizing across jurisdictions is more challenging and therefore requires the 
assistance of a coordinating organization. Intra-jurisdictional harmonizing, on the other hand, can 
typically be accomplished through voluntary, independent, non-facilitated interactions.  
Because my data indicate that coordinating organizations are important to facilitate 
collaboration under difficult conditions, I use empirical examples to explore the role of 
coordinating organizations in more detail, especially how they overcome challenges of and 
obstacles to collaboration.  
I conclude the chapter with a brief exploration of how regulations facilitate, stimulate, 
and shape collaboration. The forum code “Regulations/law”, which indicates that collaboration 
183 
 
 
occurred alongside or through a regulation or law, is also associated with INTER-jurisdictional 
coordination. Although the relationship is less prominent in the data, regulations and law (like 
coordinating organizations) may facilitate collaboration under difficult conditions.  
 
Review of secondary codes 
Secondary codes were described in Chapter 4 (Methods and Data).  They identify key contextual 
aspects of each “instance” of collaboration. Whenever a primary code such as harmonizing is 
applied, secondary codes are applied to the same text segment. This way, contextual information 
is physically linked to the description of each collaborative event.   
Three categories of secondary codes were applied to each harmonizing case: (1) codes 
that describe the forum of collaboration, (2) codes that describe the groups that are collaborating, 
and (3) codes that describe the policy area.104  Although code categories (Forum, Groups, and 
Policy Area) were determined ahead of time, secondary codes themselves were developed 
inductively.  New secondary codes were added as needed and periodically reviewed and refined.   
 
Forum codes that co-occur with harmonizing 
Table 7.1 lists the forum codes that co-occurred with cases of harmonizing, and how they vary 
by harmonizing type. The ALL column indicates the total number of times each forum code co-
occurred with a harmonizing case, while the GEO and ORG columns break these down by 
                                                             
104 These three secondary codes (Forum, Groups, and Policy Area) were applied to all cases marked with one of the 
five primary benefits codes except for Resource Exchange, which has its own set of secondary codes: Resource 
Provider and Resource Type. 
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geographical and organizational harmonizing, respectively. Because there were only two 
examples of ecological harmonizing, these are left out.105 
Forums coded two or fewer times are subsumed under the heading “Other forum or 
mechanism for collaboration”.  These included: “Facilitated by a nonprofit program” (1 case) 
and “Facilitated by a memorandum of understanding/agreement” (1 case).  
 
Table 7.1: Forum codes applied to harmonizing examples (N=99) 
 
 
# co-occurring by 
Harmonizing type 
FORUM CODES 
ALL 
(N=99) 
GEO 
(N=48) 
ORG 
(N=49) 
Facilitated by a coordinating organization 
(COO) 41 28 11 
Voluntary, independent cooperation (VIC) 38 8 30 
Facilitated by a regulation or law 17 10 7 
Facilitated by financial incentives 11 10 1 
Facilitated by a plan 9 5 3 
Single person coordinates 3 0 3 
Other forum or mechanism for collaboration 2 1 1 
 
 
The forum code that co-occurs most commonly with harmonizing cases is “Facilitation by a 
coordinating organization” (COO). Coordinating organizations facilitate collaboration among 
other organizations. Most times, this facilitation role is explicit and their role is understood ahead 
of time by the organizations they work with; in fact, coordination is often a central part of their 
mission. For example, regional organizations like the Bay Program, the Interstate Commission 
                                                             
105 Because the two Ecological harmonizing examples were left off of this table, you may notice that the GEO and 
ORG numbers do not always add up to the number in the ALL column. Ecological harmonizing examples comprise 
the difference between the ALL column and the GEO + ORG columns.  
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on the Potomac River Basin (ICPRB), and the Northern Virginia Regional Commission (NVRC) 
are explicitly designed to be coordinating organizations. However, organizations may serve a 
coordinating role when circumstances demand it, even if this is not central to their mission. 
The forum code “Voluntary, Independent Coordination” (abbreviated VIC) indicates that 
parties work together without the formal structure of a coordinating organization, plan, or 
regulation. Collaboration is voluntary and occurs at the will of the participants, often without 
facilitation. VIC is often informal and ad hoc. It works best when organizational representatives 
already have a working relationship: perhaps they are on a committee together, see each other at 
events, or are co-located in the same office building. Several examples are described in Table 
C.1 in Appendix C.  
Note that 37 out of the 38 cases coded with VIC (97%) came from interviews rather than 
the Bay Journal. This discrepancy can be explained by the nature of data sources. The Bay 
Journal reports on major events and focuses on apparent motivators for behavior, like funding, 
laws, court cases, plans, and formal agreements.  As a “news” source, it is less likely to capture 
situations where coordination occurs informally, spontaneously, or as part of daily, routine 
programmatic tasks.  With interviews, on the other hand, I can ask about small, insignificant, or 
routine acts of coordination between the interviewee and her colleagues.   
Cases of harmonizing are also commonly “facilitated by regulations or laws” (REG). 
This code is applied when a regulation or law stimulates, supports, or shapes the collaborative 
interaction. Some regulations or laws, for instance, require collaboration to occur. The Total 
Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) regulations require upstream jurisdictions to collaborate with 
downstream jurisdictions on TMDL development if they are contributing to water quality 
impairment. Other regulations or laws allow for collaboration to occur or stipulate how it occurs. 
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For instance, Virginia has water quality regulations that allow point source polluters within the 
same watershed to engage in nutrient trading, and stipulates the legal process for such trades. 
(Nutrient trading is a “cap-and-trade” program that allows point source polluters to purchase 
pollution credits from other polluters in their watershed, as long as watershed-wide limits are not 
exceeded). Regulations or laws may shape the way collaboration occurs, or set up a process for 
collaboration. For instance, the state of Pennsylvania passed Smart Growth legislation in 2000 
that, among other things, allowed its municipalities to transfer development rights across 
jurisdictional lines so they could direct development to designated areas and protect open 
space.106 Finally, the REG forum code might be applied when regulations provide an impetus for 
collaboration. The Bay Program’s attempts to prevent or forestall the Chesapeake Bay TMDL 
provide an apt example. Starting with the Chesapeake 2000 agreement, the Bay States began a 
more aggressive collaborative approach towards solving the nutrient and sediment impairments 
in the Bay, in large part to fix the problem before the 2011 court-imposed deadline that would 
initiate a Baywide TMDL.  
The forum code “Facilitated by financial incentives” applies when financial incentives 
encourage collaborative projects or provide the necessary boost for collaborative projects to 
move forward. Financial incentives take many forms: money added to the budget of agencies, 
cash or tax breaks provided to individuals or businesses, or grants distributed through a 
competitive process. Typical cases include grants for cross-border watershed projects or land 
conservation. Sometimes collaboration is a requirement for continued funding of a project; for 
instance, Federal funding for flood control in the Four Mile Run watershed required Arlington 
County, Alexandria, Fairfax County, and Falls Church to set up a Memorandum of Agreement 
(MOA) in which they collectively agreed to implement flood control measures.  
                                                             
106 Bay Journal, July/August 2000, “Ridge signs bills aimed at curbing sprawl in Pennsylvania" 
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Harmonizing may also be “Facilitated by a plan”, i.e. a plan requires or promotes inter-
organizational coordination towards some common or collective goal. The plan typically 
provides a structure and process for coordination. Plans are generally more effective when 
written by the agencies encouraged to or required to collaborate, such as the NOVA localities’ 
drought response plans coordinated by NVRC (case #7 in Table C.1). Plans by themselves are 
often not sufficient to encourage coordination, so they are typically combined with other 
facilitation measures such as financial incentives or regulations. For instance, the Maryland state-
wide green infrastructure plan called Greenprint identifies areas in the State for future 
development and growth, versus areas that should be conserved (Maryland Greenprint 2012). To 
encourage local governments to follow the plan, the State offer subsidies for infrastructure in the 
desired “growth areas”, while denying subsidies and offering land conservation grants in 
“conservation areas”.  
The final code, “single person coordinates”, indicates that a particular person was 
instrumental in orchestrating or facilitating collaboration.  
Forum codes are not mutually exclusive. More than one forum was coded in twenty-one 
(21) of the 99 harmonizing cases.  This is illustrated in Table C.1 (Appendix C), where five (5) 
of the sixteen (16) cases listed have more than one forum code associated with them. Following 
are all pairs that occurred more than once, with the number of times they were paired together in 
parentheses:  Coordinating organization paired with regulation/law (5 times), Coordinating 
organization paired with a plan (5 times), Coordinating organization paired with financial 
incentives (3 times), and a Plan paired with financial incentives (3 times).107  
                                                             
107 It is not surprising that the “Coordinating Organization” forum would pair with another facilitating factor, like 
regulations, plans, or financial incentives. Some coordinating organizations are formed expressly for the purpose of 
writing or carrying out a plan, or of carrying out existing regulations that require inter-jurisdictional coordination. 
Further, once coordinating structures are in place, they serve as an administrative platform for new plans and 
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Forums for geographical versus organizational harmonizing 
When comparing geographical and organizational harmonizing in Table 7.1, the clearest 
difference is that geographical harmonizing occurs more often through a “Coordinating 
organization” (COO), whereas organizational harmonizing occurs more often through 
“Voluntary, Independent Coordination” (VIC).  
This may reflect the difference in the types of problems addressed by Geographical 
versus Organizational harmonizing. Geographical harmonizing addresses problems that flow 
physically over borders. This generally means one jurisdiction is harming another through its 
actions, a situation likely to generate animosity; and high conflict problems are difficult to solve 
through informal, voluntary means. Further, the jurisdiction affected negatively stands to benefit 
more from coordination than the jurisdictions causing the problem. In cases of unequal benefits, 
some mechanism (like financial incentives or a regulation) might be necessary to facilitate an 
agreement that both sides find compelling.  
Organizational harmonizing, on the other hand, addresses stovepiping problems usually 
caused by mission dissimilarity, institutional/procedural differences, or a simple lack of 
information. There is rarely harm being caused. Assuming both organizations are interested in 
solving the problem, there are individualized benefits available for both. 
There is another possibility that has less to do with the essential nature of geographical 
versus organizational harmonizing. This is the idea, confirmed in the next section, that GEO 
harmonizing is more likely to involve INTER-jurisdictional coordination, whereas ORG 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
programs.  Further, the overlap between Plans and Financial incentives makes sense intuitively. Plans often require 
individual organizations to contribute their own resources toward a shared problem, which is a collective action 
challenge. Financial incentives directed towards individual organizations provide the individualized benefit 
necessary to motivate them to follow through on their promises. 
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harmonizing is more likely to involve INTRA-jurisdictional coordination and that INTER-
jurisdictional coordination is more challenging. INTER-jurisdictional coordination is expected to 
be more challenging because each jurisdiction is serving a different constituency, has different 
institutional structures and procedures, and has different political cultures. Plus they lack a 
common government structure to encourage harmonizing of their actions/decisions for the 
collective interest. This reasoning will be described in more detail in later sections.  
 
Groups codes that co-occur with harmonizing 
The type of organizations harmonizing their actions and decisions is another contextual variable 
coded for analysis purposes. Like forum codes, groups categories were not set ahead of time, but 
emerged inductively from the data. Table 7.2 lists the main groups codes that co-occurred with 
cases of harmonizing, and how they vary by harmonizing type (again, only geographical and 
organizational are shown because there were so few ecological harmonizing examples).108 Group 
codes applied two or fewer times are subsumed under the heading “Other collaborating 
groups”.109   
Most group codes represent types of organizations, such as nonprofits and local 
government agencies. However, the last three categories, bolded in the table, represent particular 
characteristics of the harmonizing groups. “Upstream/Downstream” indicates that groups are 
located upstream and downstream of each other, i.e. that the border problem being addressed has 
an upstream/downstream dynamic.  The “Land use managers and water quality managers” code 
                                                             
108 This is the reason why the numbers do not add up for “State agencies with each other (INTRA-state)” and “Other 
collaborating groups”. Ecological harmonizing examples comprise the difference between the ALL column and the 
GEO + ORG columns.  
109 These included: “Federal agencies with each other” (2 cases), “State government agency and nonprofit” (2 cases), 
“Managers of different species” (2 cases), “Local government agency and nonprofit” (1 case), “Local government 
agency and private sector company” (1 case), “Polluters with each other” (1 case), “Private sector company and 
nonprofit” (1 case), “Citizens’ committees with each other” (1 case), “Natural gas utilities and water utilities” (1 
case), and “Park sites” (1 case). 
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indicates that harmonizing occurs between organizations that manage land and water. Similarly, 
the “Transportation and Environment code” indicates that harmonizing occurs between 
organizations that work on transportation and environmental issues. These codes provide 
additional information about harmonizing groups, but are not meant to replace the regular (non-
bolded) groups codes.110   
 
Table 7.2 Groups codes applied to harmonizing examples (N=99) 
 
  
# co-occurring by 
Harmonizing type 
GROUPS CODES 
ALL 
(N=99) 
GEO 
(N=48) 
ORG 
(N=49) 
Local governments with each other (INTER-jurisdictional) 26 24 2 
States with each other (INTER-state) 16 14 2 
Local government agencies with each other (INTRA-
jurisdictional) 24 1 23 
State agencies with each other (INTRA-state) 6 0 5 
Local government and state government agencies 7 3 4 
Federal government and state government agencies 4 3 1 
Water utilities with each other 4 3 1 
Federal government and local government agencies 3 2 1 
Regional organizations with each other 3 0 3 
Other collaborating groups  13 4 7 
Upstream/Downstream 12 12 0 
Land use managers and water quality managers  5 0 5 
Transportation and environment 3 0 3 
 
The groups codes most commonly applied to harmonizing cases involved local government 
agencies; there were 26 cases of INTER-jurisdictional local government coordination and 24 
cases of INTRA-jurisdictional coordination.  The third most common groups code was “States 
with each other” (INTER-state coordination).  Dominance of these groups codes was likely 
                                                             
110 These special groups codes are applied in addition to the regular groups codes (i.e. the non-bolded ones in the 
table).  
191 
 
 
related to data sources. Of 76 total NOVA interviews, 29 (38%) were with local government 
officials, by far the largest category of interviewees. This explains dominance of INTER- and 
INTRA-jurisdictional coordination at the local level. Bay Journal data may explain the large 
number of instances of inter-state collaboration, since many articles involve the interstate 
Chesapeake Bay Program partnership and related programs and committees. The relatively large 
number of cases involving “Upstream and Downstream” groups makes sense considering my 
focus on surface water quality.  
 
Groups codes for geographical versus organizational harmonizing 
The main finding from Table 7.2 is the apparent association between INTER-jurisdictional 
coordination and Geographical harmonizing on one hand, and between INTRA-jurisdictional 
coordination and Organizational harmonizing on the other. The relevant cells have been bolded 
in the Table to emphasize this finding.  
This finding confirms my thoughts described above and makes intuitive sense. GEO 
harmonizing solves border problems, where jurisdictions lack political control over the full 
“spatial landscape” needed to properly address a problem. Such cross-border problems must be 
solved through coordination with neighboring jurisdictions. On the other hand, cross-border 
coordination is rarely an essential component of ORG harmonizing. Rather, ORG harmonizing 
addresses the Stovepiping problem, which occurs often in an INTRA-jurisdictional context. 
The follow up question is whether INTER- versus INTRA-jurisdictional coordination 
might be an “intervening variable” that explains the connection (shown in Table 7.1) between 
GEO and the use of Coordinating Organizations and between  ORG and Voluntary, Independent 
coordination (VIC). The argument made above is that, because GEO is more likely than ORG to 
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involve INTER-jurisdictional coordination (a more difficult condition for collaboration), an extra 
boost of energy and help is needed in the form of facilitation by a coordinating organization. If 
this is true, then we should see a direct connection between the groups and forums codes 
themselves, i.e. between INTER-jurisdictional coordination and the use of coordinating 
organizations, and between INTRA-jurisdictional coordination and VIC. I will follow up in a 
later section by querying the co-occurrence between groups and forum codes.  
 
Policy area codes that co-occur with harmonizing 
A final contextual variable describes the policy areas in which harmonizing occurs. Like forum 
and groups codes, policy area categories emerged from the data. Table 7.3 below lists the main 
policy area codes that co-occurred with instances of harmonizing, and how they vary by 
harmonizing type. Again, only GEO and ORG harmonizing are shown.111  Policy Area codes 
applied two or fewer times are subsumed under the heading “Other policy areas”.112  
 
  
                                                             
111 This is the reason why numbers do not add up for “Fisheries”. Ecological harmonizing examples comprise the 
difference between the ALL column and the GEO + ORG columns. 
112 These included: Flood management (2 occurrences); and all of the following with one occurrence each:  oceans 
policy, solid waste, Scenic River designation, air quality, environmental education, invasive species, and tree 
canopy/urban forest. 
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Table 7.3: Policy Area codes applied to harmonizing examples (N=99). 
 
# co-occurring by 
Harmonizing type 
POLICY AREA CODES 
ALL 
(N=99) 
GEO 
(N=48) 
ORG 
(N=49) 
Stormwater 17 3 14 
Land conservation 9 4 5 
Land development and planning 9 0 9 
Recreation 9 8 1 
Watershed planning / management 9 7 2 
Fisheries 7 3 2 
Wastewater (includes septic) 7 1 6 
Water quality, general 7 7 0 
Water supply 7 5 2 
Smart growth 4 2 2 
Agriculture 3 1 2 
Energy 3 0 3 
Environment, general (no specific policy 
area) 5 1 4 
Other 9 5 4 
 
 
The most common policy areas that co-occurred with my harmonizing examples were 
Stormwater management, Land development/planning, Land conservation, Recreation, and 
Watershed planning/management.  These have received considerable attention through examples 
presented in the previous two chapters.113  
                                                             
113 Note the wide range of policy areas represented, some of which have little to do with water quality. This breadth 
of policy areas is a function of my sources and conscious decisions on my part.  The Bay Journal covers all aspects 
of the Chesapeake Bay restoration. Since the Bay Agreements themselves are not limited to water quality – they 
include objectives related to recreation opportunities, environmental education, invasive species, and open space, 
among other things— neither is the Bay Journal reporting. I use all Bay Journal articles rather than pick and choose 
by policy area to broaden the contexts in which collaboration is examined. My main research purpose is to 
conceptualize and describe collaboration and its benefits. I felt that limiting my material a priori was counter-
productive, especially if these limits are based on difficult decisions about what is and what is not water quality 
policy. If my conception of collaboration is to be useful, it should apply at least to all policy areas overlapping with 
water quality. 
Further, although the policy backgrounds of my interviewees were mainly land use management, stormwater 
management, planning, and/or water quality regulation, I purposefully selected interviewees working in related 
policy areas, such as water supply, agriculture, recreation, and economic development, to learn about collaboration 
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Policy area codes for geographical versus organizational harmonizing 
Geographical harmonizing occurred most commonly in policy areas related to Water quality (7 
times), Watershed planning (7 times), and Recreation (8 times). Most recreation-related GEO 
cases involve trails or parks that cross jurisdictional boundaries. Water quality and watershed 
planning cases are varied, but all can be traced to the border problems that plague water quality 
management: the cross-border movement of stormwater and in-stream pollutants.  
Organizational harmonizing, on the other hand, is heavily concentrated in the policy areas 
of Stormwater (14 cases) and Land development/planning (9 cases) and, to a lesser extent, 
Wastewater (6 cases). My interview data plays a heavy hand here. Stormwater and land 
development are both functions of local government and much harmonizing occurs between 
local government departments.  All jurisdictions in my NOVA study area have MS4 permits for 
stormwater, which require stormwater managers to work with other departments within their 
jurisdiction. They also have rapid land conversion. As land is converted to impervious surface, 
stormwater becomes an issue; many successful harmonizing cases are about incorporating 
stormwater into land development processes.  
 
Relationships among secondary codes 
Using the query function in Atlas ti, secondary codes may be crossed with each other to explore 
a variety of relationships. For instance, by crossing the policy area code with the forum and 
groups codes, one can answer the questions: In a given policy area, which collaborative forum(s) 
tend to be most common and which type(s) of groups tend to collaborate most often? Or by 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
from a variety of perspectives. Within the interview, I did not steer towards water quality beyond telling the 
interviewee (ahead of time) about my interests. Thus, I made conscious decisions to keep the policy area of “water 
quality” broad, which provides me with harmonizing examples occurring under a wide range of policy contexts. 
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crossing the groups codes with forum codes, one can answer the question: For a given set of 
groups that collaborate, which forum(s) are most often used?  
Queries that crossed policy areas with forums or groups produced no surprising or 
significant results. Certain forums are associated with certain policy areas in predictable ways. 
For instance, coordinating organizations are likely to be used in Fisheries, Recreation, and Water 
Supply, while harmonizing in Land Conservation is mostly conducted through some combination 
of Voluntary, Independent Coordination (VIC), Financial Incentives, and Plans.  
The most relevant secondary codes query is between forums and groups. Based on the 
other results presented, I am particularly interested in whether INTER- and INTRA-jurisdictional 
harmonizing tend to employ different forums.  
 
Relationship between Groups and Forum codes  
Table7.4 shows the results of crossing the groups codes with forum codes. Cells indicate the 
number of times the corresponding group and forum codes were simultaneously applied to a case 
of harmonizing. To make the Table more readable, groups or forum codes applied fewer than 
four times are excluded.  
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Table 7.4 Forum and group code combinations for cases of harmonizing 
Groups Codes 
Coordinating 
organization 
Voluntary, 
independent 
coordination 
Regulation / 
law 
Financial 
incentives Plan 
Local governments (INTER-
jurisdictional) 15 7 7 4 1 
States (INTER-state) 12 1 2 2 1 
Local government agencies 
(INTRA-jurisdictional) 5 16 2 0 0 
State agencies (INTRA-state) 1 4 0 0 1 
Local government and state 
government agencies 1 2 2 2 4 
Federal government and state 
government agencies 2 1 0 1 1 
Water utilities with each other 3 0 2 0 0 
Upstream/Downstream 6 3 4 0 0 
Land use managers and 
water quality managers  1 4 0 0 0 
 
 
The results indeed indicate that, among harmonizing cases, INTER-jurisdictional coordination is 
most often associated with the use of a coordinating organization, while INTRA-jurisdictional 
coordination is most associated with Voluntary, Independent Coordination (VIC).  Adding 
together coordination at the local and state levels, cases of INTER-jurisdictional harmonizing 
were facilitated by coordinating organizations a total of 27 times, compared to 6 times for 
INTRA-jurisdictional coordination. In contrast, cases of INTER-jurisdictional coordination 
occurred through VIC 8 times, compared to 20 times for INTRA-jurisdictional coordination.  
This corroborates my idea that INTER- versus INTRA-jurisdictional coordination is an 
intervening variable that explains the initial relationship found between GEO harmonizing and 
coordinating organizations and between ORG harmonizing and VIC. Further, I postulate that the 
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reason why coordinating organizations are more commonly used to facilitate INTER-
jurisdictional coordination is because coordination between jurisdictions is a more challenging 
condition than coordination within jurisdictions. I elaborate on reasons for this below.  
 
INTER- versus INTRA- jurisdictional coordination and the need for coordinating 
organizations 
For several reasons, coordination between agencies in different jurisdictions might be more 
challenging than coordination among agencies within the same jurisdiction.  To illustrate, I will 
focus on local government agencies, the most common category of examples in my data. First, 
with INTRA-jurisdictional coordination, the coordinating agencies are working for the same 
constituency and, ultimately, the betterment of the same city, town, or county. They may be in 
competition for resources, or prefer one procedure over another, yet their end goal involves 
greater efficiency and service improvement for the same residents. Further, they work under a 
common set of political officials who push them to coordinate in the collective interest. Conflicts 
among departments and/or inefficiencies due to stovepiping may not be tolerated for long by the 
shared political leadership. On the other hand, INTER-organizational coordination involves two 
politically independent jurisdictions which, if they are neighbors, are competitors for residents 
and business. Not only do they serve different constituencies, they have little incentive to help 
their competitor.  
Second, agencies within the same political jurisdiction are accustomed to working within 
the same or similar institutional structure and utilizing the same or similar procedures. They also 
work within the same political culture, whether that culture is generated by the elected officials 
in office or the constituents they serve. On the other hand, coordinating across political 
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jurisdictions entails bridging differences in procedures, institutional structures, and political 
culture. One interviewee who works at the regional level in NOVA described this challenge:   
Rachel: Could you talk about the challenges of working across jurisdictions?  You’ve 
mentioned a couple of projects where you’ve had multiple jurisdictions involved. 
 
Interviewee: One of the main challenges I guess is that everybody has a different process 
and the jurisdictions have their zoning ordinances [which] are completely different and 
their regulations are different and their political climate is different.  We just have to be 
flexible and a project that may go smoothly in one jurisdiction may not in another 
because they each have their own individual set of rules. 114 
 
Third, most local governments are small, so employees are likely to be professionally and even 
personally familiar. They might work together in the same office, attend the same meetings, and 
know each other personally from shared activities outside of work. This inter-personal 
familiarity and trust is important for the effectiveness of voluntary, independent coordination 
(VIC). With separate jurisdictions, on the other hand, partners are generally less personally and 
professionally familiar. If the jurisdictions are competitors, they may be prone to mistrust and 
tentativeness in their relationships. 
These factors explain why VIC might fail in the case of INTER-jurisdictional 
coordination (or other conditions that make collaboration challenging). They indicate a need for 
secondary motivators or facilitators. Although coordinating organizations are most common, 
harmonizing may be facilitated under difficult conditions through other means, such as 
regulations/law and financial incentives. In fact, the analysis in Table 7.4 indicates that the forum 
codes “Facilitation via regulation/law” and “Facilitation by financial incentives” may also be 
more common for INTER-organizational than for INTRA-organizational coordination.   
The remainder of this chapter focuses on the role of forums, particularly coordinating 
organizations, in facilitating collaboration under difficult conditions. Empirical data describes 
                                                             
114 Interviewee #66 
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how coordinating organizations overcome obstacles and challenges of collaboration. In the final 
section, the facilitative role of regulations and law is discussed briefly.  
 
Coordinating organizations and collaboration 
Table 7.5 lists coordinating organizations most commonly associated with harmonizing in my 
data. Only organizations mentioned two or more times are in the table; the rest are subsumed 
under the “Other” category.115  The second column indicates the number of times each 
organization co-occurred with one of my 99 harmonizing cases. All are specific organizations 
except for “Intra-Jurisdictional Committees”, which represents three different County-level 
committees or task forces, each involved in one harmonizing case.    
 
  
                                                             
115 These included the following ten organizations, all mentioned once: The Metropolitan Washington Council of 
Governments (COG), the Susquehanna River Basin Commission (SRBC), the Bi-State Blue Crab Committee, the 
Mid-Atlantic Regional Panel on Aquatic Nuisance Species, the Potomac Drinking Water Source Protection 
Partnership, the Upper Occoquan Sewage Authority, the Eastern Shore Conservancy (nonprofit land trust), the 
Greenhouse Gas Task Force (inter-state), the Committee on Ocean Policy, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 
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Table 7.5: Coordinating organizations (specific or by type) that co-occurred with harmonizing. 
Coordinating organization  
# of co-   
occurrences with 
harmonizing  
Northern Virginia Regional Commission (NVRC) 8 
US EPA Chesapeake Bay Program 7 
Interstate Commission on the Potomac River 
Basin (ICPRB) 6 
INTRA-jurisdictional local government 
committees (involve multiple departments) 3 
National Park Service (NPS) 3 
Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission 
(ASMFC) 2 
Northern Virginia Regional Park Authority 
(NVRPA) 2 
Other coordinating organization (one mention) 10 
 
Most organizations were created for the purpose of managing some boundary problem that could 
not be solved, or solved well, without coordination. The Chesapeake Bay Program and the 
ICPRB were created expressly for managing border problems related to water quality (and water 
supply in the case of ICPRB) in their respective watersheds. The Northern Virginia Regional 
Commission (NVRC) was created under Virginia State law to manage a variety of NOVA 
regional issues including cross-border environmental issues like land conservation, water quality, 
and water supply.  The Northern Virginia Regional Park Authority (NVRPA) was created to pool 
money from member jurisdictions and build parks throughout the NOVA region that residents 
can use for free or reduced prices. The Atlantic State Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC), 
an interstate body, brings together fisheries managers in the Atlantic States to write joint 
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fisheries management plans and harmonize fisheries regulations; it is also used as a forum to 
settle inter-state fisheries conflicts.  
“Intra-jurisdictional local government committees” facilitate coordination among 
representatives from multiple departments of local government on a temporary or permanent 
basis. Temporary committees form around a particular project and have specific tasks or issues 
to resolve; one harmonizing example is the interdepartmental team assembled to plan the 
redevelopment of the Route 28 commercial corridor in Loudoun County, which involved the 
Planning Department, Economic Development Agency, Housing Department, Public Works, and 
the relevant School Districts. Permanent committees include examples like the Environmental 
Coordinating Committee (ECC) in Fairfax County. This high level administrative committee, 
comprised of department heads and one other designee from each County department, 
coordinates and prioritizes environmental programs across the vast County bureaucracy.  
The National Parks Service (NPS) is the only organization created for its own 
programmatic purposes of managing the National Parks and National Trails systems, rather than 
as a coordinating organization.116  However, there are times that NPS serves as a coordinating 
organization, including for the Chesapeake Bay Gateways network (described in Chapter 6) and 
several examples related to creation or maintenance of cross-jurisdictional trails. In these cases, 
programs pursued by NPS for their own purposes require them to coordinate other organizations’ 
actions and decisions.  
Coordinating organizations come in many varieties. Some are long-standing and 
permanent while others end when their project or task is completed. Some coordinating groups 
                                                             
116 There are two similar examples under “Other”. First is the Eastern Shore Land Conservancy, a nonprofit land 
trust which helped to coordinate a regional planning effort among Eastern Shore counties. The second is the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers, a Federal agency which coordinated a watershed project between the City of Alexandria 
and Fairfax County.   
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have a narrow mission. For instance, the Bi-State Blue Crab Committee (subsumed under 
“Other”) has the specific purpose of coordinating blue crab catch restrictions between Maryland 
and Virginia and is unlikely to expand into new areas. On the other hand, long-standing 
coordinating organizations like NVRC or ICPRB take on new inter-jurisdictional problems over 
time. Some coordinating organizations, like NVRC and NVRPA, have specific members whom 
they serve and who pay dues. Others, like ASMFC, are forums for inter-jurisdictional planning, 
conflict resolution, and programming, but provide little in the way of “services” beyond 
information and technical resources.  
 
Exploring the beneficial role of coordinating organizations 
My data indicate that coordinating organizations are important facilitators of INTER-
jurisdictional coordination. By extension, they may be important facilitators for collaboration 
under a variety of difficult conditions, when organizations are unlikely to naturally seek and 
pursue common goals, such as institutional or cultural differences, contradictory interests, a 
competitive atmosphere, coordination tasks that are excessively time-consuming, or a history of 
animosity or failed relationships.  
Using examples from the data, a thematic analysis presented in the following sections 
describes how coordinating organizations facilitate harmonizing and other forms of collaboration 
under difficult conditions. Themes were identified and elaborated using data from two sources: 
the “Coordinating Organization” forum code and a tertiary code called “Facilitator Role” that 
identified examples of facilitator organizations whether or not collaboration was occurring.117 
                                                             
117 All passages under the secondary “Coordinating Organization” forum code and the tertiary “Facilitator Role” 
code were part of my analysis of coordinating organizations, whether harmonizing occurred or not.  This includes 
163 passages under the “Coordinating Organization” forum code and 188 passages under the “Facilitator Role” 
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Coordinating organizations provide a landscape-level perspective 
Organizations concerned with surviving and achieving their own goals have little time to peruse 
the landscape for coordination opportunities. Coordinating organizations, on the other hand, have 
a broader view; they recognize boundary problems (both border problems and stovepiping) and 
can facilitate coordination needed to address them. They may be created by the jurisdictions / 
organizations themselves specifically to provide this “landscape-level” perspective, or this 
perspective may be inherent to their own mission.  
NVRC is the latter type. Its mission is to facilitate regional coordination among its 14 
member jurisdictions (four counties, five cities, and five towns in Northern Virginia). In the 
quote below, a NVRC employee explained how she identifies cross-border issues and 
opportunities for localities. Although NVRC has no authority to force coordination (it is a non-
regulatory agency), it offers assistance should the localities decide to pursue coordination.  
Interviewee: … what we develop essentially just serves as a guidance and the localities 
move forward toward implementation of some of the recommendations, or of all the 
recommendations, it’s kind of their choice. 
 
Rachel: Okay, I see, so for something like green infrastructure, you would create kind of 
regional suggestions and the localities would incorporate that or not incorporate that into 
their plans. 
 
Interviewee: Exactly, it provides the opportunity where they can still see within their own 
jurisdiction what is possible, but also identify those areas that cross jurisdictional 
boundaries to be able to say, “Oh, that’s kind of an important area and maybe we want to 
consider working together to look at this area a little bit more closely.” 118  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
tertiary code. Thus, the themes apply beyond the 99 Harmonizing cases to collaboration more broadly, although I 
use harmonizing examples to illustrate them when possible. 
118 Interviewee #76 
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The identification of cross-border issues is a service to member jurisdictions. It can also provide 
“social” benefits, in the form of better policy, if jurisdictions adjust their decisions and actions to 
make sense at the regional level. 
NVRC and the other Planning District Commissions (PDCs) in Virginia provide benefits 
not just to their member jurisdictions but also to State agencies, which frequently consult or 
subcontract with PDCs. In addition to local government connections, PDCs offer a 
comprehensive, landscape-level perspective that helps the State determine how projects in one 
policy area, like water quality, fit with related policies for transportation and land development. 
In other words, they provide a “landscape-level” perspective on the region that the State lacks.  A 
Virginia DEQ employee from the Northern Virginia regional office described working with 
PDCs on TMDL projects, praising their comprehensive knowledge of the region:  
The reason that we can bring them on board as being a contractor for the TMDL projects 
is that they have a really good relationships with the counties that are in their little region 
and they have a lot of connections who know a lot about what's already going on in the 
county, kind of comprehensively, not just in the environmental watershed arena, but with 
transportation and just everything else that might be going on in the region so that they 
have a good base of knowledge. 119 
 
Coordinating organizations address competitive pressures  
Because organizations have their hands full with their own responsibilities, missions, and legal 
obligations, they tend to be bad at landscape-level approaches. This problem is intensified when 
they are in competition, as the following exchange with an NVRC employee illustrates. The 
interviewee is discussing a water supply emergency response system for NOVA localities, which 
was being developed through an NVRC working group (case #7 in Table C.1):   
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Rachel:  All the jurisdictions working together in this working group would set up some 
rules? 
 
Interviewee: Yes….A Master Plan that all of the local governments would adopt as in 
their ordinances that would say, “When we hit this condition there is this message, when 
we hit this condition there is another message”….  
 
Rachel: I’m going to make you justify NVRC again. Couldn’t local governments do this 
work on their own?  
 
Interviewee: No. And the reason for that is for the most part a single jurisdiction is 
concerned for itself. There is too much competitiveness between the jurisdictions to 
really do some of these things. For instance when it comes to growth in the economy no 
local government is going to be willing to say, “I don’t need that growth, let it happen 
next door”. There is always too much of a bit of competitiveness between local 
governments and that gets in the way and that is where we come in with the aspect of 
living and dying by consensus. 120   
 
The “self-centered” focus of organizations means collaboration is difficult unless benefits to the 
individual organizations are certain and immediate. Otherwise, there must be some other 
impetus, such as a facilitating organization that works diligently to forge consensus.  
A Bay Journal article on the Chesapeake Bay Gateways Program echoed this idea. The 
Gateways Program, administered by the National Park Service (NPS), strings together features of 
various parks, trails, and other sites into a coherent “Chesapeake Bay experience” for visitors, 
sort of like a National Chesapeake Bay Park scattered over hundreds of different sites.  The 
assistant director of the Maryland Office of Tourism Marci Ross, quoted in the passage below, 
says that competition between the States was one problem that NPS successfully overcame. She 
makes it quite clear that, because of inter-jurisdictional competition, the States could not have 
coordinated on tourism programs without facilitation assistance from NPS: 
Ross said the park service brings more to the Gateways Network than grant money. 
States often compete for tourism, she said, and do not have the ability to reach across 
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borders and coordinate a region-wide tourism program focused on the Bay without the 
park service. “If we could have, we would have,” she said.121  
 
Implicit in both quotes about “competition” is a larger truth.  Voluntary, independent 
coordination (VIC) is hard to achieve because each party has responsibilities to improve the 
quality of life for its own residents and taxpayers.  Jurisdictions are also constrained by legal 
obligations, such as their own schedule for MS4 compliance and their own local ordinances. 
What is behind some of this talk about “competitiveness” is a concern that collaboration will 
interfere with a jurisdictions’ ability to both meet its own legal requirements and to fully serve 
and protect its own citizens.122 A coordinating organization can alleviate some of those fears by 
ensuring that benefits are shared and relatively equal, and that partner jurisdictions don’t shirk 
their promises.  
Furthermore, political and fiduciary responsibilities of government officials make it 
difficult for jurisdictions to spend their taxpayers’ money on collaborative projects that provide 
benefits to another jurisdiction.  Local governments generally cannot pay for stream restoration 
projects outside of their borders, even if these streams carry pollutants into their borders. A 
watershed planner from Fairfax County discussed how neighboring jurisdictions participated in 
advisory groups convened to discuss shared watersheds. Information on stream conditions in 
these other jurisdictions was collected. Yet, he said: “what we didn’t do is we didn’t try to 
address the problems” because Fairfax taxpayers won’t agree to pay for project in a neighboring 
County.123  However, the same interviewee goes on to discuss how the Army Corps of Engineers 
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122 Similar arguments could be made for organizations in general, but it is much easier to describe using political 
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(ACOE), by providing financial incentives and serving in a facilitator role, was able to achieve 
this elusive inter-jurisdictional coordination in another shared watershed: 
Interviewee: One of our watersheds, [Kenman] Run, the Corps of Engineers came in and 
initiated a collaborative effort to also look at other things that they could bring to the 
table.  Sort of like going over and beyond what we were able to do, and in that vein 
they brought in the city of Alexandria, which parts of that watershed flows through.  
So we have an ongoing effort to sit and talk about other watershed restoration projects 
that the Corps could fund. 
 
Rachel: I see.  So they can provide funding and they can also provide participation from 
Alexandria. 
 
Interviewee: Right.  Right.  So they coordinate between the jurisdiction - Alexandria and 
Fairfax - they’re designing the plans and we meet once every two months and discuss the 
status.  It’s been slow but it’s heading in the right direction (emphasis added). 124 
 
Even when benefits are mutual, paying for a benefit in a neighboring, competitor jurisdiction is 
anathema. This issue was apparent from an example of a pollution trading program for municipal 
wastewater treatment plants in the NOVA region. Under this program, plants can meet new 
Chesapeake Bay regulations by buying or selling pollution credits. Without this coordination, all 
plants would upgrade at once and drive up construction costs. Although this is a winning 
situation for smaller plants (the interviewee uses Berryville and Front Royal as examples) who 
can put off upgrades by paying larger, newer plants (like Fairfax County) for the right to pollute, 
there is an unexpected problem. These small plants, which represented smaller, poorer 
municipalities, didn't want to write a check to a rich County like Fairfax.  They literally could not 
get themselves to write “Fairfax County” on a check: 
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You'd hear from Berryville or Front Royal in the valley, "That's fine but I am not writing 
your check to Fairfax County." The rural smaller areas sending the money to the richer 
counties directly was just politically a nonstarter, not going to happen. 125 
 
The fix was easy: set up an anonymous nutrient credit exchange organization to collect and 
distribute the funds. As described by the interviewee: “They didn't mind writing a check to a 
nutrient credit exchange and then the credit exchange writes a check to Prince William or Fairfax 
County but Berryville itself was not going to write out a check to Fairfax.” 126 This example 
illustrates the power that competitiveness and similar animosities have to derail collaboration and 
shows how in some cases even a simple coordinating arrangement can resolve the issue. 
 
Coordinating organization assist in solving complex, many participant problems 
Cross-border problems can be complex. Many organizations cause or impact the problem 
through their actions, are impacted by the problem, or are involved in solving it. Achieving the 
appropriate “organizational landscape” requires participation from all of them, and they each 
have their own interests, schedules, cultures, and preferred procedures. Under these conditions, 
voluntary, independent coordination is difficult to initiate and sustain.  
For these many-participant cross-border problems it is best to engage a coordinating 
organization that has the administrative capacity and the willingness to manage these 
relationships over the long term.  The Lower Four Mile Run restoration project, described by an 
NVRC employee in the quoted exchange below, is a good example of a situation that requires 
the assistance of a coordinating organization. This project involves only two jurisdictions 
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(Arlington County and Alexandria), but has several Federal and State partners and a slew of 
private contractors. NVRC coordinates the effort: 
Interviewee: So there are different consultants working on different aspects of stream 
restoration. This includes not only restoration, but bridge design, landscaping, etc. And 
there are issues about where the funding will come from for all of these projects. And 
there are two jurisdictions involved. And there are Federal agencies, who are the sponsors 
- for instance, the EPA is paying for stream restoration but the funding comes through 
Virginia [Department of Environmental Quality]. The Transportation Enhancement grant 
[the one we got for the pedestrian bridge] is also Federal funding but it comes through the 
[Virginia Department of Transportation]. And the Army Corps of Engineers is involved. 
And when we design all these projects it has to go through any necessary state, local, or 
Federal permitting processes.  
So there are all these coordinations that have to happen. And the [Arlington County] and 
[City of Alexandria] people don't necessarily meet on a regular basis to discuss issues 
like this…. Sometimes there are competing interests. There might be issues that need to 
be resolved or facilitated so that people can reach some common goals. And this is where 
the coordination comes in.  
 
Rachel: So is it your job to see the big picture? 
 
Interviewee: Yes, exactly. 127  
 
The description makes it clear that this project requires extensive coordination that informal, 
voluntary, and sporadic coordination could not achieve.   
 
Coordinating organizations provide a neutral, non-hostile venue for coordination 
Coordinating organizations may provide facilitation assistance and a neutral space for meetings. 
They smooth over difficulties arising from differences in organizational culture, historical 
animosities, or personality conflicts. Where there is anxiety over the distribution of benefits, they 
may even out benefits or promise benefits in future collaborations.  In short, they can create an 
atmosphere conductive to collaboration.  
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Several interviewees talked about the importance of a “neutral” forum for collaboration 
and facilitation by a “third-party” or “neutral” party. This indicates the importance of a 
collaborative space and process that are (or are perceived to be) fair and unbiased. An example is 
the “Builders for the Bay” program. This program brings together developers, environmentalists, 
stormwater managers, and others to participate in roundtables to examine and revise local 
ordinances, with the purposes of improving stormwater management and making it easier for 
developers to incorporate green design features. The venue and process of Builders for the Bay 
was perceived as fair and unbiased, in part, because the program was jointly coordinated by 
environmental nonprofits and the National Association of Home Builders. Participants also 
reported that third party facilitation of the roundtables created a “neutral environment” and 
reined in local “interests and agendas.”128 
Good facilitation also creates a comfortable environment where organizational 
representatives feel they will not be blamed for the problems under discussion. I heard this 
perspective from an employee of the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) who 
participated in Fairfax County’s watershed planning processes. In discussions of stormwater and 
water quality, VDOT is a common culprit because they build and manage a large proportion of 
the region’s impervious surface. As demonstrated by the quote below, this interviewee found 
facilitation to be very helpful in creating a “non-hostile” environment: 
The biggest thing I saw very challenging from my perspective was I would come to 
meetings and the idea would be to have a non-hostile environment where people could 
openly talk and not get into any type of confrontation. I think that’s probably the hardest 
thing to achieve sometimes, and I liked the way that, at least Fairfax County was doing it, 
is they hired a consultant to facilitate the discussion. 129 
 
                                                             
128 Bay Journal, May 2005, “Builders group has designs on developing consensus for the Bay” 
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Note that changing the coordinating environment does not create “trust” in the same way that 
knowing someone personally does. An “atmosphere conductive to collaboration” relates to 
whether participants feel comfortable. Is the environment or the venue friendly and 
nonthreatening? Is the process facilitated fairly? Do the participants feel they can share 
information without fear that it will be used against them? If the answer to these questions is yes, 
this is a positive and productive “collaborative space”. The feeling created by this type of 
positive collaborative space is something that a good coordinating organization can help provide.  
 
Coordinating organizations take over the administrative tasks of collaboration 
Collaboration takes a lot of time. Participating organizations are reluctant to expend resources on 
a collaborative process that provides landscape-level benefits, unless individualized 
(organizational) benefits are clear, immediate, and guaranteed. Since this is generally not the 
case, coordinating organizations ease the burden of collaboration by taking on collective 
administrative tasks. They will organize and facilitate meetings, do research, write up meeting 
minutes, draft documents, and generally work to keep the collaborative process moving forward. 
NVRC’s coordination of the Lower Four Mile Run restoration provides a useful example. 
One employee of the NVRC described their role in managing the Agency Coordinating Group 
(ACG), a steering committee consisting mainly of local government department representatives 
from Alexandria and Arlington, plus one representative from the Army Corps and a citizen 
representative from each jurisdiction. NVRC coordinates this group and keeps the project 
moving forward by providing the necessary administrative assistance: 
There are 10-15 different people representing 10-15 different [local government] 
departments participating in the ACG. So someone from a Parks Department may not 
know what the water quality or the flooding requirements are. When planning or 
developing a park, they need to know what might be the constraints from other programs, 
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and that has to be conveyed and discussed, and a resolution needs to be reached. This 
kind of coordination is needed both within jurisdictions and between jurisdictions. And 
people need to get together to determine priorities and the order of priorities. All of these 
people have their day-to-day jobs, so they come to the meetings and have only a little bit 
of time to work on this. So they don't remember everything from meeting to meeting. So 
we [the NVRC] feed them with the right information at the right time, we answer their 
questions, pull up documents, etc.  For instance, if the consultant has a report that needs 
to be reviewed by all the parties, we put it on our website and send a reminder to 
everyone to read it and make comments. Then we collect and comments and organize 
them, and get them back to the consultant. It is a lot of work. 130 
 
Coordinating organizations play an equally important role in providing opportunities for 
information exchange. They are “keepers and managers” of information about particular 
projects, “feeding” this information to participants when it is needed. Further, information 
exchange occurs informally among participants in workgroups and committees convened 
through coordinating organizations. Several interviewees identified this information exchange 
role as the “value added” of the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG).  In 
the following quotes, three different interviewees discuss the information exchange role of COG 
and how it affects their work. Source information is given at the end of each: 
I think that by and large COG's major role is information exchange. It's a really useful 
place to get together with your peers. COG does a good job of bringing in the technical 
experts or the regulatory agencies so you can have some face to face dialogue with those 
folks about what's coming down. I think that’s a really beneficial role that they play. 
(Source: an environmental manager from Arlington County) 131 
 
It’s a chance to compare notes on emerging issues like green building and more 
environmentally friendly building standards, the newer issue...If peers from other 
jurisdictions can talk and compare notes about what they’ve learned about the issue; 
successes that they’ve had or that their jurisdiction have had in implementing those things 
on public facilities and also interactions they’ve had with private sector developers on the 
issues, if we can compare notes, then we become more knowledgeable about it and we’re 
able to advance those issues better. (Source: Leader of an internal environmental review 
team in Loudoun County) 132 
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We work with them some. Mostly we use those as information gathering sessions. We 
listen to whatever the other folks are doing (Source: Public works employee for the City 
of Falls Church). 133 
 
Coordinating organizations provide critical information at just the right time, to agencies that 
lack the time and capacity to research everything themselves. In this vein, other interviewees 
expressed gratitude toward COG for compiling and distributing updates on the Chesapeake Bay 
TMDL as it was being written by US-EPA. Local governments lack the capacity to send an 
organizational representative to the multitude of meetings that US-EPA organized, and could 
instead rely on COG to collect and share relevant information, as well as represent the “local 
government perspective” to EPA and the State agencies. 
 
Coordinating organizations can provide (some) accountability 
When a cross-border problem is addressed via collaboration, there are generally no sanctions for 
organizations that refuse to participate or back down on promises.  A coordinating organization 
can, at the least, set deadlines for action, forge agreements to be signed by participants, and apply 
pressure when participants shirk their responsibilities.  
One common approach is drafting and signing a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) 
among the jurisdictions that spells out their responsibilities and how they will meet them.  In 
some cases, the MOA gives an existing (or created) coordinating organization authority to 
review actions or decisions of the partners.   
The original Four Mile Run coordination, which dates back to the 1970s, illustrates how 
this might work.  After the Army Corps of Engineers installed a levy and flood walls in the lower 
part of Four Mile Run in the 1970s, they required the local jurisdictions to jointly manage future 
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development to prevent additional flooding. The four jurisdictions signed a MOA in which they 
all agreed to give NVRC authority to review major development proposals. NVRC developed a 
computer model for the Four Mile Run watershed and, for the past 30 years, has been reviewing 
developments to ensure that increases in impervious surface will not increase the peak (100-year) 
flow downstream. When they spot potential flooding problems, they recommend alternative 
detention practices.134   
The four jurisdictions comprising the watershed135 recognized that they could not meet 
ACOE requirements through voluntary, independent coordination.  First, individual jurisdictions 
lack a watershed-scale perspective. They would not know whether a development within their 
borders causes flooding problems for their neighbors. This issue was addressed with the 
watershed model. Yet, based on ideas discussed above (i.e. jurisdictions are unlikely to spend 
their own resources on something with landscape-level benefits), it is unlikely the watershed 
model would have been created without NVRC. Second, and more relevant to this section, the 
jurisdictions cannot control each other’s behavior. Each is an independent political entity with its 
own ordinances and permitting processes; plus they are in competition. Under these conditions, it 
is impossible for, say, Alexandria to review Arlington’s development plans and demand changes.  
The solution was to develop a process they all could agree upon (using a model to 
determine water detention requirements) and then give a neutral organization they trust (the 
NVRC) the authority to implement the process. All of this was enshrined in the MOA, and sealed 
with good will and signatures. It is not an iron-clad legal document, but it is much more than 
VIC could provide.  
 
                                                             
134 Information comes from interviewee #10  
135 This is the whole Four Mile Run watershed. The project discussed extensively above, for the Lower Four Mile 
Run, involves only two jurisdictions.  
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Other facilitators of collaboration 
In my data, facilitation by coordinating organizations was most commonly used to achieve 
difficult cases of collaboration. However, other forums may be used such as regulations/law, 
financial incentives, and plans. The analysis of harmonizing examples in Table 7.4 indicates that 
the forum code “facilitation via regulation/law”  and the forum code “facilitation by financial 
incentives” are more common for INTER-organizational than for INTRA-organizational 
coordination. Adding together coordination at the local and state levels, cases of INTER-
jurisdictional harmonizing were facilitated by a regulation/law a total of 9 times, compared to 2 
times for INTRA-jurisdictional coordination. Similarly, cases of INTER-jurisdictional 
harmonizing were facilitated by financial incentives a total of 6 times, compared to 0 times for 
INTRA-jurisdictional coordination. This indicates that regulations and financial incentives serve 
a similar facilitating function under conditions where VIC is difficult to achieve.  
In the following section, I make a few key points about regulations as a facilitating factor 
for collaboration. Although preliminary, this exploration is important because many scholars 
incorrectly assume a strict dichotomy exists between collaboration and regulation. In contrast, I 
find that regulations occur in concert with collaboration, often shaping and complementing the 
collaborative interaction.  
 
Regulation as a facilitator of collaboration 
My data indicate that regulation complements collaboration by facilitating or stimulating 
collaboration to occur. Some regulations “force” the formation of collaborative relationships by 
requiring jurisdictions to implement a joint project or plan. The Total Maximum Daily Load 
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(TMDL) regulations are the most obvious example. TMDL plans are written to address specific 
water quality impairments and must identify and quantify all contributions to impairments, 
regardless of how far upstream they occur. TMDL implementation plans, not required by US-
EPA but standard practice in many States (including Virginia), then implicate upstream 
jurisdictions in the clean-up. If the implementation plan has enforcement mechanisms (which 
unfortunately is not always the case), upstream jurisdictions will be required to alleviate 
impairments they cause outside their own borders. The practical result is that neighboring 
jurisdictions coordinate to meet each other’s TMDL requirements.  
There are more subtle ways that regulatory requirements stimulate collaboration.  For 
instance, a looming regulatory burden may provide impetus for collaboration, as organizations 
try to forestall imminent regulation or prevent it altogether.  The best example from my data is 
the Bay Program’s attempts to address Bay impairments through voluntary measures before the 
2011 deadline that triggered a Bay-wide TMDL. They were ultimately unsuccessful, yet the 
looming “regulatory hammer” kept them pushing forward even under difficult financial 
conditions, as described in the following passage from a 1999 Bay Journal article:  
The Bay Program is in a race to meet a new goal: Clean the Chesapeake by the end of the 
next decade. Unlike past goals, the new one has a potentially harsh backup. If the Bay 
Program doesn’t succeed, the EPA could force far more prescriptive - and potentially 
costly - nutrient reductions, especially from regulated sources such as wastewater 
treatment plants, city stormwater systems and animal feedlots. Those approaches could 
replace the traditional Bay Program approach to nutrient control which has relied largely 
on voluntary measures and cost-sharing grants, with modest regulatory controls…. These 
changes are being driven by four letters: TMDL. That stands for “Total Maximum Daily 
Load,” a program that forces detailed plans to be spelled out and implemented to clean up 
waterways. The EPA has indicated that it will require a TMDL for the Bay if it is not 
cleaned up by 2011. To head that off, the Bay states are likely to agree in their 
“Chesapeake 2000” agreement to finish the job by 2010. “It’s going to provide us with 
the backbone that we need to make the cooperative effort work,” said Bill 
Matuszeski, director of the EPA’s Bay Program Office. “And I think that we’re going to 
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find it relatively straightforward to set a goal in the context of the new Bay Agreement to 
eliminate our nutrient problems by 2010.” (emphasis added) 136 
 
The consternation over a Chesapeake Bay TMDL did, in fact, lead the Bay States to sign an 
ambitious Chesapeake 2000 agreement aiming to make the necessary nutrient and sediment 
reductions by 2010. Although they ultimately missed their target, the decade was marked by 
major steps forward in aggressiveness towards the problem.  
The data included other examples of voluntary programs implemented in an effort to 
forestall or avoid more stringent regulations. They are often developed and championed by soon-
to-be regulated entities and may be of questionable effectiveness. For instance, poultry farmers 
and environmental officials in Delaware signed a Memorandum of Understanding that instituted 
voluntary measures for reducing manure runoff, avoiding (or forestalling) the regulatory 
approach used in neighboring Maryland.137 It is unclear whether these voluntary efforts would be 
successful.  
The motivating effect of a “looming regulatory hammer” is an intriguing concept that 
deserves further attention. Several interviewees confirmed, from their experience, that the threat 
of looming regulations creates significant impetus for collaborative efforts and is, in fact, often 
the driving force.  Two quoted conversations below illustrate this idea. The first comes from a 
leader/teacher at the Virginia Natural Resources Leadership Institute (VNRL), and emerged from 
a conversation about the newly initiated Chesapeake Bay TMDL. 
Rachel:  Do you think it’s possible to facilitate a collaborative process when you have 
this, like you said, a gun to the head in terms of regulation? 
 
Interviewee:  Yeah. That happens all the time, actually. Yeah. I think that happens all the 
time. People rarely do things unless there’s something that’s really strongly driving them 
and a lot of times what’s driving them is the risk of something more draconian 
                                                             
136 Bay Journal, September 1999, “Bay program must clean Chesapeake by 2010— or else” 
137 Bay Journal, March 2001, “Delaware signs voluntary agreement with chicken processors” 
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happening. So I don’t think that’s unusual. I think people have known [the Chesapeake 
Bay TMDL] was going to happen for a long time. 138 
 
The second conversation was with a citizen activist working in Loudoun County. It emerged 
from a more general conversation about how to control rapid land development, and the role of 
voluntary programs verse regulation and legal action: 
Rachel: So you’re saying voluntary processes are not going-- 
 
Interviewee: They are effective up to a certain point, but after that they basically stop 
working. Then if you really feel that greater action is needed, it has to be forced on 
people. It’s unfortunate, but true. 
 
Rachel: [Do you think that voluntary processes won’t] work unless there’s an imminent 
threat of something-- 
 
Interviewee: A big stick of some kind. An outside force of some kind that’s basically 
requiring them to do it.... [Yes], that’s been my experience. You can accomplish a lot 
through a collaborative process, but you also have to have some outside factors that are 
moving that along, otherwise people aren’t going to give up things that involve their own 
personal self-interest. 139 
 
These quotes illustrate some of the interesting and unexpected ways that regulations may 
stimulate collaboration and points to pathways and questions for future research.  An exploration 
of the other forums, such as financial incentives and plans, and their stimulating effect on 
collaboration is also warranted.  
 
Wrap up and preview of the next chapter 
This chapter was an examination of the context in which harmonizing occurs, based on 
secondary codes applied to my data. The most interesting result was the prevalence of 
coordinating organizations as facilitators for INTER-organizational coordination, while INTRA-
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organizational coordination tends to be achieved without a facilitating forum. This finding points 
to the importance of coordinating organizations as facilitators of collaboration under difficult or 
challenging conditions. To explore this idea, I conducted a thematic exploration of the 
coordinating organization role, finding that coordinating organizations are able to overcome 
many obstacles that typically hinder or prevent collaboration.  
Beyond the findings presented, a key contribution of this analysis is demonstrating the 
utility of my hierarchical coding scheme that employs primary, secondary, and tertiary codes.  
Primary codes capture the concepts of most importance to answering my research questions, 
while secondary codes capture contextual information. Coding these together so contextual 
information is physically linked to primary passages sets up a reliable and consistent system for 
analysis. Tertiary codes may be added on as needed to capture related concepts or new ideas 
emergent from the data. A similar process may be applied by other researchers, who could insert 
their preferred codes into the same hierarchical structure.  
In next chapter, I present a thematic analysis for the other four benefits of collaboration 
identified by my literature survey: resource access/exchange, social capital, innovation 
generation, and reduced/resolved conflict. Relevant themes were pulled from the data to illustrate 
the nature of each benefit and the processes/mechanisms of collaboration that generate them.  
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Chapter 8: Thematic Analyses for Resource Exchange, Innovation, Social Capital, and 
Conflict Reduction Benefits 
 
The most interesting results, and my unique contribution to the collaboration literature, came 
from analysis of the coordinated action benefit. In chapters 5, 6, and 7 I identified, described, and 
illustrated a coordinated action process I call harmonizing, explained how collaboration is 
uniquely poised to produce harmonizing benefits, and explored the context in which harmonizing 
occurs. I found that coordinating organizations are important facilitators of harmonizing under 
difficult conditions.  
In this chapter, I summarize results from thematic analyses conducted for the other four 
benefits identified in Chapter 3. For each benefit, I identify and describe key themes related to 
conceptual development of the benefit, how the benefit is manifested empirically, and/or the 
unique processes of collaboration that bring it about. There are two reasons for conducting a 
thematic analysis rather than the structured analysis conducted for harmonizing.  Three of the 
benefits (social capital, innovation, and conflict reduction) yielded a relatively small number of 
empirical cases as shown in Table 5.1 (Chapter 5), limiting my ability for broad-based 
conceptual development.  The resource exchange benefit emerged in a large number of cases; 
however, with a wealth of existing theoretical and conceptual development available in the 
literature, there is less of a conceptual contribution to be made. My contribution is maximized by 
focusing on one benefit (harmonizing) where my data provided many cases to work with, 
existing conceptual development was lacking in the literature, and my analysis yielded 
interesting and innovative results.  
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Overview of thematic analysis results 
Thematic analysis involves sorting and categorizing examples of the benefit using both excel 
spreadsheets and diagrams. Key themes are drawn out and supported by narratives from the data, 
mainly vignettes and quotes. Each analysis is based primarily on passages contained within the 
corresponding primary code; however, some data from tertiary codes is used for clarification and 
elaboration purposes. 
Table 8.1 summarizes the results of my thematic analysis for the four benefits. Themes 
are divided into two types, each described in its own column. First are themes contributing to 
conceptual development of the benefit itself: they describe the benefit and how it is manifested 
empirically.140 Second are themes that identify and describe the processes of collaboration by 
which the benefit is achieved.   
 
  
                                                             
140 Note that there are no such themes under “innovation generation” or “conflict resolution / reduction” because 
these benefits are self-explanatory. Also, my data yielded more interesting results on process. 
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Table 8.1 Summary of results from the thematic analysis  
 Key themes 
Conceptual development of the 
benefit itself 
Processes by which the benefit is 
produced 
Resource 
exchange/ 
access 
• Resource exchange/access 
overcomes resource constraints 
and allows organizations to (1) 
accomplish collective tasks that 
would be impossible alone and 
(2) improve the quality or 
efficiency of collective action.   
• Different organization types bring 
distinct types of value to partnership 
(organizational “niches”) 
Social 
capital: 
relationship 
building 
• Social capital built through 
collaboration leads to institutional 
infrastructure (spin-off groups, 
working relationships) applied to 
solve future problems.  
• Inter-personal relationships 
Innovation 
generation  
• Involving diverse groups in decision-
making. 
• Removing perceived roadblocks by 
involving “naysayers” in decision-
making. 
Conflict 
resolution / 
reduction 
 
• “True listening” 
• Basic civility 
• Inter-personal relationships 
 
 
In the remainder of the chapter, I provide narrative descriptions of the key themes for each 
benefit summarized in Table 8.1, supported by a sampling of passages from my empirical data.  
 
Resource access and exchange 
The following proposition was derived from my theoretical exploration of the “resource access 
and exchange” benefit in Chapter 3: 
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Collaboration leverages financial, technical, human, and informational resources, 
expanding the resource base available to solve collective problems and overcoming 
resource constraints of individual organizations.  
 
This proposition was explored in my empirical data by applying a basic primary code called 
“Resource exchange: Overcoming constraints” to passages where collaboration clearly overcame 
resource constraints and led to some improvement in policy decision-making, implementation, or 
outcomes. Two hundred and forty-three (243) such cases were identified in the data, the largest 
number of any benefit explored. The data indicate that resource exchange, by overcoming 
resource constraints, assists organizations in achieving two related benefits: 1) accomplishing 
collective tasks that would be impossible alone and 2) making collective action more effective or 
efficient. These are illustrated below with empirical examples.    
 
Theme 1: Accomplishing collective tasks that would be impossible alone  
By pooling resources, organizations can achieve policy-related goals that would be impossible, 
or highly unlikely, to accomplish alone. One example brought up by several interviewees is a 
program, run through the NVRC, which pools money from various municipalities and water 
utilities in the NOVA region for radio and television spots on stormwater education. All 
municipalities with MS4 permits141 are required to conduct stormwater education, and it would 
be expensive and duplicative for each to pay for media outreach.  Instead, they pay into a large 
pot of money that the NVRC, with input from the municipalities and utilities, uses for joint 
                                                             
141 MS4 stands for Municipal Separate Storm Sewer Systems. MS4 permits are issued from US-EPA or its State 
affiliate agencies under the Clean Water Act and require urbanized municipalities and Counties to regulate their 
stormwater runoff. There are several specific requirements in an MS4 permit, including public stormwater 
education.  
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messaging; contributions are based on population. Two interviewees praised this program for its 
sensible use of collective regional resources. “[I]t does not make sense for all of us to do these 
things separately” said one employee from the City of Fairfax.142 Another interviewee from 
Arlington County pointed out that the program allows municipalities to “pool our funds and do 
more with a pooled budget versus each of us trying to do our own outreach individually”.143  An 
NVRC employee added that the pooling of funds is collectively more efficient: “we are able to 
get more efficient in that way. That’s one of the very large value added things [of NVRC:] 
working on a regional basis. You are able to get a better scale of economy”. 144  
More relevant to “overcoming constraints” is the fact that some smaller municipalities 
simply would not be able to afford high quality stormwater education (i.e. radio and TV spots) 
without the pooled funds, as illustrated by the following exchange with an interviewee from the 
City of Falls Church: 
Rachel: I would think that’s something that you, as a pretty small city, probably wouldn’t 
be doing on your own.  
 
Interviewee: No question. Our cost for [the stormwater education media program] is 
minimal…somewhere around $2000 a year for our small jurisdiction. Where Fairfax 
County probably puts up $100,000. So you know, for our $2000 that time on the radio is 
just like everybody else’s. So that’s a pretty good deal for us. 145 
 
Land conservation is another area where resource pooling is common and necessary. Frequently, 
it is private land trusts that identify lands for conservation and work with landowners to 
orchestrate purchase of the property or the property’s development rights. Yet these 
organizations, often small nonprofits, have few financial resources to purchase land. Instead, 
they coordinate a variety of potential funding partners, ranging from private nonprofits or 
                                                             
142 Interviewee #7 
143 Interviewee #3 
144 Interviewee #42 
145 Interviewee #21 
225 
 
 
foundations, larger land trusts like the Virginia Outdoors Foundation or Virginia Land 
Conservation Foundation, and state and Federal agencies. This process is uncertain, as illustrated 
by the following quote from a member of the Prince William Conservation Alliance regarding 
the creation of the Merrimac Farm Wildlife Management Area: 
the way the will was written, the property had to be sold at fair market value, so we had 
to go find partners to produce the funding to basically spend $3 million to buy the 
acreage.  It took 7 years, and [a leader of our organization] talked to probably 20 different 
potential funding organizations… it turned out in the end it was the state agencies that 
were willing to partner with the adjacent Marine Corps base Quantico.  And between the 
state agencies and the federal agencies we found the money to purchase the land and 
create a wildlife management area. [Further], [t]he state agency required a lot of patience, 
because it took a long time for the deal to fall into place, and we had to deal with the 
Virginia Land Conservation Foundation, which provided some of the grants, and the 
Department of Game and Inland Fisheries, which provided some of the money, and since 
then, for four years, we’ve been in partnership with the Game and Inland Fisheries, which 
ended up as the land owner. 146 
 
Simple resource provision (organization A provides a resource to organization B) may have a 
similar effect as resource pooling when just the right resource is provided at a critical time. 
Long-term collaborative relationships are important for this type of resource provision. With 
such relationships, organizations are implicitly expanding the potential resource base upon which 
they draw: when an emergency arises, partners step in to provide the necessary resource(s).  For 
instance, a representative of water and wastewater utility in Northern Virginia described how a 
chlorine spill into the aeration basins of his wastewater facility killed all the microorganisms 
needed for treatment. With assistance provided by a neighboring wastewater plant, his plant was 
up and running in a matter of days. The interviewee describes how relationship building before 
the incident developed the available resource base needed to address the emergency: 
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There is a lot of cooperation at the plant level between the jurisdictions around here, 
between the Virginia Water Environment Association, VWEA, and the Virginia 
Association of Municipal Wastewater Authorities, VAMWA, and some of the 
committees that work in the [Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments]. We 
sort of all know each other and see each other on at least a monthly basis. So there is a lot 
of cooperation at that level. To give you an example we had a disaster in May 2008. We 
had a very intense storm that floated an empty chemical tank full of chloride that was 
attached to three full tanks [and] when it floated it ripped the piping off of all of them and 
we dumped all three tanks into… the aeration basins where the microbiology does its 
work. We basically killed everything in about 15 minutes. Other than being flooded that's 
about as bad as it gets in our business. I called up [Person X] at the [Y] County plant that 
is about eight miles to the north of us, said "[Can] you spare some trucks? I'll have an 
operator at the front gate in ten minutes to direct your truck." We were… back in 
compliance and treatment in two days. It would have taken weeks without that kind of 
cooperation from a neighboring plant.147 
 
Organizations may also collaborate in order to acquire the authorities needed to pursue desired 
projects.  “Authority” to do a certain task is not a typical resource like cash, labor, or technical 
assistance; yet without authority, a task is clearly impossible. For instance, local governments in 
Virginia are limited in their ability to spend public money for improvements on private property 
because of a constitutional prohibition against using public tax dollars to benefit individual tax 
payers. This prohibition limits local governments’ ability to implement subsidy programs for 
urban BMPs or pay for stormwater demonstration projects on private land.  Local governments 
get around this issue by providing grant funding to a third party, like a nonprofit or a SWCD, to 
implement such projects. The following quote is from a representative of the Northern Virginia 
SWCD, which often plays this intermediary function for Fairfax County: 
[The County] can do a lot on libraries and schools and right of ways and things, 
but…there’s a lot of things that can happen on church properties, and individual 
properties, and all that. And that’s where we come in. Because we can help make those 
things happen. A church can go after a grant to do a really wonderful stormwater 
demonstration project that is parking lot, and roof, and all around. And then they need 
some technical expertise to help them do it, and that would be us. The County can’t really 
do it. It can’t put its money [on private property]. 148 
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For local governments, working on private land is also difficult because of access issues. Even if 
they manage to install an innovative new stormwater project on private land, access to the project 
afterwards for monitoring and maintenance is not guaranteed unless the landowner grants an 
easement. Because of this difficulty as well as the constitutional limitations, local governments 
tend to use public properties, such as schools, libraries, and government properties for 
stormwater improvements and demonstration projects. However, there is only so much public 
land for these purposes and it may not coincide with the areas in most need of stormwater 
improvements. To expand the reach of their stormwater programs, local governments rely on 
partnerships with third party organizations and private landowners. 
Note that these examples illustrate how an expanded resource base was established 
through relationship-building over time. In times of crisis or emergency, or when it becomes 
clear that a task is impossible without help, organizations are able to call upon their partners. 
Thus, although the resource mechanism in many examples is a simple provision (organization A 
gives to organization B), it occurs in the context of a larger (potential) inter-organizational 
resource base accumulated over time.     
 
Theme 2: Improving collective action 
This theme posits that resource exchange improves collective action by expanding the resource 
base. Unlike the first theme, which is about achieving collective action, this theme focuses on 
making collective action more efficient or effective.  
Good, trusting relationships are one resource that, when available, consistently improves 
collective action. Relationships and connections are valuable commodities that certain 
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organizations “bring to the table” in a collaborative partnership and can be utilized by the 
partnership to increase the chances of policy success.  
For instance, successful implementation of State and Federal agricultural best 
management practices (BMP) programs is heavily dependent on close personal relationships 
between farmers and the local Soil and Water Conservation Districts (SWCDs). Along with 
Federal NRCS District Conservationists, SWCDs are on-the-ground implementers of the State 
and Federal BMP programs described in Chapter 2.149 While financial support comes from the 
central USDA office and the State Agricultural Departments, and US-EPA has some regulatory 
leverage, the Federal and State offices lack interpersonal connections with farmers and are rarely 
trusted. SWCD employees and District Conservationists, on the other hand, live in the same 
communities, attend the same churches, and send their children to the same schools. As one 
SWCD employee put it, “We’re the front line. We know the local community. We know the 
farmers. We know the properties….We are the faces that the farmers will recognize.” 150  
Trust generated through such inter-personal relationships opens farmers up to appeals to 
experiment with innovative practices. Another benefit relates to enforcement. In the case of 
County or municipal government laws, for instance, the SWCD and the County/municipal 
government can “play a good cop/bad cop” routine which is generally just as effective as strict 
enforcement in addressing violations and avoids aggravating already adversarial relationships 
between farmers and government. An exchange with a one SWCD employee explains this 
routine: 
Interviewee: If somebody calls the county and complains about an activity [happening on 
a] farm, the first thing they’ll do is pick up the phone and call us and ask us “Do you 
know what’s [happening] on that property? Do they have a conservation plan? What can 
                                                             
149 USDA NRCS District Conservationists also work closely with farmers. Although they are Federal employees, 
they work in local districts and are often embedded within SWCD offices.  
150 Interviewee #69 
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you tell us about it?” If it’s an agricultural issue, a lot of times they’ll want to back off 
immediately and trust us to work with the farmer. 
 
I think a lot of times we can get things done and we’re a little bit more approachable 
since we’re non regulatory. I think the county might see that as a value, that we’re less 
threatening. They can be the bad guy and we can actually go with them to look at 
something. They can be the bad guy and we can be the good guy. And the result would be 
the same. We would still get BMPs on the ground or address whatever their concern is. 
 
Rachel: Without getting people as upset… 
 
Interviewee: Yeah. Yeah. Exactly. We’re here to help. 151 
 
Land conservation is another policy area where trusting, inter-personal relationships are a crucial 
commodity. The funding to purchase land or development rights comes from a variety of 
sources, including large nonprofits and Federal and State bureaucracies. However, the delicate 
and sensitive task of working with landowners is often taken on by small, locally-based nonprofit 
land trusts that have the close, trusting relationships with landowners necessary to see the 
process through. Large, impersonal agencies or organizations often cannot garner the level of 
trust necessary to maintain these critical relationships under complicated and stressful conditions 
related to family dynamics, money problems, or disagreements regarding the final use of the 
land. One land trust representative described what goes into this relationship development: 
People know that they can come to us, they can discuss their family finances, their long 
time wishes, they can sit down and talk to us about things that are difficult to put into 
tangible means.  Like how their grandchildren feel about the decisions they are making, 
their emotions about what the property meant to them with their parents.  Those are very 
sensitive things that when people are dealing with land, it’s very, very personal.  They 
have to have the confidence in you that you can appreciate their feelings.   
 
Emotions run very high when people part with or impact or in some way restrict the 
future use of their property.  You have to be very sensitive to that and that is one of the 
things that land trusts [do well]. They get to know the family, they can sit on a log in the 
woods and listen to them tell stories.  That is a hard thing for other entities to do.  And yet 
it is a very important part of the process. 152  
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Another resource that improves collective action is the right type of knowledge and expertise. 
Since no one organization has expertise in all areas needed to address the problems or issues they 
face, partnerships are critical. For instance, the Virginia Outdoors Foundation (VOF), a quasi-
State agency that conserves large parcels of land in the state, depends on the State Department of 
Historic Resources whenever they conserve a property with historic homes or other sites.  As 
described by one VOF employee, “I have no expertise on what the gutters should look like [on a 
historic house].” 153 The partnership involves either co-holding the easement or splitting the 
easement so that the Historic Resources Department takes the house and VOF takes the land 
around it.  
My interviewees recognize the need for gathering the right expertise during decision-
making or planning processes. Without participation from experts in all fields relevant to the 
decision at stake, or the plan being created, mistakes are made, issues are overlooked, and 
opportunities are forgone.  One Fairfax County employee, for instance, told me about the process 
of developing energy-efficient building standards for a large redevelopment project for Tyson’s 
Corner. Because his main area of expertise is land use planning, not energy, he gathered people 
from around County government who run and operate buildings and brought them into the 
planning process. The result, he feels, will be a proposal that is “much stronger from a technical 
standpoint” than he and his usual team could develop: 
One of the challenges we have is how do you redevelop a very successful area 
economically into something that is more efficient from an energy standpoint? So I posed 
that question to our energy experts. I’m not an energy person. I’m a land use person, an 
environmental person, a little bit energy but not a whole lot. I’d be dangerous if I tried to 
take this on myself, but hey I’ve got people who run buildings and operate buildings. 
They know how buildings work. They know what’s possible. They know what’s not 
possible. Why don’t I get this group together and figure out what sorts of things we 
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should be asking our developers in Tyson’s to do to redevelop their sites? What’s a 
reasonable list of things to be asking for? We’re just starting that effort. We just had our 
first meeting yesterday on that.  
 
I think that’s going to bear some fruit because we have people who have the day-to-day 
expertise that we lack working on this. We’re educating them on the land use process and 
sort of letting them know well how this process works, where the opportunities lie 
procedurally to pursue some of the ideas. I think in that collaboration we’re all going to 
learn about a lot of what we do, but also I think develop some implementable 
recommendations that…will be much stronger from a technical standpoint than anything 
any of us could have done independently. 154  
  
Theme 3: Organizational “niches” defined by resources 
In most cases, successful resource exchange was achieved via a process I call “discovering 
organizational niches”, i.e. discovering that different types of organizations bring unique and 
distinct types of value to a partnership. In ecological terms, this could be conceptualized as 
organizations occupying unique “niches”, whereby each organization has a unique role to play in 
the achievement of collective goals. Through collaboration, organizations learned about each 
other’s particular strengths. In response, they turn to particular partners to help them achieve 
certain goals, or divide labor so each organization works towards its strengths and avoids its 
weaknesses.   
The broad concept of “organizational niches” came up in almost every interview and 
often without prompting.  Interviewees intuitively knew that different organizations serve unique 
purposes; often they plan their collaborative partnerships to engage the right organizations, with 
the right resources, at the right time. This broad idea was expressed by one interviewee using the 
analogy of a pot luck dinner: 
Like any collaborative project, I think people come to the table and they all have different 
things they can offer.  It is like a pot luck dinner, maybe I like to make cakes and maybe 
you really like to make that bean salad that is so good. I think it is that type of thing.  The 
NGO’s offer a really specific niche whether that is a technical niche or the ability to 
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contact [people] on a grass roots level for information delivery.  Or whether it is a 
[government] agency that focuses on [forestry or bugs or economic development or 
transportation].  I think everybody brings their piece to the table to get it out there. 155 
 
An organizations’ niche is, in large part, defined by the types of resources it is uniquely qualified 
to provide. For instance, my interviewees consistently told me that nonprofit citizen groups are 
uniquely suited to provide a certain suite of critical resources, namely: non-technical and semi-
technical labor, advocacy support, and political support. Other organizations, recognizing the 
value of these resources, seek out partnerships with nonprofit citizen groups that take advantage 
of them.  
In response to hearing this idea expressed many times in my interviews, I created a 
tertiary code called “Organizational Niches” which is filled with general quotes like the one 
above and specific examples of the “niches” occupied or “roles” played by particular types of 
organizations. After data analysis was complete, there were 254 quotations in this code. These 
would have to be reviewed and recoded before doing significant empirical analysis on 
organizational niches, a project for future research. For instance, passages involving different 
types of organizations could be grouped together to examine their “niches” in detail, and to 
explore how these different niches complement each other. Ideally, one would examine the 
larger “ecosystem” of organizations and how the niches fit together to produce positive policy 
outcomes. A query that looks at the correlation between the secondary codes “Resource 
Provider” and “Resource Type” would complement the analysis by providing numerical data on 
which resource provider groups are most often associated with certain resource types.   
In addition to empirical analysis, the concept of “organizational niches” may be applied 
to advance theoretical development of the resource exchange benefit. Resource exchange has 
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traditionally been looked at through lenses of economic exchange theories or theories of power 
and dependency. Examining resource exchange through a theoretical lens that emphasizes 
organizational ecology, particularly the “niche” concept, may yield new insights.   
 
Social Capital: Building relationships and institutional infrastructure 
The literature on social capital, explored in Chapter 3, indicates that relationships and 
institutional infrastructure built through collaboration extend the work of the initial collaborative 
partnership (Innes and Booher 1999; Provan and Milward 2001) and allow partners to tackle 
policy problems separate from and unrelated to the original problem (Imperial 2005). This 
analysis led to the following proposition:   
 
Collaboration generates social capital among diverse organizations, building 
relationships and institutional infrastructure that can be used to address future problems.  
 
The proposition was explored in my empirical data by applying a basic primary code called 
“Building social capital / relationships” to cases where social capital built through collaboration 
clearly led to formation of new relationships or institutions useful to future policy-making.  
Sixty-two (62) such cases were identified.  A thematic analysis of these cases revealed that social 
capital built through collaboration leads to two types of institutional infrastructure— spin-off 
groups and working relationships. Further, the process most central to building institutional 
infrastructure is the development of inter-personal relationships.  These themes are illustrated 
below with empirical data. 
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Theme 1: Development of institutional infrastructure – spin off groups and working 
relationships 
Innes and Booher (1999) describe how “spin off” partnerships often form after the primary 
collaboration process is completed, drawing upon relationships, shared meanings/goals, and 
social capital built during the initial process.  They may continue to carry out the purposes of the 
original partnership or apply their new-found collaborative skills to other problems.  
Examples from my data include spin-off partnerships emerging from the Virginia Natural 
Resources Leadership Institute (VNRLI). The VNRLI runs leadership certificate and training 
programs emphasizing the importance of productive dialogue and consensus-building to solving 
Virginia’s natural resources challenges (VNRLI 2012a). Although it is a training experience for 
participants rather than a collaborative process “in the wild”, participants model collaborative 
problems solving and conflict resolution as part of their training (VNRLI 2012b). A 
leader/teacher in the VNRLI program described two spin-off partnerships between organizations 
with diverse, conflicting interests which would not have been possible without the relationships 
built during VNRLI programming: 
We’ve been told [that] the people who’ve gone to our program [are] reaching across 
boundaries to people that they wouldn’t have done otherwise. I can give you two very 
quick examples. One - in April we were in the coal mine country in Virginia, in 
Southwest Virginia and someone from the Nature Conservancy had gone through our 
program and right after that he began a forum for science for the Clinch River. He now 
has an ongoing representative group that includes people from the coal industry and the 
people from the regulatory agency. Both of those, too, by the way, with a lot of suspicion 
and conflict between themselves and so that’s something that would not have happened 
had this program not happened. 156 
 
The second example was a coalition of environmental and agricultural organizations called 
Waste Forum and Waste Solutions focused on problems of agricultural runoff. According to the 
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interviewee, this group— which also developed out of relationships formed among VNRLI 
participants— includes a wide variety of agricultural interests and some powerful environmental 
groups.  
Enduring working relationships developed through collaboration were a more common 
occurrence than formal spin-off groups. Some relationships were utilized at a later point to 
improve policy decision-making or implementation, while others have potential to do so. One 
example derives from my interview with two employees of the Interstate Commission on the 
Potomac River Basin (ICPRB).  ICPRB had mediated a “shared visioning” process among 
groups using the Savage Reservoir for diverse (and often conflicting) recreational activities such 
as trout fishing, canoeing, kayaking, and whitewater rafting. Relationships developed during this 
process were critically important when the gates used to release water into the Savage Reservoir 
needed to be replaced. To do so, the reservoir had to be drawn down twice, once for planning 
purposes and a second time for the gates’ replacement. The network of user groups previously 
pulled together for shared visioning became an essential “outreach mechanism” for ICPRB to 
inform users what was happening, squelch rumors, and gather input when needed: 
Interviewee 29a:  We were able to utilize the group that had been pulled together and was 
working together… as the outreach mechanism that was utilized to…keep everybody 
informed about what had to be done with these gates on the reservoir outlets. And it was 
a godsend, very honestly, that we had that group pulled together because it really made 
communication smooth and easy. It made it easier to let people know what was going on. 
We knew who to talk with and they knew who to talk with if they had questions, if 
rumors developed or anything along those lines. So it did make that process go a whole 
lot easier for us as a facilitator [as well as] for the State of Maryland, for the folks at the 
Upper Potomac River Commission, [and] for the Corps of Engineers who were involved 
in the thing. Everybody was able to understand and communicate better and it went, in 
my mind, very smoothly. Thanks to the fact that we had this group pulled together. 
Thanks for the fact that we were already communicating,...I think it made things a whole 
lot smoother. 157 
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The ICPRB example illustrates the idea, prevalent in the literature, that working relationships 
developed through collaboration can be used to tackle policy problems separate from and 
unrelated to the original problem (Imperial 2005; Connick and Innes 2003). It is not predictable 
how these working relationships will be useful in the future. 
When working relationships occur over a long period of time, an enduring institutional 
infrastructure for collaboration is created which facilitates future collaborations.158  For instance, 
several interviewees told me that the State of Virginia was expected to use Planning District 
Commissions as the organizational forum for development of Virginia’s Chesapeake Bay TMDL 
plan. Planning District Commissions like the Northern Virginia Regional Commission (NVRC) 
are regional organizations chartered under State law to conduct inter-jurisdictional planning and 
programming. Most have been actively coordinating policy in their regions for decades. As 
described by one State employee, they have developed working relationships and institutional 
infrastructure for collaboration that the State regional offices do not have: 
each PDC is made up of certain jurisdictions so you've got that regional effort there and 
they're already used to working together. So instead of creating a new entity that can 
work with multiple jurisdictions…Take NVRC for instance- they are already working 
with Loudon, Prince William, Fairfax, Arlington, and the cities thereof. So they already 
have a relationship built with those local governments, so they don't have to create a new 
relationship….I think the model is a good model because they do have the relationships 
built. And I think it's worth us putting some money to the PDCs to have them do it 
because, frankly, here in our regional office we don't have the infrastructure. 159 
 
Theme 2: Enduring institutional infrastructure is built through inter-personal 
relationships  
 
                                                             
158 Building institutional infrastructure is not unique to collaboration. For instance, when regulatory enforcement is 
conducted over a long period of time, routines and relationships are solidified that facilitate and improve future 
regulatory enforcement. However, I felt it was important to mention because collaboration can be particularly 
difficult when there is little institutional infrastructure available to work from. 
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My data indicate that social capital, and the enduring institutional infrastructure that goes along 
with it, is built through inter-personal relationships.160  Several interviewees emphasized how 
good inter-personal relationships allow them to work effectively with partners. The line between 
personal and professional relationships is often quite thin, as expressed by a State employee who 
has worked closely with local Soil and Water Conservation Districts (SWCDs) for almost three 
decades:  
I’ve been here 27 years, so the relationships I’ve built with these [SWCDs] is beyond 
what we can expect the State to have with them….After a period of time, it moves from a 
purely professional relationship to somewhat a personal and professional relationship. 
And that’s just a matter of time, and it’s a matter of trust. You don’t let people down over 
a period of years, they grow accustomed to knowing that, or comfortable with that you'll 
give them good advice, that kind of thing. That comes with the person. I mean, that’s part 
of who you are as a person.161 
 
A common and illustrative relationship, discussed above, is between SWCDs and farmers. 
SWCD employees work extensively with farmers on installation and maintenance of best 
management practices (BMPs) and have, over time, developed close and trusting relationships. 
The Federal and State offices that fund and enforce BMP programs, on the other hand, lack the 
interpersonal connections needed to implement them. In the following quote, a District 
Conservationist in Northern Virginia compares his ability to work with farmers in the region to 
that of US-EPA:  
The one thing that we do bring to the table is good relations and good contacts within the 
community. I know who the farmers are that are creating the problem, and I can talk to 
them. I may not convince them that they need to change, but there are a lot of agencies 
that don’t know where to start. If you take EPA and bring them into Loudoun County, 
what are they going to do? They don’t know anybody. They don’t have any local people 
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to explore this phenomenon in my data. 
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here, and if they put somebody here, it’ll be a learning curve of many years before they 
could develop the contacts that the Conservation District has.162 
 
The same sentiment was expressed from the “other side” by a Virginia Farm Bureau 
representative and former farmer. Like the District Conservationist, he compared the positive, 
productive relationship farmers have with the SWCDs to the lack of trust they feel towards US-
EPA. Again, much of the difference is inter-personal: 
Rachel: Could you tell me a little more about…the relationship with the County Soil and 
Water Conservation Districts, it sounds like that's a pretty positive and constructive 
relationship. 
 
Interviewee: It is….Generally it is because they're local, because we know those folks. 
We know where they live, we see them at church or community functions. We know 
those people. On a local level I think it is easier to develop those relationships versus 
somebody that comes in from the state or the federal government you have no 
relationship with, you don't know what kind of person they are, that kind of stuff… There 
is no trust with EPA because we don't know what it is they're looking for or what they're 
going to do.163 
 
In building enduring working relationships, common courtesies – such as going to meet someone 
in person on their own “turf” and making “small talk” with people whom you might have cause 
to work with in the future – are critical. Experienced and successful policy entrepreneurs both 
inside and outside government assured me that these common courtesies are not a minor factor. 
For instance, a high level administrator at the Virginia Department of Conservation and 
Recreation stressed the importance of the “human element” and assured me that “what you 
learned in kindergarten is what you need to learn when you're a professional”164. A regional 
office employee of DCR told me that he always makes an effort to meet potential collaborators 
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“on their turf, so they’re comfortable”. 165 An environmental activist in Fairfax County was 
surprised by the reluctance of some members of the environmental community to make “small 
talk” with an elected official, considering they might need her help in the future.  She told the 
following story:  
I went to a meeting with the supervisor [of a Northern Virginia town], who is a lovely 
woman.  I was there with five or six other people in the environmental community.  They 
sat in their chairs and made no attempt to talk to staff or to be friendly.  I thought, here’s 
a perfect opportunity, but I couldn’t say anything.  There’s the Chief of Staff right there, 
and I went up and talked to her.  I introduced her to a few people, but they didn’t know 
what to do and so they sat down.  I thought, you could have asked her how her kids were 
doing, or anything.  Because when you call back, half the time you aren’t going to get to 
talk to [the Supervisor] but you could talk to [the Chief of Staff].  These simple little 
personal things that I think…. that have nothing to do with the issue and everything to do 
with the potential to work with people and get it done.  If I were to say one thing-- and I 
don’t know that this is necessarily unique to the environmental community, I would 
imagine it’s true for a lot of communities – [it’s] that people don’t recognize the value of 
human relationships. 166  
 
Developing good inter-personal relationships is important not just for the effectiveness of one’s 
current work; it also establishes a base for future collaborations. If your collaborators have had a 
positive experience, they will be willing to work with you again; if not, they will avoid you in the 
future. One interviewee talked about how her organization is always careful to give credit to their 
partners whenever there is a success because “if their feelings get hurt, they are not going to be 
back." 167  Another interviewee (an environmental consultant) suggested that good interpersonal 
relationships with the environmental permitting agencies, developed by working with them over 
a long period of time, makes it easier for her to get assistance with permit processes now and in 
the future.168 
                                                             
165 Interviewee #2 – First interview. I did two separate interviews with this interviewee. He also provided some 
written responses to questions.  
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Innovation Generation  
The following proposition was derived from my theoretical exploration of the “innovation” 
benefit in Chapter 3: 
 
Collaboration generates policy innovations as diverse organizations share and jointly 
process their varied experiences, ideas, and information, often through intense dialogue 
and negotiation. 
 
This proposition was explored in my empirical data by applying a primary code called 
“Innovation Generation” to cases where an innovative idea or practice clearly emerged from a 
collaborative relationship. Twenty eight (28) cases were identified in the data.169 My empirical 
analysis and thematic discussion below focus on processes/mechanisms by which collaboration 
leads to innovation.170 
  
Theme 1: Innovation is generated by involving diverse groups in decision making 
A consistent finding across collaboration literatures is that collaboration among organizations 
with diverse perspectives, knowledge, and experience leads to innovation. Diverse groups bring 
                                                             
169 Considering the prevalence of the innovation benefit in the literature, this was surprisingly few examples. Data 
limitations offer at least a partial explanation. For a passage to qualify, it must be clear from the text that 
collaboration led to or significantly contributed to the development of the innovation. Bay Journal data rarely makes 
this connection explicit, even when innovations are discussed. Even interviewees are not always sure how an 
innovation arose: Whose idea was it? Was it a new idea or an old idea that just gained traction that day? Possibly the 
way to best capture innovation generation via collaboration is to be present as they occur (direct observation), which 
was not an efficient way for me to collect the numerous “snapshots” of collaboration required for my analysis. 
170 Unlike social capital or coordinated action, innovation benefits themselves are pretty self-explanatory. It is 
usually possible to “know innovation when you see it”. Thus, I focus here on the processes of innovation generation 
rather than defining or  
describing the benefit itself. 
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diverse ideas to the table for debate and discussion. Diversity also means there are always 
participants willing to challenge others’ assumptions (Innes and Booher 1999). As described by 
an environmental planner in the Northern Virginia region, getting people with different types of 
expertise together can lead to “aha moments”: 
I think we’ve had those “aha” moments in our Watershed Committee meeting … 
certainly we all benefit from the different areas of expertise. When a civil engineer sits 
down a natural resource manager and sits down with a HOA president, diversity 
definitely leads to those types of situations where we all recognize the value, or where we 
all come to look at things in a different light. 171 
 
My data indicate that collaboration among groups representing a mix of policy sectors leads to 
“aha” moments, opening the door to creative joint programming. One interesting example 
occurred in Four Mile Run, a multi-jurisdictional restoration project coordinated by the Northern 
Virginia Regional Commission (NVRC) that aims to rehabilitate a heavily altered urban stream 
and its riparian zone.  This project is primarily focused on flood control, stormwater, and water 
quality; however, the NVRC and jurisdictional partners have been attuned to other concerns such 
as recreation and aesthetics. This open-mindedness took a truly innovative turn when one 
participant suggested the group apply for a National Endowment for the Arts grant to include 
public art in some areas of the restored watershed.172 They were awarded the grant and now the 
project is the only stream restoration I have heard of that aims to improve the attractiveness of 
public space by adding artistic visual elements.   
An organization called Arlingtonians for a Clean Environment (ACE) reaped a 
significant innovation dividend by mixing policy sectors. ACE is an independent 501(c)(3) 
environmental nonprofit closely associated with and partially funded by the Arlington County 
government. One of their unique cross-sector partnerships is with the nonprofit organization 
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Rebuilt Warehouse, which employs recently released prisoners to do environmental 
sustainability work for a living wage. Until discussions started with ACE, their main service was 
removing items from homes under renovation that could be reusable or resalable, and reselling 
them at a warehouse. With limited demand for this work, the director of Rebuilt Warehouse was 
looking for more options. ACE, meanwhile, has a popular program called the Green Living 
Challenge in which Arlington neighborhoods compete to be the most “green” through home and 
property BMPs such as installing rain barrels and rain gardens, switching to energy efficient 
appliances, and caulking windows to conserve energy. When the Director of Rebuilt Warehouse, 
a regular presenter at ACE’s annual Green Living Expo, approached ACE, they came up with an 
innovative partnership idea: Rebuilt Warehouse could be “contracted” by these neighborhoods to 
install Green Living BMPs. This would satisfy the neighborhoods’ desire to be environmentally 
friendly and provide appropriate labor and job training for Rebuilts’ formally incarcerated 
laborers.173 
Another cross-sectoral partnership was developed between ACE and a nonprofit 
organization called Arlingtonians Meeting Emergency Needs (AMEN) which provides 
emergency funding for people who can’t afford their utility bills. AMEN realized that a lot of 
these emergency funds (i.e. tax dollars) are going to units that are not energy efficient. A Board 
member of AMEN approached ACE about this energy efficiency problem and the two groups 
had been meeting for about four months, talking about common ground and opportunities to 
collaborate. Around this time, Federal block grant housing money became available through the 
Arlington County housing department, and energy efficiency was one of the grant goals. The two 
organizations applied for, and won, a grant for a pilot project which would train volunteers to 
help low income people weatherize their apartments and reduce their energy bills. This project 
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had just started at the time of my interview, and the member of ACE I spoke with was excited 
about the opportunity to approach energy efficiency problems from a unique point of view, as 
well as the educational opportunities of getting new groups of people (low income people and 
property managers) interested in energy efficiency. 
Other than the fact that cross-sectoral partnerships led to innovation, there are two points 
to pull out from this pair of stories. First is the connection between social capital/relationships 
and innovation generation. The partnership with Rebuilt Warehouse came about because Rebuilt 
had a booth at ACE’s Green Living Expo. Casual conversations between “booth sitters” 
eventually led to brainstorming and this idea for innovative joint programming. In the second 
case, an AMEN board member with a special interest in energy efficiency approached ACE and 
began casual conversations about common interests over a period of four months, priming the 
organizations to be on the “lookout” for innovative joint programming opportunities.   
A second point is the connection to harmonizing. In both cases, problems of energy 
efficiency are brought outside of the exclusive realm of environmental policy and useful 
connections to job training (in the case of Rebuilt Warehouse) and low income housing (in the 
case of AMEN) are made. This more comprehensive view of the problem leads to innovative 
solutions that would not otherwise be possible, or even conceivable. In fact, ACE’s efforts are 
forcing County departments to coordinate where they would not have otherwise, leading to 
innovations that benefit the County as a whole.  
 
Theme 2: Removing perceived roadblocks by involving “naysayers” in decision-making 
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Collaboration can lead to innovation generation by directly addressing all of the reasons why, 
according to skeptics, innovation is “impossible” or “could never happen”. This point arose 
multiple times in my data and is a unique contribution of my empirical analysis.  
I interviewed the director of a non-profit watershed partnership who was instrumental in 
organizing a roundtable negotiation process among environmentalists and developers. This 
process aimed to change local government codes and ordinances to deal more effectively with 
stormwater. He described this idea of “removing perceived roadblocks” eloquently:  
You know, everybody had been [talking about this problem whereby] people would go to 
[stormwater or low impact development] workshops in these counties and everybody 
would come back saying yes, that’s a great idea, we should do some of that stuff, storm 
water or whatever.  And I liken it to this process where they’re driving home from the 
conference and they’re energized when they get in the car and by the time they get out of 
the car and back to work, they’ve identified a list of ten things that would get in their 
way.  Oh gee, the fire department would never let us do that on the cul-de-sacs and the 
health department would never, and VDOT would never let us do this.  
 
So the idea with this consensus process was to make a list of all of those people that we 
would say would never let us do that in the three counties and then get them all in a room 
together….  And we got them together over the course of a year and said hey, we want to 
craft some model development principles that we can all sign onto and at the end of this 
exercise, this is a consensus process and we want you to be able to sign your name to 
it…. 
 
But we had those people there…the transportation department and the fire people and the 
health department and all those people who supposedly would never let things happen.  
And then we had a pretty actually –  we had some really spirited dialogue, broke out into 
different kinds of – I think we had one working group on streets and parking lots and 
another on, I forget how we broke it out, but we had the Builders Association, all the key 
stakeholders. And in the end, we made some real progress. 174  
 
In this case, a well-designed and executed collaborative process was able to accomplish what 
years of “business as usual” was unable to. A set of proposed ordinance changes for several 
municipalities in the region were brought before County and City legislatures with the consensus 
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agreement of a variety of interests, including developers, environmentalists, and local and state 
government departments that had previously been thought of as “obstacles” to change. 
Note that no truly new ideas were generated by this collaborative process. There may 
have been small process innovations, but the main contribution was not to generate some new-
fangled solution but to systematically knock down obstacles that participants perceived to be 
keeping them from adopting innovations. This process of knocking down obstacles is critical in 
public policy, where government actors are reluctant to adopt new ideas that might fail or get 
stymied by other agencies’ standard operating procedures.  Another interviewee identified this 
problem and described how her organization, the Northern Virginia SWCD, helped Fairfax 
County overcome its reluctance towards a road project with significant stormwater innovations. 
There are many parallels to the roundtable example described above: 
Interviewee: I think it took years and years to gently encourage the County to try to put 
some really creative stormwater controls in on a road project. We were told it would 
never happen, that the state DOT would never go along with it. We kept hearing all the 
roadblocks, but we solved it.  
 
Rachel: So how did you do that? 
 
Interviewee: We found out what the problems were. VDOT said: “We don’t want to have 
to maintain something that we don’t know how to do it. We don’t want anything new. 
And what if it fails? What’s the plan B?” So we solved the first problem about 
maintenance by bringing in a research group that was willing to maintain it for five years 
while they developed good maintenance specifications. And it was a group, it was 
actually the Research Transportation Council that is funded by VDOT, so they trusted 
them.  And the County was getting a lot of pressure… the County was going to pay for 
the road project in order to get these things incorporated into the design. The problem 
was, once it was done, we wanted to VDOT to accept it. So it was important to address 
any of VDOTs concerns so they would ultimately accept it. 
 
Then we had to convince the County to do a design, and they said VDOT will never 
accept, so we brought in the head engineer from Richmond who said: “Yes, it is fine. 
You can take care of the maintenance problems.” We waited almost five years to find sort 
of the perfect road. It was across from a parkland so people were feeling that if anything 
didn’t work there was going to be land to go out and put something else on if they had 
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to…..So we kind of found out what the problems were, what they were upset about, and 
[fixed it]. 175 
 
Note that a persistent, smart, and trusted coordinating organization is critical to the process of 
“knocking down perceived obstacles”. There must be significant and sustained communication 
between the actors who do not trust each other to follow through on the innovation; a good 
coordinating organization maintains communication and verifies that all actors are willing to 
adjust their standard procedures to allow the innovation to move forward.  
 
Reduced / resolved conflict 
The following proposition was derived from my theoretical exploration of the benefit 
“reduced/resolved conflict”: 
 
Through interactive dialogue among organizations, collaboration breaks policy impasses 
and reduces the use of adversarial practices among parties in conflict.    
 
This proposition was explored in the empirical data by applying a primary code called “Conflict 
reduction/resolution” to cases where conflict was clearly reduced or resolved, policy impasses 
were broken, or adversarial practices were avoided due to a collaborative relationship. Twenty-
four (24) cases were found in the data.176 My analysis and the thematic discussion below focus 
                                                             
175 Interviewee #62 
176 This relatively low number of cases was surprising considering the emphasis in the literature on the conflict 
resolution powers of interactive dialogue. There are at least two data-related reasons why I may not have found 
many examples. First, Bay Journal data is not well-suited to identifying conflict resolution benefits; as a news 
source, it emphasizes events such as the passage of new laws/regulations, development of plans, or issuance of 
reports. It is less likely to explore the dynamics and effects of interactive dialogue. Second, I did not specifically 
select cases of conflict resolution. Scholars focused on conflict resolution tend to interview multiple participants 
involved in a small number of collaborative processes where conflict resolution occurred or was expected to occur. 
In this way, they glean detailed data about how collaboration changes participants’ interrelationships over time. My 
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on processes / mechanisms by which collaboration helps to reduce or resolve conflict, since these 
were the most compelling themes to emerge from the data.177 
Themes emergent from my empirical data reinforce the idea, prominent in the literature, 
that collaboration reduces conflict levels by repeated, positive, and civil interactions that reduce 
the likelihood of opportunistic behavior and foster respect and consideration (e.g. Gray 1989, 
Innes and Booher 1999). In particular, my data highlight the importance of the following aspects 
in reducing conflict: 1) the collaborative process as a venue for truly listening to the “other”, 2) 
civility and civil interactions, and 3) developing inter-personal relationships.178  
 
Theme 1: The importance of truly listening to the “other” 
One emergent theme was that progress could be made if coordinating participants with different 
views truly listened to each other. Interviewees stressed the importance of understanding 
perspectives, needs, and constraints of others, and feeling that others understood one’s own.  
With a better understanding of the “other”, participants are poised for joint problem-solving.  
This sentiment was expressed by a representative of the Virginia Natural Resources 
Leadership Institute (VNRL), which runs leadership training programs emphasizing productive 
dialogue and consensus-building as a means to solve Virginia’s natural resources challenges 
(VNRLI 2012a). I asked which skills learned by program participants are most useful to guide 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
approach, on the other hand, was to select a variety of “snapshots” of collaborative relationships that may or may not 
have involved conflict resolution. 
177 The benefit of reduced conflict by itself is pretty self-explanatory. Thus, I focus here on the processes of conflict 
reduction rather than defining or describing the benefit itself.  
178 The themes discussed here are not new. Similar ideas and findings are common in literatures on conflict 
resolution, alternative dispute resolution, and negotiation and in works by public management scholars who draw 
upon these literatures (see, for instance: e.g. O’Leary and Bingham 2003, Gray 1989, Susskind and Cruikshank 
1987, and Bingham and O’Leary 2006. What I add are empirical examples of these themes pulled from a rich data 
set. Further, because of my broad definition of collaboration, my data include a wider variety of collaborative 
arrangements that go beyond narrower definitions posed by conflict resolution scholars.  
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them in future collaborative work. Of the three skills he mentioned, one related to “truly 
listening”:  
I think the other skill is the ability to meet with other people and hear and understand 
what their goals are, what their interests are without engendering more conflict, without 
getting upset, being able to do that in a way that you’re actually able to hear and listen 
and understand and sometimes build actually a trusting relationship with people.179 
 
A collaborative process that seemed to engender true listening among organizations with 
divergent interests was “Builders for the Bay”. This program, developed by the Alliance for the 
Chesapeake Bay, brings together local government officials from various departments— along 
with developers, environmentalists, and other interests— for roundtable discussions on 
municipal or county stormwater ordinances.  Although the program is led by an environmental 
organization, the National Association of Homebuilders and its local affiliates are actively 
involved. In the following quote from a May 2005 Bay Journal article, an employee of the 
Alliance discussed how Builders for the Bay achieves greater understanding among 
environmental and development interests: 
Everyone shares their perceptions about Better Site Design principles, and we really talk 
through what’s real and what’s perceived,” said Devlin. “It works because we talk in a 
neutral environment, without defending a particular site or place. They also appreciate 
having third-party facilitation because of interests and agendas at the local level 
(emphasis added). 180 
 
The listening that occurred in these interactive dialogues led, in some cases, to consensus 
agreement on code and ordinance changes. The May 2005 Bay Journal article quoted above 
references a similar process that took place in the Rappahannock watershed in 2001, which 
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180 Bay Journal, May 2005, “Builders group has designs on developing consensus for the Bay” 
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successfully incorporated low impact development (LID) ordinances into city and County codes. 
Harvey Gold, of the Fredericksburg Home Builders Association, describes how surprised the 
County officials were to see environmentalists and builders arriving together to support the same 
ordinance: 
“We worked hard to develop a workable, meaningful ordinance. Then we marched 
together to the public hearing. One of the county people running the hearing commented 
that they had never seen an environmental group and builders organization so supportive 
of each other,” Gold said.181  
 
Effects of “truly listening” also occur through everyday collaboration. One example from my 
interviews was the high level of respect created between two Loudoun County employees with 
very different missions and perspectives. The first interviewee supports commercial developers 
in her work for the Department of Economic Development, while the second reviews new 
developments for environmental compliance. The development-focused interviewee 
recommended I interview the environment-focused interviewee, praising him for his willingness 
to truly listen to and understand the perspective and constraints of developers in the County: 
he’s on a lot of these different groups that participate in representing the environmental 
view on behalf of the county… but he also is making a lot of crossovers to really spend 
time with economic development to try to understand our points of views. And talk to 
developers and that kind of stuff so he’s pretty forward thinking….he participates with 
our groups, comes and listens because he really wants to understand commercial 
development and then try to figure out how to best make the environmental regulations 
work.182  
 
Taking her advice, I interviewed the environment-focused interviewee and asked about his work 
“bridging” the needs of the environmental community with developers:  
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182 Interviewee #56 
250 
 
 
Rachel:  Okay.  The reason I contacted you is that [interviewee 1] told me that you were 
making a really considerable effort to bridge the needs of the environment with 
developers.  She seems to think that you were really trying to understand the developers’ 
point of view.  I was wondering how do you do that?   
 
Interviewee 2: I think that there is always a potential to have an adversarial relationship 
when you’re talking about land developers.  You’re always working at your own risk if 
you really don’t try to understand what developers are trying to do.  First of all, if you 
don’t get where they’re coming from, you’re not going to be able to talk constructively 
with them when land development applications come in.  Second of all, there’s always 
the opportunity there might be common ground.  There might be a business interest in 
pursuing certain environmental issues. 183 
 
Interviewee 2 engages with developers not out of some squishy desire to get along or be well-
liked, but because of the constructive, positive accomplishments that can be achieved by the 
simple act of trying to “understand what developers are trying to do”. In fact, his efforts at “truly 
listening” generated an innovative solution to a business problem. This part of Northern Virginia 
has many resource intensive data centers whose overheated servers require massive amounts 
water for cooling. By working together, commercial businesses and the County environmental 
team agreed that businesses will be preferentially sited so they can use reclaimed water directly 
from the local sewage treatment plant rather than draw fresh groundwater or surface water from 
the Potomac River. This solution emerged because of this employee’s sustained efforts to 
develop common ground between environmental and business interests in the County.  
 
 Theme 2: The importance of civility and civil dialogue 
Scholars have found that repeated, positive, and civil interactions reduce the likelihood of 
opportunistic behavior, fostering respect and consideration and reducing conflict levels (e.g. 
Gray 1989, Innes and Booher 1999). Conversely, a lack of civility limits opportunities to achieve 
common goals. My data bear out these ideas. For instance, two different interviewees discussed 
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how the incivility of some environmental organizations stymies their chances of finding common 
ground with local government departments or development interests. One interviewee says of an 
environmental group in her County: 
their leader [Person X] is very extreme in her views. And she's very active politically and 
not in the ways I find to be constructive. She… tells the [Government Department X] and 
tells the County Board of Supervisors that they are horrible all the time and that 
everything they do is bad.  And while in many aspects I agree with her, that's not going to 
get us anywhere. That's not going to move us forward. So while I hate some of the things 
that the Executive Director of the [Government Department X] does, at the end of the day 
I shake his hand and I work with him because that is the only way we are ever going to 
accomplish anything.  That's my view. "You're evil because you collaborated with them." 
"They're evil, you collaborate with them; therefore you are evil." I don't see that as 
getting us anywhere.184 
 
The interviewee’s environmental organization takes a much more conciliatory approach not just 
with County government, but with developers: “you have to work with the developer. If you 
don't, that's where all of the land was going to. You're not getting anywhere if you don't work 
with them.”185 This milder approach has been helpful for her organization. For instance, they 
received millions of dollars in funding from the County for projects, money that would likely 
have gone to the confrontational environmental organization if bridges had not been burnt: 
in the end I think that's where this [dollar amount] came from you know? [Person Y] is 
up for election and can't go back to the [Confrontational Environmental Organization] 
base because he lost credibility with them four years ago. He looked around for a group 
of people that he could gain credibility through, a little bit of environmental credibility, 
and we are easy. We were easy on the eyes. 186 
 
It is hard to say whether the civil approach is better than the confrontational approach for 
achieving environmental advocacy goals; both have a place. Yet, the civil approach has 
advantages in terms of developing long-term working relationships on policy issues. 
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Civil dialogue, like “truly listening”, can help groups who previously thought of each 
other as enemies to pursue common goals. My empirical data indicate that once groups with 
diverse interests get together for a serious, civil dialogue, they find areas of agreement. 
Sometimes they find that the “other side” can be a partner. In one Northern Virginia County, for 
instance, the urban forestry community expected a fight when sitting down to work with 
developers on writing a tree preservation ordinance but instead found willing partners: 
at least in the urban forest community, the developers were always looked at as the bad 
guy. I've always felt they you need to sit down and talk with the people that you think are 
your enemies to figure out, do we have common ground? I think it was an eye-opening 
experience not so much for the developers as for the urban forestry people. That, "Wait a 
minute, these guys are perfectly willing. Oh, ok. It's all about time and money." Once that 
hurdle was cleared and they figured out, I could have told them a long time that the best 
way to get that ordinance passed was to have the developers involved in writing it. That's 
just basic political sense. 187 
 
In this case, urban forestry advocates had mistaken past resistance by developers as a stance 
against tree preservation. In reality, developers were interested in tree preservation and willing to 
cooperate, as long as they could have some control over how these goals were accomplished. 
Another interviewee relayed a similar experience with a workshop on stormwater, in which 
participants normally “at each other’s throats” found major areas of agreement:  
We had a seminar where we had a third of the people from County government, a third 
were developers, and a third were citizen activists. And the subject was stormwater. And 
they were all together and we engineered it so that when there were little break out 
groups to solve problems, there was an equal mix in each group. Of course, these are 
people who are usually at each other’s throats….what we found out was that everyone 
was pretty much in agreement about stuff. They really were. They didn’t disagree that 
much at all. They agreed more innovative things had to happen to control stormwater, to 
prevent some of the problems. So the “what” was not the problem, it was the “how do 
you get there” that was the problem. 188 
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Once again, in a civil environment it was surprisingly easy for diverse interests to agree on broad 
goals. Although this may not be a policy accomplishment in itself, it has policy consequences. 
By transforming the interaction from an argument over values into a problem-solving dialogue 
(i.e. a discussion of means), participants may become more relaxed, open, and accepting of new 
information – all of which are critical to innovative breakthroughs.  
 
Theme 3: The importance of inter-personal relationships to conflict resolution  
Inter-personal relationships are another mechanism through which conflict gets resolved. Some 
relationships developed via collaboration were discussed in the section on social capital; here I 
focus on examples where good inter-personal relationships are closely connected to resolving 
conflicts. Although inter-personal relationships do not erase real differences in values and goals, 
they smooth the path towards conflict reduction. As one interviewee said, "people play better in 
the sandbox if they like each other a little more.” 189  
In one case, development of inter-personal relationships eased conflicts among board 
members of a recreational nonprofit organization.190 Board members represent different 
recreational preferences (described in the quote as “factions”) that are often in conflict. For 
instance, passive recreators like bird watchers and hikers have different values than active 
recreators like horseback riders and bikers. The interviewee, a member of this group, describes 
this conflict and how it was resolved among the board: 
Interviewee: some of our Board members had zero trust of each other when we first 
started meeting. And there were all kinds of things that we added into our Articles of 
Incorporation to ensure that no one faction would take over ….I think that has all but 
disappeared. We've worked together long enough, we know we can trust each other.  
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190 Technically, this is not an example of collaboration according to my definition because the coordination is 
occurring within a single organization. However, because the quote is good and the idea is transferable to inter-
organizational coordination, I include it here as an illustration.   
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Rachel: Do you think it was just the process of sitting down to talk to each other and 
work together that made everybody more comfortable working together? 
 
Interviewee: I do, I think it's been working side by side for as many as 5 years now 
together. There are people that just absolutely cannot stand the idea of horses on trails. 
They think they destroy them. They think they are horrible. ..The same goes for the 
mountain bikers…. And then of course people who are avid mountain bikers or avid 
horse people and advocate for trails because they want to go out on their bikes or on their 
horses then feel just as strongly about the conservation people that they don't really want 
public access they want to just protect the land and seal it off from everybody…. 
[However, Board member 1], who hates horses, now tolerates them because he 
knows that the horse people come drive all the way out east and show up at his 
workdays and work in his park that he cares about. (emphasis added) 191 
 
Board members adjusted their prejudices about each other, and gained trust, by repeated positive 
exposures to each other and by simple acts of kindness such as showing up at each other’s 
workdays. Development of inter-personal relationships seems to have softened them up to be 
more receptive and more understanding of each other’s needs and perspectives, a key 
prerequisite to conflict reduction.   
A second example describes consequences of a failure to sufficiently develop inter-
personal relationships in advance of a difficult issue. In Loudoun County, there was a proposed 
Chesapeake Bay Ordinance that turned into a political football, dividing environmentalists, 
developers, property rights’ advocates, Tea Partiers (who were active at the time) and others into 
warring factions. The ordinance, if it had passed, would have restricted development around 
sensitive water features such as streams and wetlands. Several interviewees described the 
political debacle with disappointment and regret, positing different theories to explain the failure.  
A common theory was that opposing interests failed to build the inter-personal relationships 
needed to prepare them for this upcoming conflict. When things became politicized, there were 
few social networks to provide a positive, supportive atmosphere for dialogue; also the lack of 
                                                             
191 Interviewee #97 
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inter-personal respect led to hurtful political rhetoric and escalated animosities. In one 
interviewee’s opinion, things would have been different if greater understanding had been built 
ahead of time: 
Interviewee: if you can get people to talk before there’s an issue so you need some kind 
of relationship there before it’s politicized…..But it really seems to be and it all comes 
down to relationships and people knowing each other before the issue comes up. I think 
you’re a lot better off. In that sense I think collaborating just to get to know what 
everybody’s perspective is and what their wins are or what they need you are going to 
have a better understanding. 
 
Rachel: The relationships that [were] formed on these committees like the Stakeholder 
Steering Committee or maybe even the Technical Advisory Committee, have those 
relationships been useful to tackle contentious problems like this one? 
 
Interviewee: Yes, [but] not this particular one. 
 
Rachel: So for this one it didn’t really work. 
 
Interviewee: It was going well for a while but it’s really turned into a mess. I think it 
could definitely do that. Especially since you have builders and you have environmental 
groups sitting down. We really don’t all sit down and hear each other’s issues very often 
when they’re not opposing each other in front of the Board about an application. I think 
the more you can do that the better. 192 
 
The end of this quote ties together many themes discussed above. When diverse groups “sit 
down and hear each other’s issues”, they are doing more than forming inter-personal 
relationships. By “truly listening”, they develop an understanding of each other’s perspectives, 
limitations, and constraints. Feeling understood not only makes people feel better about working 
together, it also opens up opportunities for innovative breakthroughs and solutions (as described 
under “innovation generation”) and develops working relationships that can be utilized for future 
problems (described under “social capital”). 
 
Wrap up and preview of conclusion 
                                                             
192 Interviewee #93 
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In this chapter, I provided the results of a thematic analysis for four of the five “benefits of 
collaboration” identified in Chapter 3. For each benefit, the thematic analysis was organized 
around two tasks: 1) describing the dynamics and nature of the benefit itself and 2) identifying 
and describing the processes/mechanisms of collaboration that bring about the benefit.  The 
themes identified here contribute to a greater conceptual understanding of the benefits and point 
to areas for future research.  
In the next and final chapter, I review my findings, summarize the contributions and the 
limitations of this research (including its relevance for public managers), and discuss future 
research opportunities.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I will review my research questions, describe my findings and contributions, 
discuss the limitations of my research, and talk about plans for future research.  
My approach in this dissertation is conceptual and I address broad research questions. 
Although I use a rich empirical dataset, my contributions are towards theory-building and 
concept development. My main contribution is conceptual development of the Coordinated 
Action benefit. In my analysis of coordinated action, I identify and describe (both conceptually 
and empirically) a process called harmonizing by which organizational actions and decisions are 
coordinated over the appropriate problem landscape. The description of harmonizing, although 
conceptual, has practical implications for public managers and others managing complex 
problems over a fragmented landscape.  Later in the chapter, I will describe how public 
managers can apply this concept in their work.  
 
Review of research questions and methods 
As presented in the Introduction chapter, my research questions were as follows: 
1) What key concrete, policy-related benefits can be attributed to collaboration? 
2) What are the process/mechanisms unique to collaboration that bring about these 
benefits?  
3) How do key contextual variables (in particular: policy area, actors involved in 
collaboration, and collaborative forum) affect the type of benefit(s) that emerge from 
collaboration?  
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To address the first research question, I started with a survey of various literatures addressing 
collaboration from different theoretical angles. This survey, presented in Chapter 3, revealed 
eight benefits of collaboration. Five of these eight were tangible, policy-related benefits that fit 
my broad definition of collaboration: 1) resource access/exchange, 2) innovation generation, 3) 
coordinated action, 4) working relationships built through social capital, and 5) 
reduction/resolution of conflict. Five research propositions, one for each benefit, were developed 
indicating how each benefit might emerge through the collaborative process.  
A rich empirical dataset was developed to explore the research propositions. Two cases 
were examined, the Chesapeake Bay watershed restoration and water quality management in 
Northern Virginia (NOVA), an embedded region of the Chesapeake watershed. Data on the 
Chesapeake Bay watershed restoration derived primarily from the Bay Journal, a news source 
covering water quality and related topics over the entirety of the Bay watershed. Data on the 
NOVA case derived primarily from in-depth interviews with people involved in water quality 
management and related fields. The final data set included 1081 Bay Journal articles and 86 
hours of audio interviews.  
Research propositions were turned into “primary codes” and applied to the data. When a 
text passage clearly indicated one of the five benefits emerging from the collaborative process, 
the corresponding “primary code” was applied.  Each text passage marked with a primary code 
became an “instance” or “case” of collaboration that led to a distinct, policy-related benefit. A 
total of 456 instances of collaboration were identified. They included 243 instances of resource 
exchange/access, 99 instances of coordinated action, 62 instances of working relationships 
developed through social capital, 28 instances of innovation generation, and 24 instances of 
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conflict resolution or reduction. These “instances” of collaboration represent the data used for 
analysis. 
The second research question was addressed through analysis of these “instances” of 
collaboration. The most structured and thorough analysis was done for the coordinated action 
benefit in Chapters 5,6, and 7, leading to conceptual discoveries about coordinated action itself 
and the processes of collaboration that bring it about. In particular, a process called harmonizing 
was identified that expresses the essence of coordinated action. A less structured thematic 
analysis, presented in Chapter 8, highlighted key processes related to the emergence of the other 
four benefits. 
The third research question relates to the context in which collaboration occurs. 
Secondary codes representing three contextual variables (the types of groups collaborating, the 
collaborative forum, and the policy area) were applied to each “instance” of collaboration 
identified by a primary code. This way, contextual information is physically linked to each case. 
A full analysis of secondary codes was conducted in Chapter 7 for the 99 harmonizing (i.e. 
coordinated action) cases. This analysis indicated that certain forums, particularly coordinating 
organizations, help achieve collaboration and produce collaborative benefits under difficult 
conditions.  These results led me to conduct a thematic analysis of the “coordinating 
organizations” contextual variable across all 456 instances of collaboration.  
 
Review of findings and contributions 
My findings and contributions from the analyses described above are separated into three 
subsections. The first section describes my contributions to conceptual development of the five 
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benefits.  The second section describes findings and contributions related to the context of 
collaboration. The third section describes other findings and contributions.  
 
Conceptual development on the benefits of collaboration 
Benefits of collaboration are currently under-conceptualized in the collaboration literatures. 
Instead, there has been considerable attention paid to the dynamics of collaboration (especially 
aspects of structure, governance, and management), the antecedents of collaboration, and the 
determinants of collaborative success. There are also a multitude of “performance studies” that 
evaluate collaboration, but these tend to use narrow outcome measures that do not capture the 
complexity of collaborative benefits.  Although all these scholarly endeavors are valuable, they 
divert attention from the foundational task of conceptual development on the benefits 
themselves. Through theoretical and empirical analysis, my research fills gaps in our conceptual 
understanding of collaborative benefits and the processes/mechanisms by which they are 
produced.   
Conceptual development for coordinated action was conducted most thoroughly. This 
benefit was chosen for detailed study because of the distinct absence of theory in the literature, 
combined with a sufficient number of empirical cases in my data.  I identified a process common 
to my empirical examples of coordinated action, called harmonizing, by which organizations 
address a shared problem at a scale that more appropriately fits with the actual scale or scope of 
the problem. Harmonizing overcomes a spatial or organizational “mismatch” between the 
appropriate problem landscape and management units with authority to solve the problem. 
Ultimately, harmonizing decisions at the appropriate problem landscape leads to more holistic, 
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comprehensive policy, as actors working on some piece of the problem, affecting it, and/or 
affected by it are all engaged in the solution. 
  In Chapter 5, I described harmonizing conceptually and empirically.  I developed an 
original typology based on the type of “problem landscape” over which organizational 
actions/decisions are coordinated: geographical, organizational, or ecological. Each harmonizing 
type was described conceptually with diagrams and visual depictions. Then each type was 
illustrated narratively, drawing upon empirical examples from my data.  
  The second conceptual innovation, described in Chapter 6, is the idea that harmonizing 
solves three “boundary problems”: the “border problem”, “stovepiping problem”, and the 
“problem of species- or media- specific programming”. I describe these problems and how they 
are solved, respectively, by geographical, organizational, and ecological harmonizing. Because 
“boundary problems” – particularly the border problem and stovepiping problem— afflict a 
range of policy areas from local housing policy to climate change to international relations, my 
conceptual description provides a theoretical jumping off point for other scholars. Scholars may 
adopt my typology of problems, and my visual depictions of harmonizing solutions, as a basis 
for describing problems and solutions in their own fields. Empirical description of how these 
problems are solved in the Chesapeake Bay provides guidance for public managers who face 
their own boundary problems.  
Third, I made a conceptual connection between harmonizing and efficiency benefits by 
reviving and expanding upon a conceptual framework developed by Huxham and MacDonald 
(1992). This framework depicts how coordinated action solves or avoids “pitfalls of 
individualism”. However, their framework lacks a conceptual description of coordinated action 
and an explicit connection between solving these pitfalls and achieving collaborative “benefits” 
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such as efficiency and better policy. Applying the framework to my concept of harmonizing, I 
find that harmonizing results in greater efficiency by avoiding duplication, divergence, and 
counter-production, and results in more holistic policy by avoiding counter-production and 
omission. Empirical examples are provided to illustrate how harmonizing avoids these pitfalls 
and achieves the resulting efficiency gains. In the process of applying harmonizing to this 
framework, I give the framework a conceptual backbone and greater conceptual depth, making it 
useful for future scholarship.  
Although my contributions are greatest for coordinated action, I make some unique 
conceptual and empirical contributions for the other four benefits (these were summarized in 
Table 8.1). For instance, I demonstrate how resource exchange generates collective benefits at 
the community/societal levels – not just organizational-level benefits as implied by resource 
exchange theory— by expanding the overall resource base and improving organizations’ 
collective ability to act. A unique contribution made to innovation generation theories is the 
importance of including perceived “naysayers” in the decision process, preventing innovations 
from being quickly squashed and forcing a serious conversation about perceived versus real 
obstacles.  
The most important contribution from my Chapter 8 thematic analysis was the concept of 
organizational niches. I found that the resource access / exchange benefit was perceived by 
interviewees not as a simple exchange, but as a process of discovering the unique and distinct 
value that partner organizations bring to the table. In ecological terms, this could be 
conceptualized as organizations occupying unique “niches”, or unique roles, in the achievement 
of collective goals. “Organizational niches” represents a new theoretical perspective on the 
benefit of resource access or exchange, which has traditionally been looked at through economic 
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exchange theories or theories of power and dependency. Perhaps resource exchange is less about 
organizations attempting to equalize power relationships, and more about organizations playing a 
role that they are particularly equipped or designed to play better than anyone else.  This 
theoretical angle has implications for resource exchange and for organizational theory more 
generally. The idea of organizational niches also points to practical questions about the “niches” 
of different types of organizations and how these fit together into an organizational “ecosystem”. 
Specific questions for future research will be presented later in this chapter. 
Conceptual development on the benefits of collaboration is important in its own right. 
Scholarly research on collaboration is notoriously fragmented, and unifying concepts are hard to 
come by (O’Leary and Vij 2012). In this research, I use empirical data and conceptual analysis to 
develop the concept of harmonizing, which is broad and generalizable across many policy areas. 
Although not inclusive of all characteristics scholars attribute to collaboration, harmonizing 
could be a unifying concept for scholars of collaboration.  
More practically, conceptual development is a critical step towards evaluation. Scholars 
have attempted to evaluate collaboration without understanding which benefits collaboration can 
be expected to produce and why. We need to know which benefits to include in an evaluative 
framework, and to better understand these benefits before they can be operationalized. By 
establishing baseline concepts about collaborative benefits, I am contributing to the future 
development of evaluative frameworks. 
 
Findings and contributions related to the context of collaboration 
I applied “secondary codes” to all instances of collaboration in my data, capturing three aspects 
of the collaborative process:  the types of groups collaborating, the collaborative forum, and the 
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policy area in which collaboration occurs. In Chapter 7, secondary code data was used to 
examine the context in which harmonizing occurs. The most intriguing results relate to the role 
of collaborative forums – particularly coordinating organizations, regulations/law, and financial 
incentives— in facilitating harmonizing under difficult conditions. Such forums are utilized more 
often under conditions of INTER- versus INTRA-jurisdictional coordination, and INTER-
jurisdictional coordination is presumed to be a more challenging condition for collaboration. 
Reasons for the greater difficulty of INTER-jurisdictional coordination include the fact that 
representatives are working for different constituencies and under the leadership of different 
political officials, do not share the same institutional structure or standard procedures, and have 
fewer opportunities to get to know each other professionally and personally.  
 My analysis indicates that coordinating organizations are important facilitators of 
collaboration under a variety of difficult conditions, when organizations are unlikely to naturally 
seek and pursue common goals. This idea was further explored through a thematic analysis of the 
role of coordinating organizations, which utilized a total of 351 passages filed under two codes: 
the secondary forum code “Facilitated by a Coordinating Organization” (with 163 passages) and 
the tertiary code “Facilitator role” (with 188 passages). Themes explored the different ways in 
which coordinating organizations facilitated collaboration under difficult conditions and/or 
helped organizations overcome obstacles to collaboration. The analysis identified six distinct 
(but related) facilitation roles played by coordinating organizations, summarized below: 
 
1. Coordinating organizations provide a landscape-level perspective that the organizations 
they “coordinate” cannot achieve on their own, since narrow concerns for achievement of 
organizational-level goals limit their ability for comprehensive thinking. 
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2. Coordinating organizations address competitive pressures among the organizations they 
coordinate. Competing organizations would otherwise be reluctant to expend their own 
resources on collective goals that help competitors, even when benefits are shared.  
 
3. Coordinating organizations assist in solving many participant problems that are too 
complex for voluntary, independent coordination, especially among busy participants 
distracted by their own organizational-level goals.  
 
4. Coordinating organization provide a neutral, non-hostile venue for coordination by 
creating a safe, productive collaborative space where participants feel they can share 
information. This only applies when the coordinating organization has earned trust of the 
organizations they work with and has access to skilled facilitators.  
 
5. Coordinating organizations take on the administrative tasks of collaboration, allowing 
collaboration to move forward when it is too time-consuming for individual organizations 
to manage on their own.   
 
6. Coordinating organizations provide some accountability when organizations cannot 
enforce commitments upon each other either because they lack the capacity or because 
they are in competition. Enforcement (or at least pressure) from a neutral, trusted 
coordinating organizations is usually acceptable.  
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Although coordinating organizations were the most common facilitating forum, my analysis 
indicated that “facilitation by regulations or law” also motivates collaboration under inter-
jurisdictional coordination and, by extension, under other difficult conditions. Some regulations, 
like the TMDL, require collaboration to occur. Other regulations or laws permit collaboration to 
occur, stipulate how it occurs, or shape the process of collaboration. Yet the most intriguing 
manner in which regulations or law motivate collaboration is via the threat of looming 
regulations. That is, organizations see the “regulatory hammer” hovering above them, and try to 
solve their problem through collaboration before it comes down.  The most prevalent example 
from my data was the Bay Program partners’ attempt to address nutrient and sediment 
impairments through voluntary measures before the 2011 deadline that triggered a Bay-wide 
TMDL. Although they ultimately failed, the regulatory deadline made the partners scramble, 
according to a series of Bay Journal articles about the situation.   
The role of regulations in stimulating collaborative partnerships, and in particular the role 
of a “looming regulatory hammer”, is a fascinating topic for future research (particular questions 
will be presented later in the chapter). This topic has not received sufficient attention, in large 
part because some scholars are committed to defining collaboration in opposition to regulation.  
By excluding regulation, however, scholars may be missing a crucial facilitating force and 
shaper of collaborative outcomes. The initiation and/or success of collaboration could, in fact, be 
utterly dependent on credible threats of imminent or future regulation. 
The need for facilitating forums points to a larger truth that has not been sufficiently 
emphasized in the literature: collaboration does not just happen because of good will. Good will 
is one ingredient in a complicated recipe for collaboration: often it must be supplemented with a 
“pinch” of individualized benefits and a “sprinkle” of pressure.  If participants don’t foresee 
267 
 
 
immediate and significant gains for themselves or their organization, and if there is no pressure 
from regulations, laws, or coordinating organizations, motivation to collaborate will probably be 
low. This is true even when collective, societal-level benefits are significant. Under these 
conditions, there are likely to be lost opportunities for achieving critical “landscape-level” goals.  
When you add in difficult conditions— such as inter-organizational competition, 
accountability concerns, goal divergence, and time-consuming collaborative processes— the 
likelihood of good will carrying collaboration forward is even slimmer. Additional motivating 
factors are needed. Based on my empirical analysis, “forums” such as facilitation by a 
coordinating organization, regulations or laws that “back up” the collaborative endeavor, and 
financial incentives serve this purpose.  
 
Other finding and contributions 
My research is a unique blend of theoretical and empirical analysis. In Chapter 3, I review the 
literature, combining theoretical contributions from diverse areas of scholarship that touch on 
collaboration, and refining these results to generate a list of five key benefits. My main theory-
building contribution is presented in Chapters 5 and 6, where I develop an original concept 
called harmonizing, an original typology, and insights regarding the types of policy problems 
solved by harmonizing. All my conceptual work, however, occurs through careful and 
methodical analysis of empirical data. The very concept of harmonizing, as well as the typology, 
emerged inductively through empirical analysis. Further, I use empirical examples to illustrate 
my concepts and bring collaborative benefits “to life”. Future scholars who employ my 
conceptual innovations have myriad examples to draw upon. By combining rigorous theoretical 
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work with empirical analysis, I conceptualize the coordinated action benefit more thoroughly and 
make finer distinctions than previous scholars have done.   
My empirical work ultimately resulted in a database of 456 “instances” where 
collaboration led to a distinct, concrete, policy-related benefit. The source data included 1081 
Bay Journal articles and 86 hours of audio interview data, plus additional articles and interviews 
used for developing the coding scheme. This represents a unique and valuable database of 
collaborative arrangements, produced through original data collection and analysis, which can be 
employed for future scholarly projects.  
Finally, my hierarchical coding scheme is a methodological contribution. Primary codes 
capture the concepts of most importance to answering my research questions, while secondary 
codes capture contextual information.  Primary and secondary codes are based on theory and 
were set ahead of time, although sub-codes and categories were allowed to emerge from the data. 
The key innovation is this: whenever a primary code is applied to a passage, secondary codes are 
applied to the same passage. Thus, contextual information is physically linked to each primary 
passage, making it easy to count and analyze co-occurring codes. It also sets up a reliable and 
consistent system for coding and analysis. Tertiary codes, which allow for flexibility in coding 
and analysis, may either be determined in advance or emerge spontaneously from the data. If the 
research aims stay the same throughout the project, they supplement the primary codes. But 
tertiary codes could be of upmost importance if research questions change or a new research 
project is initiated.  For instance, I have the empirical data to begin a new project on 
“organizational niches” because this tertiary code was created early on in my coding process.  
Although other researchers have their own primary research interests and preferred 
contextual variables, the same hierarchical structure could be adopted even as the codes change. 
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This structure provides a consistent process for coding and data analysis that can be adapted over 
and over again for new projects. 
 
So what? The practical implications of this research 
As described in the introduction, it is critical to know whether collaboration creates and 
distributes quality public benefits at a reasonable cost to society. Collaboration is often mandated 
or strongly encouraged as a policy tool because of expected benefits, even without hard evidence 
of these benefits. Further, collaborative processes are thought to be costly, especially in terms of 
time; so it is important to know whether they are worth it.  
This research is not itself an evaluation. However, it provides a conceptual basis for 
future evaluations by identifying and describing the types of benefits that should be expected 
from collaboration. In a more limited way, it also describes the conditions (contexts) under 
which certain benefits can be expected to emerge. This information is critical to inform scholars 
setting up their own evaluations, who need to know which benefits to explore and how to 
identify them when they occur. An evaluative framework would transform the expected benefits 
described in this dissertation into outcome criteria, and then into operationalized outcome 
measures. Evaluations could then be conducted by applying the operationalized measures to 
cases of collaboration and non-collaboration. If empirical evaluations were conducted, the key 
question would be: How well does each process (collaboration and non-collaboration) achieve 
the identified benefits? 
 My analysis also provides practical insights for public managers. Most prominently, I 
describe harmonizing, a process by which complex problems that span geographical, 
organizational, and/or ecological boundaries can be solved. Public managers can learn to 
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“harmonize”.  The most important step is identifying the appropriate landscape over which a 
problem should be solved.  A public manager may ask herself the following questions, 
corresponding to the three types of harmonizing: 
 
1. What is the geographical or spatial landscape over which the problem extends? Which 
jurisdictions or organizations are physically connected to, or physically affected by, the 
problem?  
2. Which organizations work on some piece of the problem, affect the problem by their 
actions, or are affected by the problem? Relatedly, which policy areas does this problem 
affect, and which organizations in these policy areas are acting on— or should be acting 
on— the problem? 
3. Are there elements of the ecological landscape that affect the health and survival of my 
target species or element? If so, which organizations manage these elements?  
 
These questions are a way to “survey” the landscape of a policy problem and determine its real 
boundaries, rather than abide by artificial boundaries established by borders and organizational 
stovepipes. Once the landscape is identified, the public manager has a list of various 
organizations or jurisdictions. Her difficult task is to assemble this organizational landscape and 
achieve coordinated action on the shared problem. Coordinated action, of course, will never be 
complete. Organizations coordinate on some aspects of the problem but not others, and parts of 
the organizational landscape may never be activated. However, just developing an awareness of 
the organizational landscape and establishing basic communication and coordination will help 
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prevent counter-production, duplication, omission, and divergence occurring through careless 
disregard.  
Similarly, public managers may consider whether they face “boundary problems” in their 
work, such as the border problem and the stovepiping problem.  These problems are described in 
detail in Chapter 6. Most public managers intuitively know when they run up against a boundary 
problem; they don’t need my visual depictions and narratives. Yet my clear, focused description 
of boundary problems is helpful in defining these problems and explaining them to others who 
may not recognize them. Recognizing and truly understanding a problem, including its sources, 
is an important step towards solving it.  
Findings from my thematic analyses of the other four benefits also have practical 
implications. For instance, I find that inter-personal relationships are critical to both building 
future working relationships (through social capital) and resolving conflict. It behooves public 
managers, therefore, to cultivate personal relationships with potential partners. Even small 
gestures of civility go a long way. Interviewees stressed the importance of small talk, willingness 
to visit potential partners “on their own turf”, truly listening to others even when you disagree (or 
believe you disagree), and willingness to engage in civil discourse.  My data reveal that 
organizations often find common ground through civil discourse, even when they disagree 
fundamentally on goals and values. 
According to my analysis (which confirms findings from the literature), public managers 
interested in innovative program expansions should look for diverse partners, since diversity is 
critical for innovation generation. My analysis adds another twist, which may run counter to 
public managers’ instincts: involving “naysayers” in the collaborative process can facilitate 
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innovation. By including those who would normally throw up roadblocks to innovation, and 
directly addressing their concerns, several programs were successful at adopting innovations.  
Finally, public managers who aim to create or sustain a collaborative process must 
recognize that good will is unlikely to carry collaboration forward on its own. Based on my 
empirical analysis, collaboration is successful in part because of facilitative “forums” such 
coordinating organizations, regulations or laws that “back up” the collaborative endeavor, and 
financial incentives.  Public managers should take advantage of these forums, especially when 
trying to foster collaboration under difficult conditions such as inter-organizational competition, 
a lack of accountability measures, and goal divergence. 
 
Limitations of the research 
This is a theory-building project, rather than a theory-testing project. My contributions are 
towards concept development, particularly the concept of harmonizing. Although I have a rich 
empirical dataset, I use it primarily to illustrate my original concepts and develop themes related 
to them. I do not test correlative or causal relationships. The closest I get to traditional empirical 
research, i.e. relating one variable to another, is using an Atlas-ti query to look at the co-
occurrence of groups and forum codes in Chapter 7. This analysis indicated that certain 
facilitating forums are more common for INTER-jurisdictional collaboration than INTRA-
jurisdictional collaboration, which– along with supporting qualitative data from interviews— led 
me to infer the importance of forums in facilitating collaboration under difficult conditions. Even 
this, my clearest “finding”, is based on a certain amount of inference and should be taken as an 
indicator rather than truth.  Rather than definitive findings, my greatest contribution in this 
dissertation is the conceptual development that will guide future thought and research. 
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My concept development of four of the five identified benefits – resource 
exchange/access, innovative generation, conflict resolution/reduction, and social capital– is also 
limited.  At a certain point, it became clear I had to choose between superficial concept 
development on all five benefits and thorough concept development on one. I chose to focus on 
one (coordinated action) and to emphasize my original concept of harmonizing because it was 
my most intriguing idea, there was a distinct lack of concept development in the literature, and 
my empirical data yielded a sufficient number of cases. However, this means I did not meet the 
intent of my original research questions:  to fully explore the key benefits of collaboration.   
The fact that I do not examine the costs of collaboration is another key limitation. 
Although this is not evaluation research, the costs should be considered. Leaving them out was a 
conscious, strategic decision based on my review of the literature. Literature on benefits of 
collaboration is voluminous, but fragmented. The sheer amount of scholarly work done on 
collaborative benefits, which comes from a wide variety of literatures and utilizes various 
theoretical bases, meant it was possible to develop well-researched research propositions. The 
fragmented state of the literature on collaborative benefits indicates that it is an appropriate time 
to organize, streamline, and integrate existing scholarship into a defined list of benefits, and 
explore them empirically.  On the other hand, scholarly work on costs of collaboration is limited. 
Scholars talk about how collaboration is time-consuming and expensive, and about the loss of 
autonomy or the fear of releasing proprietary information. But most of the public management 
literature addresses obstacles to achieving collaboration rather than costs.  There is not yet a 
sufficient volume of literature on which to base a concept-development project. 
Note that I still collected data on costs of collaboration. However, I fell into the trap that 
many scholars do, creating a tertiary code capturing both costs of collaboration and obstacles to 
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collaboration. The 463 passages to which this tertiary code was applied would have to be 
differentiated before an analysis of costs could be conducted; this is a project for future research 
(described below).  
Some scholars might find my broad definition of collaboration to be limitation. I define 
collaboration as “any interaction between two or more organizations undertaken with the 
intention to cooperate.” This definition does not include many of the characteristics other 
scholars commonly attribute to collaboration, such as consensus-building, diverse participation, 
networks, joint projects, or mutually beneficial outcomes. A valid concern is that, by using such 
a broad definition, I automatically attribute too many benefits to collaboration because almost 
everything IS collaboration. However, this concern is overridden by my need to develop broad, 
generalizable concepts.  My primary goal in this research is to build theory about collaborative 
benefits using a combination of existing theory and empirical examples. Drawing upon a wide 
variety of collaborative arrangements, occurring in different contexts and under different 
conditions, helps me build more comprehensive concepts through my empirical data. 
There are more specific methodological limitations of my research. Most obviously, I 
have no “comparison cases” of non-collaboration. While problematic for a traditional case study, 
this lack of non-collaboration cases is less concerning for me. The actual unit of analysis for my 
research is an “instance” of collaboration that successfully produced a concrete, policy-related 
benefit; these are identified in my data by primary codes. My two “cases”, the Chesapeake Bay 
Watershed restoration and water quality management in the NOVA region, are a way to define or 
bound the data I collect (the people I interview and the documents I read) from which these 
“instances” are drawn.  I do not use the cases themselves for comparison or analysis. Further, 
within each of these cases, there are instances of collaboration and of non-collaboration.  
275 
 
 
Scholars might be concerned with my narrow focus on watershed management when 
approaching a topic as broad as collaboration. However, what appears to be a narrow policy 
focus is, in reality, quite broad. Bay Journal articles, for example, cover policy areas beyond 
traditional water quality such as fisheries, recreation, land conservation, wetlands, water supply, 
agriculture, and land development. To keep my results as generalizable as possible, I coded all 
articles in each Bay Journal issue I read regardless of topic. I also selected interviewees working 
in a wide variety of fields. Insights gleaned from analysis of Bay Journal articles and interviews, 
then, should be generalizable to other policy areas. 
I have some concerns about bias in my selection of cases and my data. For instance, the 
NOVA region is comparatively urban, wealthy, and highly educated. I selected the region 
because these characteristics guarantee opportunities for diverse collaborative arrangements. 
Wealthy urban/suburban areas with an educated populace tend to be institutionally rich, with 
many organizations, citizen activists and leaders, and complicated local government 
bureaucracies. Collaboration in more rural areas, however, would likely involve different types 
of actors, different problems, and different institutional structures than what I saw in NOVA. 
Some rural examples are gleaned from the Bay Journal, which covers the entire Bay Watershed. 
At some point, however, it would be informative to add “instances of collaboration” from a rural 
case and re-analyze the data. A second concern is the “newsy” bias of the Chesapeake Bay case 
data. As a news source, the Bay Journal emphasizes visible events, such as regulations, public 
agreements, and financial awards over day-to-day collaboration. However, this newsy bias is 
effectively cancelled out by my interview data, which provide significant detail on the day-to-
day (often mundane) collaborative relationships important to people’s work.    
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Plans for future research 
This project has answered some questions and generated many new ones. In this section, I 
discuss ideas for future research both to follow up on my findings, and to take them in new 
directions. I propose hypotheses and research questions for each new topic.  
There are several ways to pursue the concept of harmonizing. First, it would be useful to 
explore the concept in other policy contexts to see if my conception and typology hold up, and if 
there are new insights to be gained. Because boundary problems exist in other policy contexts, I 
assume harmonizing may also be applied as a solution. Further, now that I better understand the 
concept, it would be useful to explore the practical aspects of harmonizing. By conducting more 
interviews with managers in water quality (and other fields), I could ask how they practice 
harmonizing, the benefits they perceive to gain from it and why, and the difficulties and 
obstacles.  
Of most interest is whether harmonizing in fact produces the benefits discussed in my 
analysis. The examples provided in my analysis support the idea that harmonizing produces more 
comprehensive, holistic policy and reduces duplication, omission, counter-production, and 
divergence. These findings should be explored more systematically through correlation or 
regression. The unit of analysis would be a particular policy problem. Specific hypotheses to be 
tested would include: 
 
Harmonizing H1 (Comprehensive policy): More harmonizing among organizations in the 
appropriate problem landscape is associated with more comprehensive and holistic 
solutions to the problem.  
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Harmonizing H2, H3, H4, and H5 (Duplication, Omission, Counter-Production, and 
Divergence): More harmonizing among organizations in the appropriate problem 
landscape is associated with less duplication, less omission, less counter-production, and 
less divergence.  
 
If I knew which organizations comprised the appropriate problem landscape, harmonizing could 
be operationalized as the proportion of these organizations that actually participate in solving the 
problem. If not, a work around would be some measure of the geographical span of participating 
organizations (for geographical harmonizing) or the number of policy areas represented by 
participating organizations (for organizational harmonizing).193 If a particular policy area was 
chosen for study, criteria could be developed to measure the comprehensiveness of a policy. For 
instance, watershed management policies are most comprehensive if they integrate policies for 
land development, agriculture, and transportation in addition to water quality, and if they apply 
across all jurisdictions that comprise the watershed. The level of duplication, omission, counter-
production, and divergence would be difficult to measure. I would first consult Huxham and 
McDonald, as well as others who have employed their 1992 framework, to see if measures have 
already been developed for these variables.  
Finally, harmonizing could eventually be proposed as the basis for some unifying concept 
or definition of collaboration. Proposing this idea would occur down the road, if the concept 
holds up across policy contexts and is useful to scholars.  
 I also plan to explore the resource access/exchange benefit. My data yielded 243 cases of 
resource exchange/access that improved policy by overcoming resource constraints.  Key themes 
                                                             
193 I would likely not pursue ecological harmonizing because it is specific to environmental policy, and thus less 
generalizable.  
278 
 
 
were pulled out from these cases and presented in Chapter 8, but a full, structured analysis was 
not done. It would be useful to review the cases and follow up on major concepts. For instance, I 
could further explore the concept of “organizational niches” commonly described under the 
resource access/exchange benefit. The tertiary code “organizational niches”, created during my 
data analysis in response to the prevalence of the concept, was applied to 254 passages. I would 
start by reviewing these to look for patterns and themes. However, I already have several broad 
research questions in mind: 
 
1) What are the organizational “niches” of different types of organizations, such as 
Federal/State agencies, small citizen-based nonprofits, larger nonprofits, and different 
departments of local government? More specifically: What roles do they typically play in 
solving shared policy problems? Which particular resources do they typically provide to 
their partners? 
2) How do different organizational niches complement each other? That is, which types of 
organizations tend to “need” each other to achieve their goals?  
3) Is there a particular grouping of organizations (an “ecosystem”) necessary for solving 
water quality and related policy problems?  
 
Data already secured under the “organizational niches” code would be sufficient for a 
preliminary approach to these questions. A query looking at the correlation between the 
secondary codes “Resource Provider” and “Resource Type” would complement my analysis by 
providing numerical data on which resource provider groups are most often associated with 
certain resource types (question #1 above).   
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 I also plan to pursue research on coordinating organizations and their role(s) in 
facilitating collaboration. Part of my research could be combined with the “organizational 
niches” project described above. Questions related to the organizational niche of coordinating 
organizations might include: What services do they provide to their members? What are their 
main functions in the policy process and in promoting collaboration? Although these questions 
were addressed by my thematic analysis of coordination organizations, which revealed six key 
ways that coordinating organizations facilitate collaboration, they should be pursued in a larger-
scale, more systematic way. Based on the six findings from my thematic analysis, hypotheses to 
explore would include:  
 
Coordinating Orgs H1 (Reducing competition): Among organizations that are typically 
competitive with each other, collaboration via a coordinating organization is associated 
with a reduction in competitive pressures. 
 
Coordinating Orgs H2 (Solving many participant problems): Many participant problems 
tend to be solved via a coordinating organization rather than through voluntary, 
independent coordination (VIC).  
 
Coordinating Orgs H3 (Ensuring accountability): Organizations collaborating through a 
coordinating organization are more likely to believe their partners will follow through on 
promises, compared to those collaborating through VIC. 
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Coordinating Orgs H4 (Harmonizing): Organizations collaborating through a 
coordinating organization are more likely to harmonize their decisions and actions over 
the full problem landscape, compared to those collaborating through VIC. 
 
I will also pursue research on the relationship between regulation and collaboration. Through a 
series of tertiary codes, I have already identified hundreds of passages on this relationship. The 
most fascinating question is how a “looming regulatory hammer” affects collaborative 
relationships focused on voluntary participation and voluntary measures. Based on what I have 
heard from interviewees, the threat of regulation, rather than squashing collaboration, stimulates 
organizational partners to achieve policy goals by voluntary means. This could be tested 
empirically with the following hypothesis: 
 
Collaborative and Regulation H1 (Looming regulatory hammer): When the threat of 
regulation is high, collaboration occurs more often and more intensely.  
 
My data hint at other interesting research opportunities on the relationship between regulation 
and collaboration. Following are several research questions worth exploring; for all of them, I 
have data to use as a starting point: 
 
1) What kinds of collaboration occur during, or as part of, the regulatory process?  
2) What are the “organizational niches” of regulatory versus non-regulatory government 
agencies in achieving policy goals through collaboration?  
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3) What is the effect on a traditionally voluntary program like the Chesapeake Bay program, 
when moving towards a more regulatory approach like the Chesapeake Bay TMDL?  
 
Finally, I will pursue research on the costs of collaboration. I have already collected data, under a 
tertiary code, on the costs of collaboration and obstacles to collaboration. The 463 passages 
under this code would have to be differentiated so I am analyzing just costs. The research 
questions I would ask the data are similar to those asked for benefits:  
 
1) What key costs can be attributed to collaboration? 
2) What are the process/mechanisms unique to collaboration that bring about these costs?  
3) How do key contextual variables affect the type of costs that emerge from collaboration?  
 
Based on a short review of the codes, the key costs seem to be time and money; no interviewee 
mentioned loss of autonomy or release of proprietary information, as described in the literature.  
If this holds, there is little need for conceptual development on the costs themselves; they are 
self-explanatory. However, it would be important to understand why collaboration in particular 
tends to bring about these costs.  It is unclear whether new data would have to be collected, 
either on the Chesapeake Bay and NOVA cases or in some other context. 
This brings me to a final point about this project. Although in this dissertation I focus on 
conceptual development and theory building, my analysis is based on a rich empirical dataset 
that has been heavily coded. In the final version of my Atlas-ti hermeneutic unit, I have a total of 
55 tertiary codes covering everything from the relationship between regulation and collaboration, 
to passages about accountability, to ideas about the importance of building a stewardship ethic. 
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Because my coding process was thorough and detailed, many of these codes have a lot of data 
stored with them. This presents myriad opportunities for future projects, both extending the 
topics explored in this dissertation and moving beyond them.   
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Appendix A: Case descriptions 
 
In this appendix, I provide additional information on the two cases, with emphasis on describing 
the collaborative organizations associated with each. Although these details are not necessary for 
understanding examples provided in my empirical analysis in Chapters 5 through 8, they provide 
useful contextual background.  
 
Case # 1: Chesapeake Bay restoration 
This case focuses on watershed management and restoration activities occurring in the 
Chesapeake Bay watershed under the auspices of the US-EPA Chesapeake Bay Program194  or 
through affiliated organizations. The Chesapeake Bay Program partnership was created in 1983 
under the first of three major Bay agreements (described below).195 The central Bay Program 
partners are the US-EPA, the six states that comprise the watershed plus the District of 
Columbia, and the Chesapeake Bay Commission (described below). However, there are several 
other partners, including fifteen more Federal agency partners, several academic institutions, and 
NGOs (US-EPA Chesapeake Bay Program 2012a).  
The Executive Council is the Bay Program’s decision-making body and provides a venue 
for high-level coordination among the Federal and State partners. Executive Council members, 
who meet annually, include the governors of Maryland, Pennsylvania and Virginia, the EPA 
administrator, the mayor of D.C., the administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection 
                                                             
194 Although called the US-EPA Bay Program, this is not a program of EPA Central or any particular EPA region. 
Rather, it is a separate partnership in which US-EPA is one of the key partners. Its funding comes directly from 
Congress. 
195 Others have dated the beginning of the Bay Program to 1976, when Congress gave the US-EPA $25 million to 
conduct a 5-year study of the Chesapeake Bay. As part of this study, US-EPA was tasked with coordinating existing 
research on the Bay, establishing a data collection and analysis program, and making recommendations on 
Chesapeake Bay management. Although this was mainly a research program, it laid a foundation for the inter-state 
coordination solidified by the 1983 Bay Agreement.  
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Agency, and the chair of the Chesapeake Bay Commission.  This Council is ultimately 
responsible for negotiating and signing the Bay Agreements and Directives that govern the 
overall Bay restoration.  Of course, they have a lot of help and input. The Principals Staff 
Committee, comprised primarily of high level bureaucrats from the Bay States, develops policy 
and advises the Executive Council. The Management Board, a mixture of Federal /State agency 
representatives and NGOs, oversees strategic operations for the Bay Program. There are separate 
implementation teams that coordinate partners’ work towards Bay Agreement goals, as well as 
three advisory committees representing scientists, citizens, and local governments, 
respectively. 196  Finally, according to their website, the Bay program employs 88 staff members 
to conduct and oversee its own programs related to Bay restoration and to assist partners (US-
EPA Chesapeake Bay Program 2012c). 
 
The Bay Agreements and the Chesapeake Bay TMDL  
The Bay Agreements, as well as occasional Directives from the Executive Council, guide and 
govern the overall Bay restoration. The first Bay Agreement was signed in 1983 by the original 
Bay Program partners.197  It was a simple, one-page document in which signatories agreed to 
address Bay impairments cooperatively and it created the Bay program. This agreement was 
motivated by the publication of a five-year study, conducted by US-EPA and published in 1983, 
which attributed the decline of the Bay to nutrient pollution.  
The 1987 Bay Agreement committed Bay states to a longer set of restoration goals 
categorized by type (living resources, water quality, population growth and development, public 
                                                             
196 See US-EPA Chesapeake Bay Program (2012b) for a formal organizational chart and lists of committee 
members. 
197 These signatories are the same seven people who sit on the Executive Committee, listed above: the governors of 
Maryland, Pennsylvania and Virginia, the EPA administrator, the mayor of D.C., the administrator of the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, and the chair of the Chesapeake Bay Commission 
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education, public access, and governance). The goal that generated the most attention and energy 
was a 40% reduction in nitrogen and phosphorus by 2000. Although many of the goals of the 
1987 agreement were met by the late 1990’s, the Bay was still degraded. Partners geared up for 
the next big agreement, called Chesapeake 2000, which aimed to meet water quality standards by 
a critical 2010 deadline. If the Bay was still impaired in 2010, under a series of courts 
settlements EPA would be required to write a Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) plan for the 
Bay. The State partners feared that a TMDL would turn what had been voluntary, collaborative 
restoration into a regulatory program.  
Chesapeake 2000 updated many goals and included, for the first time, specific goals 
related to land use and sprawl.  It was at this point that the “headwater states” (New York, 
Delaware, and West Virginia) joined the Bay Program through individual memoranda of 
agreement. Although part of the watershed, these states have a much smaller portion of their total 
land area draining into the Bay.  
By the late 2000s, it became clear that the goals of Chesapeake 2000 would not be met. 
EPA began preparations for its TMDL, the first phase of which was published in December 
2010.198 Although the Bay Program has been running the computer models to determine nutrient 
reduction goals and providing assistance to their State partners, the TMDL process is being 
managed by EPA Region 3. Writing state implementation plans for the TMDL is a long process 
with several phases, so it is unclear at this point how (and to what extent) the plans will be 
carried out.199 It is also unclear what the role of the Bay Program is now that the “regulatory 
                                                             
198 For the full TMDL document and more information about the process, see US-EPA (2012c). 
199 The Northern Virginia folks I interviewed in Spring/Summer 2011 expected two more planning phases before 
Virginia’s implementation plan was complete. They expressed a lot of uncertainty about how the whole TMDL 
process would play out.  
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hammer”, wielded by EPA Region 3, has kicked in. Thus the management of the Bay 
Restoration is currently in transition. 
This does not, however, affect the time period during which my data were collected. 
Interviews with people working on the Bay restoration were conducted in 2008, and Bay Journal 
articles from 1997-2007 were selected. I wanted to capture the period leading up to and including 
the drafting and signing of Chesapeake 2000, but avoid the years 2008-2010 when the pressures 
of looming regulation threatened the voluntary nature of the Bay Program.  So although the 
current transition state of the Bay restoration is important, it was not relevant to my interviewees 
at the time, nor did it affect the events described in Bay Journal articles used for this case.  
Rather, at the time of my data collection, the Bay Restoration was primarily guided by 
the Bay Agreements described above. In between Bay Agreements, “directives” were issued and 
signed by the Executive Council to clarify existing agreement goals or add new ones.  Bay 
Agreements and directives commit the states to meeting certain goals through their own 
regulatory or incentive-based programs. The Bay Program itself does not “implement” the Bay 
Agreements. Rather, it serves as a venue for the States to make these commitments and provides 
technical and financial assistance.  It develops and maintains the watershed model for the 
Chesapeake Bay and tracks progress towards Bay Agreement goals. In short, the Bay Program 
both pushes States to live up to their commitments and assists them in doing so.  
Meeting the Bay restoration goals requires participation from partners other than the 
States. For instance, local governments make most decisions regarding land use, land 
conservation is done through private land trusts, and community watershed groups conduct small 
restoration projects. To involve these partners in policy making, the Bay Program has advisory 
groups representing both local governments (LGAC) and citizens (CAC). There is also small 
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grants programs, managed through the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation (NFWF), that 
provides funding for watershed projects by local governments and community groups. However, 
the Bay Program is a partnership of the States (and D.C.). Commitments to Bay Restoration are 
made by the States, and it is the States’ responsibility to engage local governments and others as 
needed. Most relationships between local communities and the Bay program, then, are mediated 
either through the States, the Bay Program grant projects, or the nonprofit Alliance for the 
Chesapeake Bay (described below).  
 
Bay-wide collaborative organizations 
The US-EPA Bay Program is not the only game in town when it comes to collaboration on the 
Chesapeake Bay Restoration. A full description is not possible here, but a few large 
organizations will be highlighted. These organizational descriptions show how the Chesapeake 
Bay restoration is a “hub of collaborative activity”, one of my key case selection criteria. 
 
Chesapeake Bay Commission 
The Chesapeake Bay Commission, a core Bay Program partner, is itself a collaborative 
organization. A tri-state legislative assembly representing Maryland, Virginia and Pennsylvania 
(the original Bay States), it was created in 1980 to coordinate Bay-related policy across 
Maryland and Virginia. Pennsylvania joined in 1985.  The Commission has 21 members; from 
each of the three states there are five legislators, the cabinet member with direct responsibility 
for natural resources, and one appointed citizen.   
The principles leading to the Commissions’ formation were similar to the Bay program – 
the Bay was impaired and cleaning it required interstate cooperation— but emphasized that 
288 
 
 
clean-up efforts needed to be led by the States themselves (rather than US-EPA) and to involve 
members of State legislatures.  These principles were enshrined in the legislation creating the 
Commission, which was adopted separately by all member states’ General Assemblies. It 
included goals like assisting state legislatures in responding to Bay concerns and promoting, 
where appropriate, uniformity of state legislation.  
In 1984, for instance, the Commission was successful in its coordinated effort to ban the 
use of phosphate detergents in all three Bay Program states. These detergents had been a major 
contributor to high phosphorus levels in the Bay. In 1996, a special committee of the 
Commission called the Bi-State Blue Crab Advisory Committee (BBAC) was established and 
eventually negotiated unprecedented regulations adopted jointly by Maryland and Virginia. This 
ability to directly influence and guide State legislatures is a power unique to the Commission.  
 
Alliance for the Chesapeake Bay 
The Alliance for the Chesapeake Bay is a nonprofit organization with a Bay-wide focus. It has 
offices in Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, plus some staff embedded within the 
Chesapeake Bay Program office in Annapolis, Maryland.  The Alliance focuses on forming 
partnerships among the diversity of organizations working within the Chesapeake Watershed, not 
just government agencies but also non-profits, citizen groups, and academic institutions. It is a 
non-regulatory organization, focusing on consensus building, voluntary programs, and citizen 
engagement.   
The Alliance and the Bay Program have a long history together.  The Alliance was 
formed in 1971 as a citizens’ group (then called the “Citizens Program for the Chesapeake Bay”) 
that advocated for a comprehensive, ecosystem approach to Bay management. At the time there 
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was no formal bi-state, tri-state, or Bay-wide government agency. When the US-EPA was given 
$25 million to study the Chesapeake Bay in 1976, one of their required activities was citizen 
outreach, and they decided to hire an outside organization. The Citizens Program for the 
Chesapeake Bay responded to the RFP and was awarded a $250,000 grant in 1977 to basically be 
the “citizen engagement arm” of the early Chesapeake Bay program.200  This relationship has 
continued for over 40 years. The Bay Program relies on the Alliance for much of its stakeholder 
engagement programming.  For instance, Alliance staff members coordinate and provide 
administrative assistance for the Citizen and Local Government Advisory Committees of the Bay 
Program (CAC and LGAC, respectively).  The Alliance has diversified its funding sources with 
memberships, private donations, and grants from other government or foundation sources, which 
has increased its independence from the Bay program. Yet the two are still closely intertwined in 
their missions and programming.  
 The Alliance is a leader of inter-organizational collaborative programs. They provide 
communication and networking opportunities, training and capacity building for citizens’ groups 
and nonprofits, and facilitation assistance for consensus-building. They have a reputation for 
providing accurate, unbiased information such as the award-winning Chesapeake Bay Journal 
(from which I derive much of my data).201 The following sampling of programs illustrates the 
role of the Alliance.202 In the spirit of their collaborative approach, most are carried out in 
cooperation with other organizations and agencies.  
• Project Clean Stream, an annual stream and shoreline cleanup that engages local 
watershed organizations and volunteers.  
                                                             
200 This is before the 1983 agreement that created the Federal-State Bay Program partnership. At the time, the Bay 
Program was a program of the EPA designated to carry out this research study.  
201 They no longer publish the Bay Journal. Now it is published by Chesapeake Media Service. However, they were 
the publishers during the time period in which my selected articles were written.  
202 See Alliance for the Chesapeake Bay (2012) for more information on their programming. 
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• The Chesapeake Watershed Forum, a formal three-day training and networking 
opportunity for watershed associations in the region. 
• Forestry for the Bay, a voluntary membership program that provides assistance and small 
grants to landowners interested in conserving or restoring private forest land on their 
property.    
• River trends, a water quality monitoring program that trains volunteer monitors to collect 
samples from certain locations, pools their data in a database, and produces reports.   
• The Chesapeake Network, an online networking tool for organizations and people 
working on Chesapeake Bay issues. 
 
Chesapeake Bay Trust 
The Chesapeake Bay Trust is a grant-making nonprofit with three core objectives: environmental 
education, demonstrating restoration opportunities, and community engagement. As a Maryland 
nonprofit, all funds go to projects that benefit Maryland tributaries to the Bay. The Trust has ten 
different grant programs, most of which provide small amounts to “grassroots” organizations like 
schools and community groups. It also has two special initiatives: an annual rewards program to 
recognize individual contributions to Bay restoration, and a Chesapeake Conservation Corps that 
provides one-year training and service opportunities for young people. Generally, the approach 
of the Trust is less about policy-making and more about stimulating learning, citizen 
engagement, and “on-the-ground” Bay restoration.  
 
Chesapeake Bay Foundation 
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The Chesapeake Bay Foundation was started in 1967 and has, for 40 years, been the premier 
advocate for more stringent environmental commitments in the Bay Agreements and other 
Federal, State, or local laws that affect the Bay. With over 200,000 members and 160 staff, the 
Foundation has significant resources that it can mobilize. The website lists their main activities 
under four headings: restore, advocate, educate, and litigate. 
The Foundation is at the forefront of advocacy of all types: lobbying, grass-roots 
campaigns that mobilize their membership, and participation in Bay-related partnerships like the 
Bay Program. They have also initiated lawsuits against US-EPA and other State/Federal agencies 
for failures to fully implement environmental laws (Chesapeake Bay Foundation 2012). Their 
willingness and financial ability to litigate sets the Foundation apart from organizations with 
similar goals, like the Alliance, and has pushed the cleanup forward. For instance, the 
Chesapeake 2000 settlement forced the EPA to meet its TMDL deadlines.  
The Chesapeake Bay Foundation is also known for its top notch environmental education 
programs for students in classrooms and in the field. Their website claims their education 
programs have served 1,500,000 children and adults. Finally, the Foundation does several 
restoration programs, including restoring native oyster populations, planting trees, and planting 
underwater grasses, or submerged aquatic vegetation (SAV).   
 
Localized collaborative organizations 
With the exception of the Chesapeake Bay Trust, whose grants are strictly for Maryland 
communities, the organizations described above have a Bay wide focus. However, the 
Chesapeake Bay watershed is massive and other collaborative organizations are active within 
292 
 
 
smaller parts of the watershed. In fact, the Bay Program encourages, and even funds, the work of 
organizations in its embedded watersheds.203  
The focus area of some organizations is large in scope.  For instance, the Interstate 
Commission on the Potomac River Basin (ICPRB) works within the 14,700 square mile 
watershed of the Potomac River, and the Susquehanna River Basin Commission (SRBC) works 
within the 27,500 square mile watershed of the Susquehanna River. Other collaborative 
organizations are localized, focusing on a smaller tributary that eventually empties into the Bay 
after combining with other tributaries. An example is the citizens group “Friends of Sligo 
Creek”204, whose mission is to: “restore to health the water quality, natural habitat, and 
ecological well-being of the Sligo Creek watershed by bringing neighbors together to build 
awareness, improve natural habitat, and protect our community's heritage” (Friends of Sligo 
Creek 2012). Although the goals of this organization are similar to the others, the scope is vastly 
different. Sligo creeks watershed is about 11 square miles, 0.017% of the Chesapeake Bay 
watershed. Generally, these small watershed groups focus on a few local problems, rather than 
trying to change state or national policy. 
Watershed partnerships within the region vary greatly in terms of organizational 
structures and legal authority. Most, like the Friends of Sligo Creek, are 501(c)3 nonprofits with 
dues-paying members,  volunteer staff, and informal operations. There is no required structure 
for operations or governance (aside from a Board of Directors, which is required for nonprofits), 
although many will utilize task forces or committees.  
                                                             
203 Watersheds are nested, so within the larger Bay watershed there are several smaller watersheds like the Potomac 
and the Susquehanna, and then within them there are still smaller watersheds, and so on.  
204 This example was pulled from the US-EPA Surf Your Watershed site (US-EPA 2012d). There are hundreds of 
similar watershed groups all over the Chesapeake Bay. 
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Perhaps more importantly, most watershed associations lack legal authority to make 
policy or enforce water quality regulations. State or local governments may provide grants, or 
even contract with them, to implement education, restoration, or planning projects associated 
with meeting regulatory requirements. Their representatives might serve on advisory councils 
that influence policy decisions. They may get involved in “watchdogging” activities like 
patrolling a river and calling in violations. In the end, however, the Federal, State, or local 
governments are the ones with independent legal authority to write, pass, and enforce water 
quality regulations. Without regulatory authority, the most common programming for these 
embedded watershed associations includes environmental education, restoration projects, 
advocacy, data collection, and participation in advisory groups.  Groups will select a different 
mix of approaches that best meet their goals.205  
 
Case # 2: The Northern Virginia (NOVA) region 
The Northern Virginia (NOVA) region encompasses several local governments, regional 
organizations, citizens’ groups, and partnerships. There was no single overarching project 
associated with this case; rather the region includes many collaborative projects in various stages 
of planning and implementation.  
Jurisdictions from which I interviewed at least one government representative include 
four counties (Arlington, Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince William), four cities (Alexandria, Falls 
Church, Fairfax City, and Manassas), and one town (Leesburg). Illustrative statistics for all the 
                                                             
205 I will not attempt to categorize watershed organizations here. The important point is the existence of a wide 
variety of organizations working in smaller segments of the Chesapeake Bay watershed. They offer a diversity of 
opportunities for collaboration: from localized to regional, structured to unstructured, regulatory to non-regulatory, 
and formal to informal.   
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jurisdictions are provided in Table A.1 below. For comparison purposes, the same statistics are 
provided for Virginia as a whole.  
 
Table A.1: Key statistics on Northern Virginia localities.206 
 
Local 
government 
type 
Population, 
in 100,000s 
(2010) 
Persons 
per square 
mile, 
2010) 
Percent 
population 
change 
(2000 to 
2010) 
Median 
household 
income 
(2006-
2010) 
Bachelor’s 
degree, 
percent of 
persons 
age 25+ 
(2006-
2010) 
VIRGINIA N/A 8,001,024 203 13% $61,406 34% 
Arlington  County 207,627 7,994 10% $94,880 70% 
Fairfax  County 1,081,726 2,767 12% $105,416 58% 
Loudoun  County 312,311 606 84% $115,574 57% 
Prince 
William 
County 402,002 1,195 43% $91,098 38% 
Alexandria City 139,966 9,314 9% $80,847 60% 
Falls Church City 12,332 6,169 19% $114,409 71% 
Fairfax City City 22,565 3,617 5% $97,900 53% 
Manassas City 37,821 3,826 8% $75,173 28% 
Leesburg Town  42,616 3,440 51% $94,772 47% 
 
Table A.1 indicates that the region has a relatively large population. Fairfax County residents, for 
instance, make up more than one-eighth of the total State population. Population densities are 
also higher than the State average, especially in the jurisdictions closest to D.C. such as 
Arlington, Alexandria, and Falls Church.  Further, all the Counties score a “1” on the USDA 
Urban-Rural continuum scale, indicating they are mostly urban.207  The most suburban counties 
are Loudoun and Prince William, yet both are growing rapidly.   
In fact, another key characteristic of the region is development pressure due to population 
growth. This is especially pronounced in Loudoun, Prince William, and Leesburg, which have 
                                                             
206 Source: US Census Bureau (2012). All numbers and percentages have been rounded to nearest whole number. 
207 This scale goes from 1-9, where #1 indicates counties “in metro areas of 1 million population or more”.  It is 
based on 2003 data (USDA Economic Research Service 2012).  
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seen a percent population change over the past decade of 84%, 43%, and 51%, respectively. This 
drives rapid land conversion and an increase in impervious surface, which in turn leads to 
flooding and stormwater pollution if effective stormwater controls are not put into place. On the 
other hand, areas closer to D.C., like Arlington, Alexandria, Falls Church, and Fairfax, have 
already been “built out”. In these areas, population and development pressures lead to re-
development, as developers convert properties to achieve greater densities.   
Significant development pressures means that private developers and the organizations 
that represent their interests are active in regional and local policy. However, environmental 
groups and neighborhood groups are also numerous and powerful in the region. Environmental, 
neighborhood, and development groups regularly come in conflict with each other over new 
development, which can put local government officials who issue permits in a difficult position.   
This region is also relatively wealthy, with median household incomes ranging from 
$75,173 in Manassas to $115,574 in Loudoun (see Table 4.1).  In fact, two of my four counties 
were on a June 2012 list of the top five wealthiest counties in the U.S.; Loudoun and Fairfax 
were numbers 3 and 4, respectively (Kane 2012). This wealth raises enough in taxes to fund a 
wide variety of environmental programs. Several NOVA jurisdictions, for instance, have enough 
staff to create a stormwater or watershed management department, rather than assigning 
employees from the Public Works department to these tasks. Fairfax County has such an 
extensive array of environmental programs that they hired an environmental coordinator. 
Further, many NOVA jurisdictions levy a stormwater tax, the revenue from which goes directly 
to flood control and stormwater projects. Sometimes this tax is based on the amount of 
impervious surface on one’s property, but often it is simply a small additional fraction of a 
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percent on one’s property tax. The revenue raised can be quite high in jurisdictions with high 
property values.  
Another unique feature of the NOVA region is residents’ high education level. The final 
column in Table 4.1 shows the percent of persons age 25 or higher who have a Bachelor’s 
degree. Except Manassas and Prince William, NOVA jurisdictions are significantly higher than 
the State average. This is relevant for my research because educated people tend to participate in 
the policy process.  The NOVA region, in fact, has many active environmental and neighborhood 
groups that exert influence on local government decisions through advocacy, participation in 
public meetings or workshops, and/or formal advisory groups or committees.  Many NOVA 
local governments have adjusted their processes to allow for significant participation. Arlington 
County, for instance, has a dizzying number of citizen commissions and advisory groups 
(Arlington County 2012). I have been told by several interviewees about the “Arlington way”, 
which means conducting the business of government with maximum openness to and 
participation from the community.  
In NOVA jurisdictions, citizen participants tend to be more educated and capable than the 
“average Joe”.  They carry over particular technical skills from their education or workplace. For 
instance, the chairperson of the Leesburg Watershed Committee works for the Center for 
Watershed Protection, the leading national research organization on watershed management. The 
chairperson of the Environment and Energy Conservation Commission (E2C2) in Arlington 
County works on chemical and material risk management for the Department of Defense. These 
citizens are not only highly educated, as indicated by the statistic in Table 4.1; many of them 
have high-level, powerful jobs in nearby Washington, D.C. where they influence policies that 
affect local government. This can be a great asset to the local governments, who rely on these 
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citizen committees to identify problems and make recommendations. It can also be difficult 
when these savvy, capable, and well-connected people challenge local government decisions.  
 
Regional collaborative organizations 
There was no particular collaborative project that drew me to the NOVA region. However, there 
are several regional organizations that encourage and promote inter-jurisdictional coordination. 
 
Northern Virginia Regional Commision (NVRC) 
The Northern Virginia Regional Commission (NVRC) is one of 21 Planning District 
Commissions (PDCs) in the State of Virginia. Under the State Regional Cooperation Act, local 
governments in selected regions can create and charter a PDC to help them collectively meet 
their responsibilities under State and Federal law, represent their common interests to the State, 
and conduct inter-jurisdictional planning and programming. PDCs, therefore, are a political 
subdivision of the State but are created by the local jurisdictions themselves. Under Virginia 
State law (section 15.2-4207), the purpose of the PDCs is to: 
"...encourage and facilitate local government cooperation and state-local cooperation in 
addressing on a regional basis problems of greater than local significance. The 
cooperation resulting from this chapter is intended to facilitate the recognition and 
analysis of regional opportunities and take account of regional influences in planning and 
implementing public policies and services.” (Virginia Association of Planning District 
Commissions 2012).   
 
The Northern Virginia Regional Commission, chartered in 1969, is one of the most active PDCs 
in Virginia.208 Its current member governments are all the jurisdictions listed in Table A.1, plus 
the city of Manassas Park and Town of Dumfries in Prince William County, the Town of 
Purcellville in Loudoun County, and the Towns of Herdon and Vienna in Fairfax County. 
                                                             
208 See Northern Virginia Regional Commission (2004) for the official NVRC charter. 
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Members of the 25 person Commission, the main decision-making body, are appointed by the 
member governments on a population-based formula, with the caveat that each government gets 
at least one representative. Only elected officials may serve on the Commission.  
Member governments make annual contributions to support NVRC in exchange for the 
facilitation and assistance services it provides. Other funding sources include appropriations 
from the Virginia legislature and a variety of grants and contracts. These funds have allowed 
NVRC to grow beyond the size of other PDCs in Virginia. According to their website, they have 
24 staff members, several of whom are highly trained facilitators, planners, engineers, and 
research analysts.  
NVRC fulfills several important roles in the region. It provides professional and technical 
services for member governments, facilitates inter-jurisdictional planning and projects, and 
serves as a venue for information exchange and communication. They also see themselves as 
“the voice of Northern Virginia”, representing and relaying the concerns and interests of the 
region to State and Federal agencies (Northern Virginia Regional Commission 2012b).209 For 
instance, every year the Commission writes a legislative platform and circulates it to Virginia 
State delegates and other key decision-makers.   
NVRCs programs are wide-ranging, from coordination on military base realignment and 
closure (BRAC) to affordable housing to a regional strategy for energy conservation. Following 
are NVRC projects most relevant to my research on water quality. Several came up in the 
empirical chapters as “instances” of collaborative activity: 
1) Watershed planning and projects in Four Mile Run and Cameron Run.  
                                                             
209 This is the language used on their website. I did, however, hear the same thing from interviewees who work at 
NVRC.  
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2) Clean Water Partners, a jointly funded media program focused on stormwater 
education.  
3) Tracking the Virginia Implementation Plan for the Chesapeake Bay TMDL. 
Providing information and updates to member governments and participating on 
behalf of the NOVA region.   
4) A regional plan for Green Infrastructure, i.e. creating large open spaces connected by 
corridors.  
5) Coordination among water utilities in the NOVA region in order to ensure adequate 
supply during droughts and protect water source quality. 
 
The NVRC, in short, is the premier collaborative, regional organization for the NOVA region. 
For local governments, they are a “go to” place for information, technical expertise, and 
assistance in facilitating an inter-jurisdictional project. For the State government, they provide an 
easy way to incorporate NOVA concerns into policy without dealing individually with fourteen 
jurisdictions. 
 
Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) 
The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (called WashCOG, or just COG) is 
another organization working in the NOVA region. Their geographical focus is the entire 
metropolitan Washington DC area, however, so their membership includes the District of 
Columbia and its Maryland suburbs. COG was founded in 1957 to address regional issues 
affecting Washington DC and its suburbs. Crucially, over more than 50 years of work it has 
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established inter-jurisdictional relationships that can be mobilized quickly when emergencies 
arise, such as the days after September 11.210 
The COG Board of Directors is comprised of appointees from the 22 participating local 
governments, plus appointees from the Maryland and Virginia legislatures and from the U.S. 
Congress (all Federal and state legislative appointees must represent communities in the Metro 
Washington region).  Like the NVRC Commission, Board members are elected officials.  Also 
like NVRC, COG is financially supported through annual contributions from its participant local 
governments and through Federal and State grants.  
COG is distinct from NVRC, however, because of its major responsibilities towards 
meeting Federal standards for both air quality and transportation.  COG is responsible for 
attaining EPA air standards for the region through the inter-jurisdictional Metropolitan 
Washington Air Quality Committee (MWAQC).  Further, the COG Transportation Planning 
Board (TPB) is the federally designated metropolitan planning organization for the region, which 
means it is tasked with writing regional transportation plans that must be approved by the 
Federal government before transportation funds are provided to the region. 
 These responsibilities take up a major portion of COGs staff time. COG has an enormous 
staff, the bulk of which works on transportation – I counted 120 staff members on their website, 
60 of them under Transportation (Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments 2012b). 
COG does have some water quality programs that are important for my research purposes. These 
include the following: 
1) The Chesapeake Bay and Water Resources Policy Committee gives local 
governments a chance to discuss the progress of the Chesapeake Bay TMDL and 
                                                             
210 The video made for COGs 50th anniversary, available on the COG website, provides more historical examples of 
cooperation fostered by COG in emergency situations, such as the DC riots after Martin Luther King was shot 
(Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments 2012a). 
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other Bay-related activities. COG staff members track the progress of the TMDL and 
keep jurisdictions updated; they also represent the metro DC perspective in meetings 
with State agencies and the US-EPA.  
2) Coordination on water supply through the Water Supply Task Force, which has led to 
the drafting of inter-jurisdictions agreements on managing water supply and 
emergency management in times of drought or contamination.  
3) The Anacostia Watershed Restoration Partnership, a multi-jurisdictional watershed 
partnership whose executive director work in the COG offices.   
 
When asked about the “value-added” of COG in regard to water quality management, 
interviewees consistently told me two things: (1) They provide updates on the Chesapeake Bay 
TMDL, which helps individual jurisdictions who lack the time to attend all the TMDL meetings 
and sift through the relevant information, and (2) their committees provide opportunities for 
information exchange with counterparts in D.C., Virginia, and Maryland. However, COG is less 
active than NVRC in actual planning, project facilitation, and service provision in the water 
quality area. According to an NVRC employee I interviewed, COG purposely leaves a lot of the 
Virginia environmental programming to NVRC, which lets COG focus on the Maryland side 
where there is no equivalent NVRC organization.211  
 
Other regional collaborative organizations 
Although NVRC and COG are the most important for regional water quality, there are other 
organizations that work at the regional level. The Northern Virginia Conservation Trust (NVCT) 
is a regional land conservation organization that works with both private landowners and local 
                                                             
211 Interviewee #42.  
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governments to get land under permanent conservation easement. They encourage a regional 
perspective and are, for instance, actively involved in NVRCs Green Infrastructure plan.  The 
Northern Virginia Parks Authority (NVPA) pools money from its member jurisdictions and 
builds parks throughout the region that residents can use for free or reduced prices.  
Further, just like in the Chesapeake Bay there are a multitude of localized environmental 
organizations like land trusts, watershed associations, wildlife conservation organizations, and 
others. Again, these are nonprofits run by volunteers or with a few staff members. Although they 
generally do not manage inter-jurisdictional projects, they will participate in projects developed 
by the local governments or one of the regional organizations.  
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Appendix B: Interview Protocol (NOVA case) 
 
This is a basic protocol used for the NOVA interviews. Other questions were added particular to 
each interviewee, based on pre-interview online research on the interviewees’ work and 
organization.  Further, since interviews were conversational we would often spend a long time on 
certain questions, especially #2 and #4 below.  Many follow up questions were asked. 
An earlier version of this protocol was used for preliminary interviews on the Chesapeake 
Bay restoration case.  
 
Description of collaboration 
1. In general, what is the role of collaboration in the work that you do? 
• Recall that I define collaboration as organizations working together to solve complex 
problems or achieve common goals. 
 
2. Which other organizations does your agency (or do you) collaborate with regularly? On what 
sorts of projects do you work with them? 
 
3. Are there certain types of organizations that are easier to collaborate with? Are there certain 
types that are challenging? Why? 
 
4. Does your agency seek input from interest groups (environmental groups, recreation groups, 
farmers’ organizations, private developers, etc)?  Please describe. 
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Effects of collaboration - General 
5. What do you think are the positive effects of collaboration? (Whatever comes to mind..... 
effects on watershed management, on policy results, on water quality, etc)  
 
6. What do you think are the disadvantages or costs of collaboration? 
 
Effects of collaboration – Specific 
7. Following are mechanisms I have developed to describe how collaboration in Northern 
Virginia may improve watershed management. Please indicate if you agree or disagree with 
these, and why. Specific evidence and general thoughts are both welcome.  
 
a. RESOURCES: Collaboration between government, non-profit organizations, and/or 
landowners provides financial or technical resources necessary to achieve goals. No 
one organization has the resources to do these activities alone.  
 
b. INFORMATION EXCHANGE: The exchange or pooling of information reduces 
duplication of effort and allows organizations to learn from each other, improving 
outcomes. 
 
c. COORDINATED PLANNING: Inter-organizational coordination allows for: 
strategic planning over the entire watershed, harmonizing policies between 
municipalities, and targeting resources where they are most needed.  
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d. COMMON GROUND: Coordination and exchange helps actors with different goals 
build consensus. 
 
e. INNOVATION: Bringing in more points of view fosters innovation and creative 
ideas.  
 
Final questions 
8. What is your work title? 
9. Is there anything else you think I should know regarding how you incorporate collaboration 
into your work?  
10. Is there anything you think I should know about the advantages or disadvantages of 
collaboration?  
11. Do you any suggestions for people in the area I should talk to? 
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Appendix C: Empirical Examples of Harmonizing 
 
Sample harmonizing passages 
A case of harmonizing is generally indicated by a single text passage (of varying length) coded 
from either the Bay Journal or the interview data. To meet the criteria for a primary harmonizing 
code, passages should indicate that (1) there is collaboration occurring according to my 
definition, (2) collaborating organizations are addressing a problem or issue more holistically 
than they would if acting in isolation, and (3) there is some benefit achieved through their 
harmonized decisions or actions. The example should be specific enough that secondary 
contextual categories (forum, collaborating groups, and policy area) can be coded. Finally, I 
should be able to identify the example as a case of geographical, organizational, or ecological 
harmonizing.   
 I provide four sample passages below, selected to represent the two data sources and the 
two main types of harmonizing that appear in the data (geographical and organizational). 
 
1. Launching the Mid-Atlantic Regional Panel on Aquatic Nuisance Species (Case #1, Bay 
Journal, Geographical): 
Representatives from mid-Atlantic states, from New York to North Carolina, have 
formally joined forces in the ongoing battle against zebra mussels, snakeheads, purple 
loosestrife and other unwanted aquatic invasive species. In April, representatives from 
state and federal agencies, along with a host of other interested parties, officially 
launched the Mid-Atlantic Regional Panel on Aquatic Nuisance Species-a federally 
recognized body aimed at coordinating state efforts and luring new federal support to 
help fight common enemies. “Instead of doing things state by state, or not talking to each 
other, the panel will help with coordination…” said Julie Thompson, a biologist with the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s Chesapeake Bay Field Office. “We are actually working 
on a larger geographic area than what we were doing with the Chesapeake Bay 
Program.” (Bay Journal, May 2005: "Regional agencies join forces against exotic 
invaders") 
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2. Joint TMDL plan for Maryland, Virginia, and D.C., coordinated by ICRPB (Case #4, 
Interview, Geographical): 
we have served as the coordinator for the development of a total maximum daily load 
plan for the Potomac and Anacostia Rivers for PCBs. That was requested by, demanded 
by, EPA because each of the three jurisdictions, Maryland, Virginia and the District of 
Columbia, each had a PCB impairment, and each was upstream of one other jurisdiction, 
and downstream of one other jurisdiction. The way the Anacostia and the Potomac flow, 
you get that upstream downstream issue and if you have an individual TMDL for 
Maryland, as an example, for PCBs, they can impact both Virginia and the District. And 
it’s the same thing with Virginia, they can impact both Maryland and the District. So it 
became obvious that we should try to do one TMDL rather than having three TMDLs. So 
that’s what was done. (Interviewee #29a) 
 
3. Standardization of procedures for testing striped bass (Case #8, Bay Journal, 
Organizational): 
For the first time, scientists from Maryland, Virginia and the federal government will be 
using identical procedures in catching striped bass and testing them for mycobacteriosis, 
a disease that past studies suggest may infect anywhere from 40-70 percent of the Bay’s 
most popular recreational fish. The standardized surveys will help determine whether 
[differences found in symptoms and causes of the disease] are real, or result from 
different survey and laboratory techniques and interpretations. “If we are all on the same 
page, the results will be more easily compared and thus be of higher quality,” said Chris 
Ottinger, an immunologist with the U.S. Geological Survey’s National Fish Health 
Laboratory in West Virginia. The surveys will take place on the York and Rappahannock 
rivers in Virginia, and the Potomac and Choptank rivers in Maryland. The work will 
involve scientists from the USGS, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the University of 
Maryland, the Maryland Department of Natural Resources and the Virginia Institute of 
Marine Science. (Bay Journal, Nov 2002: "States, feds to coordinate study of striped bass 
infections in Bay") 
 
4. CBLAD works with other state agencies to ensure consistency with the Chesapeake Bay 
Preservation Act (Case #11, Interview, Organizational) 
In addition, we’ll work with the Health Department. Like over the last couple of years 
they are revising their regulations to accommodate these new types of septic systems that 
are out there. And we’re kind of working with them so they don’t put anything in their 
regulations that would conflict with what’s in the Bay Act regulations. So we’ll interact.  
308 
 
 
 
[Then there is the State Department of Transportation (VDOT), which has] promulgated 
some regulations regarding streets and things like that and different development 
patterns and development requirements that [have a] a bay water quality impact, so we’ll 
tend to work with them on a few things as well….as they revise their regulations and 
requirements, we’ll provide input into that saying, “Hey, look, you’re doing something 
here that’s not completely consistent with the Bay Act,” that kind of stuff. (Interviewee 
#19a) 
 
Sampling of harmonizing cases 
Below I present Table C.1, which briefly describes 16 cases of harmonizing from the data. It 
includes 7 cases of geographical harmonizing (GEO), 8 cases of organizational harmonizing 
(ORG), and 1 case of ecological harmonizing (ECO). Of the 8 cases of organizational 
harmonizing, 5 of them fit the “policy sector” formulation of organizational harmonizing 
described in Chapter 5 and are labeled as ORG-POL. The secondary codes applied to these cases 
are also shown, including the Forum for collaboration, Groups that are collaborating, and Policy 
area.  
Where the source description indicates multiple data sources (cases #2, 3, and 9), the 
same “incident” of harmonizing was described in more than one text passage. Most often, this 
occurs with Bay Journal data, since the same harmonizing event (especially a significant or 
complicated one) is often discussed in multiple articles. For instance, the signature of 
Memoranda of Agreement between upstream Bay States and the Bay Program to meet the 2000 
nutrient reduction goals (case #3) was discussed in several articles as the process progressed.  
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Table C.1: Selected harmonizing cases from the data. Harmonizing type is indicated by GEO (Geographical), ORG (Organizational), 
ORG-POL (Organizational that involves multiple policy sectors), and ECO (Ecological). 
 
 Source description Brief description of case 
HAR 
Type Forum Forum2 Groups Group2 Policy Area Policy Area2 
1 
Bay Journal, 
May 2005: 
"Regional 
agencies join 
forces against 
exotic 
invaders" 
Representatives from mid-
Atlantic states, from New 
York to North Carolina, 
launched the Mid-Atlantic 
Regional Panel on Aquatic 
Nuisance Species-a joint 
effort aimed at coordinating 
state efforts on non-native 
species. 
GEO Coordinating Org   States   
Invasive 
species   
2 
Bay Journal, 
Multiple 
articles 
MD and VA are 
cooperating, via the Bi-
State Blue Crab 
Committee, to phase in 
harmonized, more stringent 
regulations for blue crab 
harvests. 
GEO Regulation / Law   States   Fisheries   
3 
Bay Journal, 
Multiple 
articles 
The three headwaters states 
of the Chesapeake Bay 
(NY, WV, and DE) signed 
Memoranda of Agreement 
to work towards the 
nutrient reduction goals of 
the Chesapeake 2000 
agreement 
GEO Coordinating Org Other: MOA States 
Upstream and 
Downstream  
Water 
quality   
4 
Two employees 
(joint 
interview), 
Interstate 
Commission on 
the Potomac 
River Basin 
(ICPRB) –
(Interviewee 
#29a) 
ICPRB coordinated a joint 
TMDL plan for MD, VA, 
and DC, all of whom were 
required to write a plan for 
the same impairment 
affecting the Anacostia and 
Potomac Rivers. 
GEO Coordinating Org 
Regulation / 
Law States 
Upstream and 
Downstream  
Watershed 
planning   
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 Source description Brief description of case 
HAR 
Type Forum Forum2 Groups Group2 Policy Area Policy Area2 
5 
County 
stormwater 
manager 
(Interviewee 
#23) 
County stormwater 
managers coordinate with 
embedded towns/cities  and 
with the Virginia 
Department of 
Transportation (VDOT). 
These entitites have their 
own MS4 (stormwater) 
permits but their 
stormwater systems are 
physically intertwined with 
the Counties' system. 
GEO Regulation / Law   
Counties / 
municipalities  
Local & state 
govt Stormwater   
6 
Planner, Prince 
William County 
(Interviewee 
#34) 
PW County coordinates 
with the City of Manassas 
on trails "so that we 
wouldn’t have any trails 
ending at the city line or 
county line and dying." 
GEO Voluntary, independent   
Counties / 
municipalities    Recreation   
7 
Northern 
Virginia 
Regional 
Commission 
(NVRC) 
employee 
(Interviewee 
#42) 
Through an NVRC 
working group, Northern 
Virginia localities are 
developing a coordinated 
emergency response system 
in case of drought. 
GEO Coordinating Org   
Counties / 
municipalities    
Water 
supply   
8 
Bay Journal, 
Nov 2002: 
"States, feds to 
coordinate 
study of striped 
bass infections 
in Bay" 
MD, VA, and Federal 
government agencies have 
agreed to use the same 
procedures for testing 
striped bass for bacterial 
infection. Scientists from 
each will work together to 
do the tests. 
ORG Voluntary, independent   States 
Federal govt 
& State govt Fisheries   
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 Source description Brief description of case 
HAR 
Type Forum Forum2 Groups Group2 Policy Area Policy Area2 
9 
Bay Journal, 
Multiple 
articles 
The Chesapeake Bay 
Gateways Network, 
coordinated by the National 
Park Service (NPS), 
connects disparate park 
sites into a unified Bay 
educational and 
recreational experience. 
Grants for Bay exhibits are 
provided by NPS. 
ORG Coordinating Org 
Financial 
incentives 
Other: Park 
sites   Recreation 
Environmental 
Education 
10 
Soil and Water 
Conservation 
District 
(SWCD) 
Employee 
(Interviewee 
#43b) 
Federal District 
Conservationists and local 
Soil and Water 
Conservation District 
(SWCD) employees 
cooperate to decide which 
agricultural cost-share 
programs to pursue for 
each farm.  
ORG Voluntary, independent   
Federal & 
local govt   Agriculture   
11 
Two employees 
(joint 
interview),  
Chesapeake 
Bay Local 
Assistance 
Department 
(CBLAD), VA 
DCR 
(Interviewee 
#19a) 
CBLAD works with other 
state agencies (Virginia 
Dept of Transportation and 
Virginia Dept of Health) to 
ensure consistency between 
their regulations and 
Chesapeake Bay 
Preservation Act 
regulations. 
ORG-
POL 
Voluntary, 
independent   
State 
agencies 
(intra-state) 
  Water quality   
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 Source description Brief description of case 
HAR 
Type Forum Forum2 Groups Group2 Policy Area Policy Area2 
12 
Stormwater 
manager, 
Fairfax County 
(Interviewee 
#4) 
A stormwater manager 
coordinates with other 
County agencies (parks, 
schools, etc.) on 
implementing requirements 
of the County MS4 permit. 
Permit is county-wide, but 
most agencies do not 
recognize their 
involvement. 
ORG 
- 
POL 
Voluntary, 
independent 
Regulation / 
Law 
(unenforced) 
Local govt 
agencies 
(intra-
jurisdictional) 
  Stormwater   
13 
Watershed 
Planner, Fairfax 
County 
(Interviewee 
#54) 
Watershed planners 
coordinate with County 
Planning/Zoning 
Department on land 
development by reviewing 
major development 
proposals and making 
recommendations. 
ORG 
- 
POL 
Voluntary, 
independent   
Local govt 
agencies 
(intra-
jurisdictional) 
Land use and 
water quality 
Land 
development   
14 
Environmental 
Planner, Fairfax 
County 
(Interviewee 
#60) 
Planners for Tyson's corner 
re-development project 
involved several County 
agencies in the planning 
process (schools, fire, 
water, power, 
transportation, etc.) to 
ensure issues were 
addressed pre-emptively, 
ORG-
POL 
Voluntary, 
independent   
Local govt 
agencies 
(intra-
jurisdictional) 
  Land development   
15 
Environmental 
Manager for 
Virginia 
Department of 
Transportation 
(VDOT) – 
(Interviewee 
#36) 
VDOT matches up its six 
year plans with Fairfax 
County watershed plans. 
Prioritization of projects is 
based, in part, on whether 
VDOT projects match with 
watershed plan priorities.  
ORG 
- 
POL 
Voluntary, 
independent   
State and 
local govt 
Transportation 
and 
environment 
Stormwater   
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 Source description Brief description of case 
HAR 
Type Forum Forum2 Groups Group2 Policy Area Policy Area2 
16 
Bay Journal, 
Jan/Feb 1998, 
"Growing 
Respect for 
Grass: 
SAV Beds May 
Be Subject to 
Additional 
Protection" 
The Bay Program Blue 
Crab Fisheries 
Management Plan, signed 
by Bay State governors, 
calls on fisheries 
management agencies and 
environmental agencies 
involved with habitat 
protection to  coordinate on 
restoration provisions. 
ECO Facilitated by Plan 
Coordinating 
Org 
State 
agencies 
(intra-state) 
Managers of 
different 
species 
Fisheries   
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